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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION   1 
Two decades ago, deliberative democracy emerged as a normative theory from an ideal of 
democratic legitimacy (e.g., Bohman, 1998; Chambers, 2003; Habermas, 1996). At the core 
of deliberative democracy lies the premise of political justification via public reasoning 
among free and equal subjects (e.g., Cohen, 1996; Elster, 1998; Gutmann and Thompson, 
2004; Mansbridge et al., 2012). In contrast to a mere aggregation of fixed preferences through 
voting, deliberation offers a talk-centric model of democracy in which decision-making is 
preceded by communicative interaction between subjects, who are required to adapt their 
preferences in the face of new evidence and superior reasoning (e.g., Chambers, 2003; Elster, 
1997; Knight and Johnson, 1994). Building on an ideal notion of political discourse, 
deliberative democracy theory had to face considerable critique from opponents who 
questioned its applicability to real-world settings (e.g., Eliasoph, 1998; Hibbing and Theiss-
Morse, 2002; Posner, 2004). For a long time, however, the discussion remained rather 
theoretical and culminated in a stalemate between “a priori skepticism and untested idealism” 
(Bohman, 1998: 422). Empirical research was subsequently proposed as a way to move the 
debate forward (Bohman, 1998). As a result, the past decade has experienced a strong surge in 
empiricism, moving deliberative democracy from a normative theory to a stage of “working 
theory” (Chambers, 2003; see Delli Carpini, et al. 2004; Mutz, 2008; Thompson, 2008 for 
reviews). While instances of deliberation have been detected in the national (e.g., Bara et al., 
2007; Esterling, 2011; Mucciaroni and Quirk, 2006; Pedrini et al., 2013; Steiner et al., 2004; 
Weale et al., 2012) and supranational (e.g., Doerr, 2009; Holzinger, 2001; Naurin, 2010; 
Ulbert and Risse, 2005) political sphere, tremendous importance has been attributed to 
tracking deliberation in the public sphere (e.g., Smith, 2011). On the one hand, deliberation 
has been studied in real-world settings such as everyday talks (e.g., Conover et al., 2002; 
Conover and Searing, 2005; Price et al., 2002), town meetings (e.g., Bryan, 1999; 
Mansbridge, 1983; Mendelberg and Oleske, 2000; Rao and Sanyal, 2009), and online forums 
(e.g., Graham and Witschge, 2003; Janssen and Kies, 2005; Papacharissi, 2004). On the other 
hand, artificial settings of interaction have been created in order to monitor citizen 
deliberation, in what have been termed mini-publics, i.e. in “more perfect public spheres” 
(Fung, 2003: 338). By gathering a cross-section of the population and by incorporating certain 
procedural safeguards such as facilitators and rules for civil discussion, mini-publics attempt 
to provide a safe venue for deliberation that is free from “certain negative or distorting effects 
of the broader public  
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sphere” (Chambers, 2004: 400).1 The idea that mini-publics may render individuals’ opinions 
more informed and considered spread quickly and resulted in a global proliferation of various 
forms of mini-publics (e.g., Dryzek, 2009; Fishkin et al., 2010; Grönlund et al., 2010; Smith 
and Wales, 2000; Warren and Pearse, 2008). The exponential increase in democratic 
innovations resulted in a shift from deliberative democracy to democratic deliberation, 
translating the hopes of deliberative democrats from the broader public sphere to small-scaled, 
self-contained initiatives of artificial public deliberation  (Chambers, 2009; Mansbridge, 
2007).  
Among these artificial settings of public deliberation, the deliberative poll (DP) developed by 
James Fishkin (1995) is probably the most widely known mini-public and has been applied to 
a variety of national and transnational settings (e.g., Andersen and Hansen, 2007; Fishkin, 
2009; Fishkin et al., 2010; Luskin et al., 2002; Luskin et al., 2013).
2
 Jane Mansbridge (2010) 
recently praised DP as the gold standard among contemporary mini-publics. DP possesses 
many of the favorable features for successful deliberation (e.g., Fishkin and Luskin, 2005; 
Mansbridge, 2010). Most importantly, these include the gathering of a statistically 
representative sample, the provision of balanced information material, the possibility to 
question experts and politicians on various policy alternatives, and the presence of trained 
facilitators who should ensure that group discussions are balanced and civil. Deliberative polls 
are also meant to “insulate people from social pressure” by depriving participants from 
reaching a decision, a common statement, or any other kind of mutual agreement that could 
distort the process of uncoerced argumentation (Ackerman and Fishkin, 2002: 134; see also 
Sunstein, 2002).  
Positive evaluations have led to DP being viewed as the model for successful public 
deliberation. Compared to other mini-publics, DP usually scores highest on the input-oriented 
criteria of representation (e.g., Fung, 2003). When it comes to output-oriented criteria, 
evaluations show that participants often change their opinion, gain knowledge and report high 
levels of satisfaction with participating during the event (e.g., Andersen and Hansen, 2007; 
Fishkin et al., 2010; Luskin et al., 2002). Although insights on these input- and output-criteria 
have been rich, the process of deliberation in DP has largely remained unexamined (for an 
exception, see Siu, 2009). Despite the fact that the body of empirical research on deliberation 
is growing, attempts to systematically investigate what actually happens when people 
                                                          
1
 For a review on existing mini-publics, see Fung (2003), Goodin and Dryzek (2006), and Smith (2008, 2009). 
Fung’s definition of mini-public is somewhat broader in that it also includes self-selected settings or settings 
where deliberators have been elected by a special body.  
2
 See http://ccd.stanford.edu for more information on the conduct of various deliberative polls.  
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deliberate in mini-publics have, until recently, been scarce.
3
 Too often, conclusions are based 
on the notion of idealized actors who successfully deliberate in the absence of any distorting 
contextual effects. Or, as Ryfe (2005: 54) puts it: “Researchers have been less interested in 
deliberation itself than in measuring its effects”. Strikingly, just as deliberative theory initially 
cared little about empirical verification, empirical research in deliberation seemed to care little 
about theoretical falsification. This is a significant shortcoming, given that available insights 
from real-world deliberation and the psychological literature on group processes raise 
important doubts about the possibility of biased-free communication among ordinary citizens 
(e.g., Conover and Searing, 2005; Mansbridge, 1983; Mendelberg and Oleske, 2000; Sanders, 
1997; see Delli Carpini, et al. 2004; Lupia, 2002; Mendelberg, 2002; Mutz, 2008 for reviews 
on the psychological literature). Of course, drawing far-reaching implications from settings 
that lack supportive institutional underpinnings for successful deliberation may not be 
appropriate. Still, we should be sure that what is seen as the role model for citizen deliberation 
actually delivers what it promises. In response, various reservations have been aired that all 
share the same underlying question: “How are we supposed to know, if we don’t know?” 
(e.g., Azmanova, 2010; Lupia, 2002; Mutz, 2006; Price and Neijens, 1998; Sanders, 2010). 
How can we know that the favorable institutional setting was sufficient to establish a 
balanced, civil and considerate atmosphere for discussion, if we actually don’t know? And 
how can we be sure that post-deliberative opinions are the result of a careful reasoning 
process instead of the mere provision of additional information or, what would be worse, the 
consequence of manipulation?  
The aim of this thesis is to expose a recent deliberative poll to this critique. In doing so, the 
thesis attempts to provide a systematic and in-depth analysis of the deliberative process at 
hand. It seeks to advance a conception of deliberation that is strongly rooted in normative 
theory but at the same time accounts for practical limitations of real-world deliberation. 
Concretely, the thesis addresses the question of whether and to what extent the deliberative 
poll under examination lives up to the promises of deliberative theory, within these practical 
limitations. For an empirical example, the thesis examines a subsample of small group 
discussions in Europolis, a pan-European deliberative poll on third country migration and 
climate change that was held in May 2009 in Brussels (Fishkin, 2009).
4
 By including 
participants from all 27 EU-member states, Europolis provided an extensive attempt for cross-
                                                          
3
 Exceptions include e.g., Stromer-Galley (2007); Siu (2009); Himmelroos (2011); Steiner (2012); Pedrini et al. 
(2013). 
4
 See Chapter 2 for further information on Europolis and the selected groups.  
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cultural deliberation in a multilingual setting. Organized in chapters, the thesis consists of the 
three central pieces of work of my cumulative dissertation. These address the following issues 
of deliberative quality in Europolis: 
Chapter 2, a collaboration with André Bächtiger, Susumu Shikano, Simon Reber, and Samuel 
Rohr, investigates the deliberative abilities of ordinary citizens. Drawing from a 
philosophically grounded measure, an updated version of the Discourse Quality Index (DQI) 
(Bächtiger et al., 2010b; see Steenbergen et al., 2003), it explores to what extent ordinary 
European citizens are capable of meeting deliberative ideals and whether socio-economic, 
cultural, and psychological biases show up in the ability to deliberate. By incorporating a 
measure that tabs whether participants use personal narratives or experiences to back their 
claims, the updated DQI accounts for recent developments in deliberative theory that call for 
expanding the admissible forms of deliberative communication (Bächtiger et al., 2010a). The 
chapter also pursues a strongly methodological perspective and applies a novel 
conceptualization of deliberative quality. Applying a Bayesian item response analysis allows 
us to explore how well citizens are able to achieve the various standards of deliberative 
quality (justification rationality, common good orientation, empathy, respect, story-telling and 
questioning). Moreover, it allows for an assessment of whether the various standards actually 
map an underlying construct of deliberative quality by simultaneously holding the realistic 
assumption that some standards of deliberative quality may be more difficult to achieve than 
others. The major finding is that while true deliberators scoring high on all deliberative 
components exist in the realm of citizen deliberation, deliberative skills are unequally 
distributed. Working-class participants from Central Eastern and, to a lesser degree, from 
Southern Europe displayed a lower deliberative competence than other participants. The 
chapter also makes a first attempt to explore whether deliberative abilities are linked to the 
propensity to change opinions. Findings reveal that both the most and the least skilled 
deliberators change their opinions to a similar degree.  
With a focus on equality, Chapter 3 is dedicated to another crucial standard of deliberation. 
The chapter takes up the claim of difference democrats who argue that informal hurdles to 
participation can persist even after individuals gain formal access to the political arena (e.g., 
Fraser, 1992; Sanders, 1997; Young, 2002). I argue for an extended approach to deliberative 
inclusiveness that goes beyond evaluating the representativeness of the participant sample. 
Specifically, I assess whether participants contributed in roughly equal measures to the 
discussion and whether their discussion partners considered their contributions on equal 
merits. In doing so, the chapter adds to the small but growing literature on deliberation that 
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expresses reservations about taking the willingness to engage with others claims for granted 
(e.g., Burkhalter et al., 2002; Dobson, 2010, 2012; Pedrini et al., 2013; Stromer-Galley, 
2007). In order to account for the intrinsically relational aspect of interpersonal 
communication, measures of social network analysis are introduced as possible tools to 
evaluate the inclusiveness of deliberative encounters (see e.g., Cinalli and O’Flynn, 2013; 
Graham and Witschge, 2003). Findings indicate that, despite the presence of trained 
facilitators, some traditionally disadvantaged groups contribute significantly less to the 
discussion in terms of speaking time. However, concerns are somewhat reduced in relation to 
consideration. In addition, equality seems to be particularly at risk in groups that display a 
considerable degree of national heterogeneity. The latter finding strongly encourages further 
investigation of contextual determinants for successful deliberation.  
At the core of deliberative polling is the question of whether participants change their minds 
after deliberation. From a normative point of view, post-deliberative opinions should be 
linked to the quality of arguments presented during discussion. Yet, there is a dearth of 
research testing this claim. The 4th and last chapter of my thesis makes a first attempt to 
overcome this deficiency (co-authored with André Bächtiger, Irena Fiket, Marco Steenbergen, 
and Jürg Steiner). Specifically, we explore whether statements backed by reasons affect 
opinions, which we term deliberative persuasion. We contrast deliberative persuasion to non-
deliberative persuasion, whereby we explore whether the most frequently repeated rather than 
the most justified position influences opinions. We focus on two crucial questions that were 
discussed in Europolis small group discussions on immigration: the regularization of irregular 
immigrants and the European involvement in immigration affairs. We find some evidence 
that, in the context of regularization of irregular immigrants, deliberative persuasion took 
place. Yet this result does not reflect a general trend: in the context of European involvement 
in immigration affairs, post-deliberative opinions are driven by the most frequently repeated 
position rather than by argumentative rationality. 
Too often, outcomes of mini-publics have not been sufficiently embedded in the larger 
deliberative system (e.g., Chambers, 2009; Goodin and Dryzek, 2006; Olsen and Trenz, 2013; 
Parkinson, 2006b, 2006c; but see Fishkin and Luskin, 2006; Fishkin et al., 2010). Neither 
does the thesis aspire to do so. However, I believe that one potential pathway to overcome this 
‘scaling up’ problem is an approach that relies on scientific discoveries. A systematic 
evaluation of the deliberative process in various mini-public designs may allow for the 
determination of the most favorable conditions for successful deliberation. In the long run, 
such an approach may increase credibility and trust in existing (and improved) mini-public 
6   INTRODUCTION 
designs and their consequences. In the end, this may allow mini-publics to grow out of their 
experimental state and become a viable complement to existing participatory processes in 
modern democracies. 
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Chapter 2 
2 DELIBERATIVE ABILITIES OF ORDINARY 
CITIZENS* 
 
 
 
Marlène Gerber, André Bächtiger, Susumu Shikano, Simon Reber, Samuel Rohr 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* We would like to thank John Dryzek for his encouragement and support. We are also grateful to the 
participants of the workshop “Frontiers of Deliberation” at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops in 
St. Gallen 2011. Finally, we would like to thank Karolina Kojder for her careful work in transcribing 
and translating the Polish group discussions. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Can ordinary citizens deliberate together at high quality levels? By high quality deliberation, 
we mean that participants in deliberation present reasons for their positions, make reference to 
the common good, are respectful, empathetic, and inquisitive (see Mansbridge et al., 2010). 
For James Fishkin, one of the deliberative pioneers, the lessons from the manifold experiences 
with citizen deliberation worldwide are clear: everybody can deliberate (e.g., Ackermann and 
Fishkin, 2002; Fishkin and Luskin, 2005). Fishkin is not the only one claiming that ordinary 
citizens can be turned into good deliberators. The thrust behind the deliberative movement is 
that Schumpeterian conceptions of the minimalist democratic citizen are woefully wrong and 
that with a little helping hand, ordinary citizens can approach philosophical ideals of 
deliberation, even in a transnational context (see, e.g., Dryzek, 2010). Not surprisingly, 
several proposals for a deliberative involvement of citizens in global affairs have been 
forwarded in recent years, claiming that deliberating citizens may do a better job than elected 
politicians in finding solutions and common ground in frequently deadlocked global politics 
(Dryzek et al., 2011; Goodin and Ratner, 2011). 
But the deliberative gospel has not convinced everyone. Since the advent of deliberative 
theories in the 1990s, deliberation has met with sustained criticism. Critiques have revolved 
around deliberation’s inconsistency with psychological theories and experiences of human 
action (e.g., Mutz, 2008; Posner, 2003). Indeed, when deliberative advocates refer to 
deliberation’s success in practice, the reaction of many empirical political scientists is 
negative. As Mutz (2008: 533) writes: “As an empirical theory, deliberative theory has been 
widely criticized for making assumptions that seem to fly in the face of what scholars already 
know about human behavior”. Critics of deliberation question the idealized conjectures of the 
“deliberative citizen” possessing sophisticated reasoning skills while being simultaneously 
respectful, reflective, inquisitive and open-minded. Drawing from psychological experiments 
and jury deliberations critics also claim that deliberative abilities are strongly biased along 
socio-economic, cultural, and psychological factors (see Devine et al., 2001; Krupnikov et al., 
2007; Mendelberg, 2002). If such biases in deliberative ability exist - and if they also transfer 
to the outcomes of deliberation - then the deliberative ideal of an egalitarian and 
unconstrained exchange of arguments is violated.  
So far, however, a great deal of this controversy is surprisingly theoretical rather than based 
on systematic empirical facts. On the one hand, many critics tend to overlook that modern-day 
10   DELIBERATIVE ABILITIES 
citizen deliberation is a highly structured affair. Most citizen deliberations are conducted 
under supportive institutional conditions, i.e., citizens get balanced information material, 
experts answer citizens’ questions, and facilitators ensure that small group discussions are on-
topic and focused on all arguments. Thus, drawing far-reaching implications from 
psychological experiments and jury deliberations that lack such supportive institutional 
underpinnings may not be appropriate. On the other hand, deliberationists tend to assume that 
reasoned discourse will quasi-automatically follow when conditions for deliberation are good. 
But they have downplayed the possibility that even under optimal conditions, deliberation 
may not occur as expected by theory. Not only may some citizens be overtaxed in the 
deliberative process, citizen “deliberation” may also be just talk, absent any philosophical 
underpinnings. In the past decade, several scholars have tried to address the objections against 
deliberation’s viability via empirical research. This empirical defense, however, is mostly 
concerned with the input dimension, i.e., the inclusiveness of the deliberative process, and the 
output dimension, i.e., the question whether deliberation leads to biased opinion and 
knowledge changes (e.g., Barabas, 2004; Conover et al., 2002; Cook et al., 2007; Luskin et 
al., 2002; Sturgis, 2003). The actual process of deliberation, however, remains understudied 
(see Ryfe, 2005). Yet, much punch behind deliberative theory is that preferences are 
constructed during the deliberative process (Parkinson, 2012), requiring that we analyze 
deliberative abilities and potential biases in that process as well. While recent studies have 
included measures of process quality, this is mostly done via survey-based self-reports of 
participants (e.g., Andersen and Hansen, 2007). But this approach is deficient as well: not 
only may self-reports contain elements of social desirability; they may also insufficiently 
capture the philosophical ramifications of the deliberative model. In sum, both critics and 
advocates of deliberation have barely made the effort of analyzing what citizens actually do 
when they are supposed to deliberate (among the few exceptions are Dutwin, 2003; 
Himmelroos, 2011; Pedrini, 2013; Schneiderhan and Kahn, 2008; Siu, 2009). 
Our article sets out to change this unhappy state of affairs. We focus on actual deliberative 
behavior of citizens rather than on potentially biased survey-based evaluation. Moreover, we 
study deliberative behavior in the context of supportive institutional conditions, namely 
deliberative polling (Fishkin and Luskin, 2005). Concretely, we focus on Europolis, a pan-
European deliberative poll on third country migration and climate change, which was carried 
out in Brussels in late May 2009. We explore to what extent ordinary European citizens were 
able to meet deliberative ideals and whether socio-economic, cultural, and psychological 
biases showed up in the ability to deliberate. To measure deliberative quality, we employ an 
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updated version of the Discourse Quality Index (Steenbergen et al., 2003) which employs a 
broad understanding of deliberative quality and allows for a quantitative content analysis of 
recorded discussions. In order to determine what counts as “high” and “low” deliberative 
quality, we draw from a classic and Habermasian-inspired understanding of deliberative 
quality (which we adapt to the constraints of citizen deliberation, however). The aggregation 
of the different DQI components is accomplished via Bayesian Item Response Analysis. In 
doing so, we explore how well citizens are able to achieve the various standards of 
deliberative quality (justification rationality, common good orientation, or respect), while 
simultaneously making the realistic assumption that some components of deliberative quality 
may be more difficult to achieve than others. By mapping all participants as ideal points on 
latent dimensions of deliberative quality, item response analysis enables us to check whether 
deliberative ability is biased along socio-economic, cultural, and psychological factors. 
Finally, we put the findings of our bias analysis in perspective by relating our measure of 
deliberative ability to another crucial measure of deliberative quality (and bias), namely 
participation equality, and by considering some consequences of deliberative ability, namely 
whether biases in deliberative ability also translate into differential opinion shifts. 
By examining actual deliberative behavior of citizens in a supportive environment for fruitful 
deliberation, and by combining this with advances in measuring deliberation, we hope to 
move the controversy between advocates and critics of deliberation to a new level of 
sophistication. Notice that when we speak of deliberative ability we do not see this as a fixed 
and unchangeable trait, but as a communicative repertoire that some people may be better at 
than others but that every individual can eventually cultivate and develop. 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2.2 gives more background on 
the controversy between critics and advocates of deliberation and lays some theoretical 
groundwork. Section 2.3 is concerned with the measurement of deliberation: it presents an 
updated version of the Discourse Quality Index, defines cut levels for high quality 
deliberation, and introduces the aggregation method, Bayesian Item Response Analysis. 
Section 2.4 gives some background of the object of our study, the pan-European deliberative 
poll Europolis, and describes the data. Section 2.5 presents the empirical findings. Section 2.6 
puts our findings in perspective and discusses the implications of our findings for a 
deliberative involvement of citizens in transnational and global affairs and the design of 
citizen deliberations. Section 2.7 concludes.  
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2.2 Deliberative Abilities: A Theoretical Overview 
For quite some time, many deliberative theorists have presented a view of the deliberative 
citizen that is in line with the view of the democratic citizen offered by John Rawls (1993). As 
Rosenberg (2005: 213) holds: “rather than offering an empirical psychology of individual 
citizenship, Rawls stipulated what democratic theory requires”. In a Rawlsian view, citizens 
must have the basic cognitive capacity to argue with reasons, be logical, and reflect on their 
own presuppositions (Rosenberg, 2005: 213–214). By contrast, many psychologists and 
skeptics of deliberation have argued that only a small minority of individuals possesses a level 
of deliberative ability as required by deliberative theory and that these abilities are also biased 
along socio-economic and other factors (e.g., Mendelberg, 2002; Rosenberg, 2005). As 
Sanders (1997: 348) has succinctly put it: “some citizens are better than others at articulating 
their arguments in rational, reasonable terms”. Since a key goal of deliberation is to include 
‘all affected’ and empower the disenfranchised, a tension between inclusion and deliberative 
ability – or what Young (2002: 38) aptly calls “articulateness” - may arise, turning 
deliberation into a potentially harmful intervention that further marginalizes already 
disenfranchised groups. 
Even the most ardent deliberative theorists now acknowledge that citizens’ deliberative 
abilities may vary considerably. Nonetheless, deliberationists still think that under favorable 
institutional conditions, a considerable number of citizens can approach deliberative ideals. In 
the following, we discuss the psychological foundations of a genuine deliberator and then turn 
to socio-economic, cultural, and psychological biases in deliberation.  
2.2.1 Foundations of the Genuine Deliberator 
From a philosophical perspective, an ideal deliberator must fulfill demanding behavioral 
obligations: she must be reasoned, common-good oriented, inquisitive, reflective, respectful, 
empathetic, and open to the better argument (see, e.g., Mansbridge et al., 2010). As mentioned 
before, a vast number of cognitive research in psychology suggests that individuals are not 
fully logical and therefore not likely to be fully rational in the manner specified by 
deliberative theory (see, e.g., Krupnikow et al., 2007; Reykowski, 2006; Rosenberg, 2005). 
Moreover, drawing from personality psychology (see, e.g., McCrae and Costa, 1987) it is not 
clear whether a genuine deliberator as envisioned by philosophers can exist in reality 
(Jennstal, 2012: 17). According to Jennstal (2012), an ideal deliberator must score high on at 
least three personality traits, namely extraversion, agreeableness, and openness. Hereby, 
reason-giving is a skill that primarily falls under the rubric of extraversion. Reflexivity, 
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respect, empathy, and inquisitiveness, in turn, require openness and/or agreeableness. From a 
personality trait perspective, a genuine deliberator represents a rare constellation of 
personality traits (Jennstal, 2012: 18). For instance, being extraverted does not necessarily 
mean that one also scores high on agreeableness and open-mindedness. Quite to the contrary, 
people who can reason well may not be very respectful and empathetic, even though complex 
thinking styles may coincide with inquisitiveness and openness (see Zhang and Huang, 2001). 
In other words, personality psychology questions the possibility of a “unitary” deliberator 
scoring high on all quality standards of deliberation. Unfortunately, the Europolis 
questionnaire does not include personality questions, thus we cannot directly link personality 
traits to deliberative behavior. But we can indirectly explore whether genuine deliberators 
exist, by checking whether the different components of deliberative quality – justification 
rationality, respect, empathy, and inquisitiveness – form a compound and coherent 
phenomenon at the level of deliberating citizens. Assume that a genuine deliberator scoring 
high on all deliberative standards indeed exists. Yet, we may still be confronted with the fact 
that this only represents a tiny minority of individuals who are also biased in socio-economic 
and other regards (see Rosenberg, 2005: 221). This is the topic of the next subsection. 
2.2.2 Biases in Deliberation 
There are myriads of potential biases in the ability to deliberate. In this article, we concentrate 
on a number of socio-economic, cultural, and psychological biases that we can capture on the 
basis of the Europolis questionnaire.  
Socio-economic biases in deliberation  
Difference democrats and feminists have claimed that certain social groups are disadvantaged 
in deliberation, namely women, blacks, poor, and less-educated people (Sanders, 1997; 
Young, 2002). The argument is that rational argumentation including logical deduction and 
general principles is frequently associated with men and socially privileged groups, while 
more tentative, figurative, and emotional forms of expression are often associated with 
women, socially less privileged groups, and cultural minorities (Young, 2002: 38–40). 
Regarding gender, some scholars have argued that women have higher capacities for respect 
and empathy and thus may even be the better deliberators than men (Mansbridge, 1996a: 123; 
Norris, 1996: 91). Regarding class, sociological research has argued that there may be class-
specific ways of speaking and arguing. According to Bernstein (1971–1990), working-class 
people tend to adopt a restricted code of speech by using rather simple, repetitive and limited 
vocabulary that stands in contrast to the more accurate and elaborate code of speech 
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commonly employed by the middle-class. Class differences in the ability of speaking and 
arguing are closely linked to differences in education. Working-class people are embedded in 
an oral culture and thus lack ‘literacy’ writ large. By contrast, higher social classes and well-
educated people are more likely to have deliberative skills. Education increases verbal 
cognitive proficiency, leads to improved comprehension of politics and governance and 
enhances tolerance towards opposing viewpoints (Nie et al., 1996). What is more, well-
educated individuals have access to occupations where they can further develop their 
reasoning and public speaking skills and this situation plays its part in widening the gap in 
deliberative skills over time (see Mendelberg, 2002). Finally, age can be seen as a proxy for 
experience with political affairs (see Spörndli, 2004). Experience may increase a person’s 
ability for self-reflection and responsiveness to others (Rosenberg, 2007).  
Cultural biases in deliberation  
Theorists of multiculturalism worry that classic deliberative ideals – such a rational 
argumentation - represent a culturally and historically specific format of communication (see, 
e.g., Young, 2002). In our sample of European citizens, this mainly concerns cultural dividing 
lines between Southern, Central Eastern, and Western Europeans. With regard to Southern 
Europeans, Gambetta (1998) has made a highly controversial argument, namely that 
“indexical” or “Claro!” cultures – an alleged feature of Southern European culture - are 
“antithetic to turn taking, mutual respect, sincerity, truthfulness and everything that 
contributes to successful deliberation” (Sass, 2006: 2). With regard to Central Eastern 
Europeans (CEE), several studies indicate that citizens from CEE countries have different 
democratic values than citizens from Western European countries: they are less engaged in 
civic affairs and politics and also have less trust in others (Fuchs and Klingemann, 2002; Karp 
and Banducci, 2007). This cultural dividing line may also transfer to different deliberative 
behavior, with the expectation that Central Eastern Europeans might have lower deliberative 
performance than Western Europeans. From an empirical vantage, several researchers have 
identified traces of cultural differences in deliberative behavior, finding that some societal 
cultures are less compatible with deliberative ideals (e.g. Duchesne and Haegel, 2007; Min, 
2009). Yet alleged cultural differences may sometimes merely reflect different experiences 
with deliberative practices. Focusing on elite deliberation in working groups of the European 
Council of Ministers, Naurin (2010) finds that new member states from CEE displayed lower 
levels of deliberative quality than old member states. According to Naurin (2010: 47), this has 
to do with experience rather than culture, since old member states are “more accustomed at 
how to ‘play the Brussels game’”.  
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Psychological biases in deliberation  
Given the limitations of the Europolis questionnaires, our study focuses on motivation, 
cognitive sophistication, and group dynamics. First, motivation is a crucial factor for 
deliberative performance (e.g., Neblo et al., 2010). High motivation and high involvement is 
conducive to “central reasoning”, leading to a willingness to diligently consider information 
and arguments; by contrast, low motivation and low involvement is conducive to “peripheral 
reasoning” and the reliance on information shortcuts (Petty et al., 1983; see also Petty and 
Cacioppo, 1984). There is, however, some controversy whether high or low involvement 
increases or decreases deliberative quality. Fung (2003) acknowledges that one possibility is 
that individuals with low stakes in a discussion (but a basic motivation to engage with the 
topic under discussion) will be the better deliberators, since low stakes are conducive to 
dispassionate attitudes and open-mindedness. This view is in line with classic deliberative 
theory, emphasizing calm and dispassionate reasoning. But Fung (2003) rather supports the 
opposite view: participants with high stakes may “invest more of their psychic energy and 
resources into the process and so make it more thorough and creative” (p. 345). We proxy 
motivation with political interest and salience.
5
 While political interest touches upon a more 
basic motivation to engage in discussion, salience is closely related to involvement and the 
personal relevance of the issue under discussion. Second, participants with a higher level of 
prior knowledge on the issue at hand may have a broader argumentative repertoire which may 
positively influence their deliberative behavior (Cappella et al., 2002; see also Hansen, 2010). 
Third, group composition and resulting dynamics might also play a role (see, e.g., Karpowitz 
et al., 2012). Despite the fact that deliberative polls are construed in a way to yield a uniform 
treatment onto participants, group composition and facilitation style might still vary in 
practice. In our study, we will take advantage of such variation and explore the effects of 
more and less heterogeneous groups as well as less vs. more dominant facilitation styles on 
deliberative quality. We expect that more heterogeneous groups have a higher quality of 
deliberation. Following epistemic democrats, a higher diversity of viewpoints should lead to a 
more dedicated exchange of views (see, e.g., Mercier and Landemore, 2012). Facilitation, in 
turn, is an understudied and under-theorized topic (see Moore, 2012). According to 
Mansbridge et al. (2006: 30–32), the primary goal of facilitation should be non-domination. 
Indeed, a dominant facilitator may free participants from engaging in discussion, leading to 
                                                          
5
 This is not an exclusive account of motivation. Other factors such as conflict avoidance or the need for 
cognition are also important antecedents of motivation (e.g, Neblo et al., 2010). Yet the Europolis questionnaire 
did not include measures that encompass these psychological constructs. At this point, we restrict the theoretical 
discussion to the available measures to capture motivation. 
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what Ryfe (2006: 88) has called “scattershot discussions” where participants tend to speak 
shorter and are stronger oriented towards the facilitator than towards other participants.  
2.3 Measuring Deliberative Quality 
While there have been some systematic and in-depth explorations of the deliberative process 
in legislatures (see, e.g., Esterling, 2011; Mucciaroni and Quirk, 2006; Steiner et al., 2004), 
there is a dearth of similar research in the context of citizen deliberation (for exceptions, see 
Dutwin, 2003; Schneiderhan and Khan, 2008; Siu, 2009). In recent years, however, it is 
becoming increasingly standard to ask participants of citizen deliberation how they evaluate 
the quality of the deliberative process (see Andersen and Hansen, 2007; Grönlund et al., 2010; 
Ratner, 2008; Sanders, 2012). In general, evaluations of such deliberative events tend to be 
positive with participants rating the quality of deliberation as high. Focusing on the Danish 
poll on the Euro, Andersen and Hansen (2007: 542) find a “high degree of quality of 
procedure”: participants reported that the discussion was focused on general principles and 
the common good, even though self-interest was not absent in the discussions. We 
acknowledge that self-evaluation is an important pathway to evaluate the quality of the 
deliberative process (see Bevir and Ansari, 2012; Neblo, 2007b). As King (2009: 6) argues, 
Habermasian discourse ethics “is interested in the intersubjective achievement of 
understanding and process of decision-making”. According to King (2009: 6), a proper 
evaluation of deliberative quality must assess “how this is perceived by other participants – 
not merely the subjective speculations of outside observers”. Yet, self-evaluation of 
deliberative quality can suffer from serious methodological flaws: first, self-evaluations may 
not be reliable, particularly given that participants know what the practitioners want to hear 
(Muhlberger, 2007). Second, the participant perspective may also be insufficient from a 
philosophical perspective. Participants may think that the quality of reasoning was good, 
whereas philosophers would judge the respective reasoning as insufficient by their own 
theoretical standards. Since classic deliberation’s theoretical focus is on the realization of 
philosophical ideals, we think that it is imperative to complement the participants’ perspective 
with an external and philosophically grounded evaluation analysis of deliberative quality. A 
pioneering effort in this regard has been made by Siu (2009). Drawing from the Discourse 
Quality Index (DQI), Siu analyzed the transcripts of several online and face-to-face 
deliberative polls in the United States. Yet, Siu’s analysis has several limitations: it mainly 
focuses on justification rationality, while neglecting other deliberative elements such as 
respect or common good orientation. Siu also omitted any statement about the abilities of 
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citizens to reach deliberative standards in the discussions she analyzed. The goal of this article 
is to provide a more comprehensive assessment of deliberative quality. 
2.3.1 Discourse Quality Index 2 
In this study, we will assess deliberative quality on the basis of the Discourse Quality Index 
(DQI; Steenbergen et al., 2003). The DQI allows for a quantitative content analysis at the 
level of individual speeches of recorded discussions, measuring the quality of deliberation 
with six indicators that are anchored in Habermasian discourse ethics. The DQI captures 
deliberation via justification rationality, common good orientation, respect toward groups, 
demands and counterarguments, and constructive politics. Not only has the DQI met with 
considerable support from deliberative theorists (Habermas, 2005; Thompson, 2008), it is also 
the most encompassing and most widely used measure of deliberation (see, e.g., Bächtiger, 
2005; Caluwaerts, 2012; Lord and Tamvaki, 2013; Steiner, 2012).  
However, the original DQI has been developed for the analysis of parliamentary debates and 
is strongly rooted in a classic and Habermasian-inspired understanding of deliberation. This 
dual focus on the political sphere and on classic and Habermasian-inspired deliberation raises 
questions of how well the DQI can be applied to citizen deliberation. Yet, we do not see any 
need to abandon the classic standards. Rather,  “standards must be loosened to accommodate 
the more informal character of the nongovernmental parts of the deliberative system, but in 
this loosening, they do not lose their character” (Mansbridge, 1999: 213). As our empirical 
analysis will demonstrate below, fears that the DQI sets overly demanding standards that no 
citizen deliberator can achieve are largely unsubstantiated. We shall make some adaptations in 
the evaluation procedure to take into account the constraints of citizen deliberation: we do not 
expect that citizen deliberators achieve the (demanding) standards of classic and 
Habermasian-inspired deliberation all the time or on average, but only once during an entire 
discussion (see below). By the same token, the DQI might also profit from being enriched 
with alternative forms of communication. Feminists and difference democrats have argued 
that rational discourse may put overly demanding requirements on ordinary citizens. Many 
deliberationists nowadays consider “alternative” communication modes such as story-telling 
or testimony as valid and even desirable deliberative practices for people with marginalized 
points of view (e.g., Sanders, 1997; Young, 2002; see Polletta and Lee, 2006). We think that 
such developments in deliberative theory and practice must be reflected in an evaluation of 
citizens’ deliberative capacities as well and shall thus add one element of expanded notions of 
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deliberation, namely “story-telling”. In the following, we briefly describe the various 
components of the updated Discourse Quality Index (DQI 2).  
(1) Justification rationality: In classic deliberation, high justification rationality is a key 
criterion for high deliberative quality. Since the “ideal speech situation” itself has no content, 
one cannot apply external standards to what constitutes a good reason. Hence, this standard 
focuses only on the syntactic structure of argument and judges to what extent a speaker gives 
complete justifications and thus makes his speech accessible to rational critique. It 
distinguishes between five levels of justification rationality: (0) no justification; (1) inferior 
justification where the linkage between reasons and conclusion is tenuous (this code also 
applies if a conclusion is merely supported with illustrations); (2) qualified justification where 
one complete justification is offered and a linkage between reasons and conclusion is made; 
(3) sophisticated justifications where a problem is examined from different viewpoints or in-
depth.  
(2) Common good orientation. In the eyes of many deliberative democrats, good reasons 
should entail a common good orientation. The original DQI measures whether arguments are 
cast in terms of narrow group or constituency interests, whether there is neutral reference or 
mixed reference (i.e., reference to both narrow group interest and common good), or whether 
there is a reference to the common good. With regard to the common good, the original DQI 
focuses both on the common good stated in utilitarian terms, i.e., as the best solution for the 
greatest number of people and the common good expressed through the difference principle, 
i.e., the common good is served when the least advantaged in a society are helped (Rawls, 
1971). In the context of a transnational discussion such as Europolis, the categories need to be 
refined, however. We distinguish among references to country interests (1), references to two 
sorts of interests, country and European interests (1.5), European Union (2) and world 
community interests (3), and the absence of such references (0). 
(3) Respect and interactivity. Another key component of deliberative quality is respect. 
Macedo (1999: 10) regards the recognition of the “merit in [the] opponents’ claims” as being 
one of the principal purposes of deliberation. The original DQI measures respect with three 
dimensions: respect toward groups, demands, and counterarguments. This three-pronged 
conceptualization of respect has met with some difficulties in the practice of coding. For 
instance, the distinction between respect toward demands and respect toward 
counterarguments is not always so clear. ‘Economies of speech’ may lead actors to focus on 
either demands or counterarguments. In the context of citizen deliberation, we simplify the 
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task by focusing merely on respect toward other participants’ arguments. Classic deliberative 
theory is about arguments rather than demands and claims (which belong more to the realm of 
bargaining). By focusing on respect toward other participants’ arguments, we also link respect 
to interactivity, a hitherto neglected aspect in the empirical measurement of deliberation. 
Interactivity means that people respond to what others have said (see Goodin, 2000: 91). 
Specifically, we measure whether speakers include other participants’ arguments but degrade 
them (0), whether speakers ignore other participants’ arguments (1), whether they include 
other arguments in a neutral fashion (2), and whether they value other participants’ arguments 
(3). In addition, we also focus on respect toward groups, which is a reflection of Habermas’ 
(1991: 73) emphasis on empathy and solidarity. Respect toward groups implies that 
participants, either implicitly or explicitly, acknowledge the needs and rights of different 
social groups. The DQI captures whether a speaker degrades other groups (0), neither 
degrades nor acknowledges them (1), whether she is neutral (2) or whether she shows explicit 
respect toward them (3). In the context of the Europolis discussions on immigration, respect 
toward groups concerned third country migrants.  
(5) Questioning: Deliberative democrats also emphasize the importance of inquisitiveness 
(see Cohen, 1989). The original DQI has not considered inquisitiveness as an essential aspect 
of an interactive deliberative process. We rectify this deficiency, whereby we operationalize 
inquisitiveness via questioning. Questioning has an informational and a critical function (see 
Ikuenobe, 2001: 334), even though the two frequently complement each other. We code 
whether a speech contains an informational or critical question (coded as 1) or not (coded as 
0). 
 (6) “Story-telling”: As mentioned before, difference democrats and feminists have stressed 
the need to admit wider forms of communication – such as story-telling, testimony, or 
rhetoric. According to Polletta und Lee (2006), story-telling is the most important component 
of alternative forms of communication. In order to capture story-telling empirically, we 
measure whether participants use personal narratives or experiences (see Stromer-Galley, 
2007). 
For the construction of our measure, we leave three components of deliberative quality aside: 
participation equality, constructive politics, and truthfulness (or, sincerity). First, even though 
participation equality is a crucial deliberative standard, it does not really capture the formal 
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quality of arguments (see Estlund, 2000).
6
 In addition, interpersonal deliberation requires a 
conception of equality as “partner in dialogue” (Warren, 2001: 81). In other words, whether 
individuals are able to participate at equal rates does not exclusively depend on their 
deliberative abilities but as well on others’ willingness to consider their contributions on equal 
merits. Nonetheless, we will make a first attempt and relate our measure of quality to 
measures of participation equality, namely the frequency and length of speaking (see section 
2.6). However, for a full account on participation equality in Europolis, see Chapter 3. 
Second, since deliberative opinion polls do not entail decision-making at the end, we expect 
that constructive politics, i.e. the pursuit of a rationally motivated consensus, will only play a 
negligible role in such discussions. For this reason, we have excluded this component from 
the analysis. Finally, Habermasian deliberation would also require truthfulness or sincerity, 
which is the absence of deception in expressing intentions. However, to judge whether a 
speech act is truthful is to make a judgment about a person’s true versus stated preferences. 
This is exceedingly difficult, since true preferences are not directly observable. The 
speculative nature of such a judgment is bound to introduce large amounts of (possibly 
systematic) measurement error. Moreover, in the context of deliberative polls where 
participants do not make consequential decisions the truthfulness problématique is 
considerably reduced. Therefore, we exclude the truthfulness criterion from our analysis as 
well.  
2.3.2 Setting Thresholds for High and Low Deliberative Quality 
Recent years have witnessed an increasing demand for setting one or more “threshold” or 
“cut” values for deliberation (see Black et al., 2010). Regarding the DQI, Drzyek (2007: 244) 
has noted: “in applying the discourse quality index, it is hard to say whether the deliberation 
in any of the cases analyzed is actually good enough by any theoretical standards. The index 
is just a comparative measure”. In this article, we address this deficit and define thresholds for 
the various DQI indicators at the level of individuals. Although this will put us in a position to 
judge whether individuals were able to reach high standards of deliberative quality, we cannot 
infer whether the discussion as such displayed a sufficient level of deliberative quality.7 
                                                          
6
 The original DQI captures equal participation by asking whether speakers were able to utter their claims freely 
or whether they were interrupted by other discussants (Steenbergen et al., 2003). Although this might be a 
suitable measure to capture participation equality in the realm of legislatures, it does not work in (simultaneously 
translated) deliberative polls where interrupting another participant is technically impossible. 
7
 See also Appendix C for summary statistics on the overall discourse quality. 
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The threshold level problem is intertwined with a level of analysis problem. To date, the 
quality of deliberation was only checked at the level of individual speeches. To achieve an 
overall maximum score, every speaker would not only have to extensively justify her 
demands and arguments in every single speech, she would also have to be simultaneously 
oriented toward the common good and be respectful at all times. Even staunch advocates of 
deliberation might agree that this is a conceptual impossibility, ignoring ‘economies of 
speech’ and the fact that in good conversations, arguments are not repeated all the time. 
Moreover, it would be overly demanding to expect that ordinary citizens constantly reach the 
various deliberative standards during discussion. Therefore, we apply a holistic approach 
which analyzes the maximum deliberative performance of a speaker in an entire discussion. 
In other words, we do not expect that citizens live up to classic deliberative standards all the 
time or on average, but only that they achieve the various quality standards at least once in 
the discussion. 
To identify high and low quality standards for the DQI indicators, we draw from a classic and 
Habermasian-inspired conception of (maximum) deliberative quality. With regard to classic 
deliberation, there is broad agreement in the literature that this type of communication entails 
complex reasoning and is geared towards finding common understanding and common values 
(see Bächtiger et al., 2010a; Mansbridge et al., 2010). Translated to the DQI indicators, 
classic deliberation means that participants offer sophisticated rationales, refer to the 
common good, show explicit respect toward other participants’ arguments as well as to other 
groups, as well as question what others have claimed. Concretely, all DQI indicators are 
dichotomized in accordance with these cut levels. Coding examples and the dichotomization 
procedure are detailed in Appendix A. Moreover, the expectation in classic deliberation is that 
the different quality standards occur simultaneously, i.e., good deliberators should ideally 
comply with all quality standards. There is also equivalence among the different standards, 
i.e., no priority or differential weight is given to specific indicators of deliberative quality. 
The rationale behind simultaneity and equivalence is the following: if a speaker only gives 
reasons but is never respectful (or, even does this in a disrespectful way) then this would be 
indicative of a rhetorical mode of communication rather than reflexive rational discourse. Or, 
if a speaker is only respectful but is not able to provide complex reasons for his position, then 
this might be a sign of deference rather than autonomous reflection. Finally, it is an open 
question whether classic deliberation can also involve story-telling so that positions and 
arguments are conveyed in a comprehensible fashion. As Neblo (2007b) convincingly argues, 
there is an opening in Habermasian theory towards alternative forms of communication if the 
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latter are necessary to convey a specific message or to equalize differences in cognitive 
abilities. The inclusion of story-telling in a measure of classic deliberation can give rise to two 
scenarios: if story-telling is aligned with the other components of classic deliberative quality, 
then it is a sort of a “rhetorical” device that higher skilled deliberators employ as well in order 
to convey their messages in a comprehensible fashion. By contrast, if story-telling is not 
aligned with the other components of classic deliberative quality, then it might represent a 
distinct form of expression that is primarily used by lower skilled deliberators or by specific 
social and cultural groups (as it was originally imagined by feminist critics of deliberation; 
see Sanders, 1997; Young, 2002). 
2.3.3 Item Response Analysis 
In order to identify deliberative quality empirically, we first check whether citizens meet the 
pre-defined standards of classic and Habermasian-inspired deliberation and whether the 
different standards actually form a compound phenomenon. Concretely, we explore whether 
the different indicators of the DQI represent a reflection of a latent variable of deliberative 
quality ranging from high to low deliberative quality. In order to construct a latent variable of 
deliberative quality, we use Bayesian item response analysis. Item response analysis was 
originally developed in psychology and educational science to measure latent psychological 
constructs based on responses to different question items (Rasch, 1980). A typical latent 
construct is intelligence. Denoting the intelligence level of respondent i by βi and the 
difficulty level of item j by αj, the probability that i gives a correct answer to j can be 
modelled as follows: 
Logit(Prob.(i gives the correct answer to j)) = γj (βi – αj) 
This equation assumes that the probability of a correct answer is given by the extent to which 
the degree of intelligence exceeds the difficulty of the question. Hence, the larger the 
difference between the difficulty of the question αj and the degree of intelligence βi, the higher 
the probability that a correct answer is given by respondent i. In this context, γj is often called 
the discrimination parameter since it represents the impact of the latent dimension on the 
response. If γj = 0, there is no relationship between the identified latent dimension and the 
response category. 
This logic can be profitably applied to our research purpose. We can interpret deliberative 
ability similar to intelligence levels in educational science, namely how well citizens are able 
to achieve the various standards of deliberative quality (justification rationality, common 
good orientation, respect, etc.). This also bears the advantage that we do not expect that all 
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participants must achieve the various quality standards in one single speech. Rather, we can 
make the more realistic assumption that some components of deliberative quality may be 
more difficult to achieve than others. Item response models take into account that different 
individuals can exhibit different relations with the latent construct (Reise et al., 2005). To 
demonstrate that deliberative quality is a latent construct, the item response functions of the 
various deliberative standards should display similar slopes for the discrimination parameters.  
Compared to other aggregation methods, such as additive indices and factor analytic methods, 
the item response model has several distinctive advantages. Compared to an additive index, 
the item response model does not a priori assume that all deliberative standards are identically 
relevant for deliberative quality. Even though philosophers tend to invoke simultaneity and 
equivalence among the different deliberative standards, this is an assumption that needs to be 
tested rather than assumed. Compared to factor analytic methods, which also relate 
deliberative standards to the underlying dimension via differentiated loadings, the item 
response function provides a more intuitive understanding of this relationship, especially by 
yielding estimates of both difficulty and discriminating power. While conventional factor 
analysis only models the covariance of the items, item response theory models the various 
items directly as a function of the latent construct (Jackman, 2001; Treier and Jackman, 
2008). By considering thresholds (and yielding a difficulty parameter for each threshold), 
item response analysis is in an excellent position to test for philosophical constructs such as 
deliberative quality, which entail the idea of thresholds in the form of “high” and “low” 
quality. Finally, factor analytic methods are not appropriate for our dummy coded data since 
normally distributed error terms are assumed.
8
  
It is well known that item response analysis suffers from an identification problem (Jackman, 
2001). To address this problem, we apply a Bayesian framework and use prior information. 
Since we lack guidance for the construction of strongly informed priors, we adopt an 
empirical approach. Concretely, we set a truncated normal distribution for the discrimination 
parameter in order to force the corresponding parameter on a negative or positive side of the 
scale. The choice of the items whose discrimination parameters are set with an informative 
prior was conducted in a stepwise fashion until the identification problem is completely 
solved.  
                                                          
8
 One important assumption of item response models is the local independence of items (e.g., Treier and 
Jackman, 2008). Aggregating the speech act level data to the individual level (as demonstrated in Appendix A) 
makes our DQI indicators independent from each other: theoretically, any deliberative standard can be met 
irrespective of one’s success in reaching another standard. Empirically, a correlation analysis of residuals shows 
that our data do not violate the local independence assumption. 
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2.4 Data 
2.4.1 Research Setting: Europolis 
We analyze the potential of citizen deliberation on the basis of Europolis, a pan-European 
deliberative poll which took place in Brussels in May 2009. During the three-day event, 
participants from all 27 EU-member states discussed the topics of third country migration and 
climate change. Europolis employed the well-known method of deliberative polling (DP) (see, 
e.g., Fishkin and Luskin, 2005; Fishkin, 2009). DP incorporates several institutional devices 
designed to support citizens’ deliberative potential: participants receive balanced briefing 
material and can question experts and politicians, which may help to enhance their 
epistemological resources. In addition, facilitators guide the small group discussions in order 
to establish an open and considerate atmosphere for discussion. 
The Europolis project was administered in the following way (Isernia et al., 2013): it started 
with interviewing a random sample of about 4’300 European citizens in April 2009. About 
1’300 of them were randomly selected to be part of the control group. The remaining 3’000 
were asked at the end of the interview whether they show interest in participating at a 
deliberative polling event. Out of the ones showing interest, a random sub-sample of 400 
citizens, proportionally stratified according to the number of seats per member state in the EU 
Parliament, was invited to participate at the DP event. 348 out of them actually took part. 
During the three-day event in Brussels, the participants were randomly assigned to 25 small 
groups for discussion. The discussions were simultaneously translated in the languages 
spoken in the respective groups. Due to limited translation capacities, a maximum of three 
different languages was allowed per discussion group. This limited the random assignment to 
small groups to some extent and as a consequence, group discussions varied considerably in 
degree of transnational heterogeneity.  
Since analyzing deliberative processes empirically is a highly demanding and time-consuming 
affair that required that we first transcribe the audio discussions, we refrained from analyzing 
all 25 small group discussions. Rather, we took a purposive sample and limited our analysis to 
the general discussion on immigration and the more specific discussion on policy options that 
address third country migration.
9
 We decided to focus on discussions between citizens of new 
EU member states (2004-) and citizens of the older states of the EU. Moreover, we also 
                                                          
9
 In doing so, we leave aside two short sessions where participants were asked to formulate questions to experts 
and politicians, as well as a session where participants were encouraged to study and discuss a variety of 
European party manifestos on third country immigration.  
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wanted to focus on discussions between citizens from Western European and Southern 
European countries. By simultaneously holding the variation within the group of Western 
European participants as small as possible, the group selection enables us to test for cultural 
and “newcomer” biases in deliberative behavior. 10  Although our subsample is limited in 
national diversity compared to the full sample of participants, it is largely comparable to the 
rest of the Europolis groups with regard to socio-economic and psychological variables. 
Appendix D displays properties of the groups that have been analyzed and compares them to 
the rest of the sample.  
2.4.2 DQI Indicators and Latent Deliberative Quality 
In a first step, we coded every speech act that participants delivered in the main discussion 
sessions on immigration by relying on the DQI coding scheme (see section 2.3.1 and 
Appendix A). An inter-coder reliability test on the various DQI standards was conducted prior 
to coding the full database. Three coders independently evaluated 80 speeches. As we detail 
in Appendix B, reliability proved to be good to excellent, i.e., there is generally broad 
agreement where a particular speech act falls on the six indicators. Cohen’s kappa, which 
controls for inter-coder agreements by chance, ranges from 0.70 for respect toward other 
participants’ arguments to 0.85 for story-telling. Notice, however, that for two indicators, 
level and content of justification, a first reliability test yielded only satisfactory results. 
Consequently, we have clarified the disagreements, re-coded the data, and then performed a 
second inter-coder reliability test for level and content of justification. This test then yielded a 
very good reliability for the two indicators. In sum, the high inter-coder reliability rates 
greatly increase the confidence one can place in the subsequent transformation and analyses 
performed with the DQI indicators. After the coding, we aggregated the speech act data to the 
level of individuals and extracted participants’ “best performance” on every standard of 
deliberative quality. By dichotomizing the individual level data as detailed in Appendix A, we 
created variables that reveal whether individuals were able to meet the previously specified 
thresholds of high deliberative quality. This was the input data for the Bayesian Item 
Response Analysis (section 2.3.3). Via Bayesian Item Response Analysis, we obtained ideal 
points of a latent construct of classic and Habermasian-inspired deliberative quality. The ideal 
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 The participants from Western Europe mainly originate from one of the founding states of the European Union. 
We excluded groups including participants from the United Kingdom, since this would introduce an additional 
dimension of variance in relation to EU history and experiences with migration (see Freeman, 1995; Geddes, 
2003).  
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points serve as dependent variable for the bias analysis (see next subsection). Details of the 
item response analysis are presented in the results section. 
2.4.3 Predictor Variables 
In order to explore whether deliberative abilities differ among socio-economic, cultural or 
psychological variables, we conduct multilevel regression analysis. The multilevel analyses 
take into account that participants in Europolis are nested in discussion groups and that two 
predictors, group composition and facilitator activity, are located at the group level. Given our 
dependent variable of latent deliberative quality (see above), we estimate hierarchical linear 
models.  
Regarding predictor variables, we focus on gender (1=female; 0=male), age (measured in 10 
years), education (measured as the age at end of the education process), working-class 
(1=working-class; 0=other), political interest (measured on an 11-point scale from 0 (“not at 
all”) to 10 (“passionately”), salience (seriousness of the immigration problem, measured on a 
scale from 0 (“no problem at all”) to 10 (“the most serious problem we face”)), and prior 
knowledge (number of correct answers to three knowledge questions on immigration).
11
 A 
variable for briefing material captures whether participants have read the information 
material. The scale ranges from 1 (“have not read or only glanced at it”) to 5 (“have read all 
or nearly all of it”). A categorical variable allows us to distinguish between participants 
coming from Central Eastern, Southern or Western European countries. With regard to group 
composition and group dynamics, we focus on group heterogeneity and facilitator style. To 
obtain a measure of group heterogeneity for our mixed national groups, we first evaluated 
group heterogeneity on the basis of the Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Index (ELF), by 
measuring the share of national groups out of the total number of national groups that were 
present in the small discussion groups.
12
 The ELF ranges between zero and one, with higher 
values indicating higher levels of fractionalization and diversity. Yet the ELF indicator does 
not take into account another crucial feature of European diversity, namely the broader 
cultural background of participants and the possibility that experiences with immigration 
types and policies differ across countries or regions (see Freeman, 1995; Geddes, 2003). 
Therefore, we weight the group scores obtained on the basis of the ELF indicator as follows: 
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 The three knowledge questions in the Europolis questionnaire concerned the definition of a Blue card worker, 
the current form of the EU immigration policy and some figures on the EU’s immigration population.  
12
 Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Index (ELF)= 1-Σsi
2
 where si is the share of group i out of a total of n groups. 
The ELF measures the probability that the two randomly selected individuals from the entire participant pool 
will be from different groups. 
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groups consisting of Western, Central Eastern, and Southern Europeans obtain a weight of 3; 
groups consisting of Western and Central Eastern Europeans or Western and Southern 
Europeans obtain a weight of 2; and groups where all participants originate from the same 
region obtain a weight of 1. In so doing, groups with a high diversity of cultural backgrounds 
receive a higher score than groups with low diversity. Facilitator performance is captured by 
the group’s average opinion on the basis of the following question “My small group 
moderator sometimes tried to influence the group with her / his ideas”. Participants could 
evaluate facilitator performance on an 11-point scale where 0 indicates complete 
disagreement and 10 complete agreement to the statement. 
2.5 Results 
Before we present the results, let us first sketch an optimistic and a pessimistic scenario for 
deliberative abilities of ordinary citizens. In the optimistic scenario, the different deliberative 
standards – justification rationality, respect etc. – form a compound phenomenon and genuine 
deliberative personalities scoring high on all standards exist. High quality deliberation is not 
constrained to a small number of citizens, and especially socio-economic and cultural factors 
– which are less changeable than psychological characteristics - are not or only weakly 
correlated with deliberative abilities. In the pessimistic scenario, deliberative quality is not a 
compound phenomenon, but falls apart into its various components (justification rationality, 
respect etc.). Alternatively, deliberative quality forms a compound phenomenon, but high 
deliberative skills are constrained to a very small circle of citizens and are strongly correlated 
with socio-economic and cultural characteristics. From a statistical vantage point, we should 
see statistical models with little statistical and substantial significance in the optimistic 
scenario, and statistical models with high statistical and substantial significance in the 
pessimistic scenario (for a similar research strategy to uncover biases in deliberation, see 
Luskin et al., 2002: 478–79). Optimistic or pessimistic scenarios for deliberative theory also 
hinge upon the question whether biases in deliberative abilities are amplified by other biases, 
especially participation equality, and transfer to the outcomes of deliberation as well. In short: 
if biases in deliberative ability combine with a lower “standing” in the process and also lead 
to differential outcomes between high and low skilled deliberators in terms of openness 
towards change, then pessimism about deliberation’s unbiased functioning is amplified. We 
shall return to these points in section 2.6.  
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2.5.1 Foundations of the Genuine Deliberator 
We first explore whether a genuine citizen deliberator exists in the real world. On the basis of 
a Bayesian Item Response Analysis, we check whether the different DQI components – 
justification rationality, respect etc. – form a latent dimension of deliberative quality.13 In 
order to achieve identification of the model, we used a standard normal distribution censored 
in non-zero values as a prior for the discrimination parameters. Due to this specification, a 
higher score of an ideal point corresponds to a higher level of deliberative quality. We ran 
three Markov chains with 7000 iterations from different initial values, respectively. We 
discarded the first 2000 iterations of each chain as burn-in and assessed convergence by visual 
inspection as well as by using the improved Brooks-Gelman-Rubin convergence diagnostics. 
We did not detect any sign of non-convergence (results available upon request). 
Figure 2.1 presents the item response functions relating the latent dimension to the response 
probability of each indicator of deliberative quality. We see that all item response functions 
have similar positive slopes for the discrimination parameters, suggesting that the indicators 
form a latent construct. Put differently, participants achieving the more difficult items 
(sophisticated justification) also have a higher probability to achieve the easier ones (e.g., 
respect toward other participants’ arguments). This means that against skepticism from 
personality psychology, a genuine deliberator scoring high on justification rationality, 
common good orientation, respect, empathy, and inquisitiveness exists in reality. The 
relatively steep discrimination parameters also indicate that participants with lower 
deliberative ability differ considerably from participants with higher deliberative ability. A 
closer look at the difficulty parameters indicates that the demanding standards of classic 
deliberation were far from being rare events in the Europolis discussions. Zero on the 
horizontal axis corresponds to the percentage of participants reaching this standard. We see 
that story-telling was the easiest item, with a 70 percent chance that Europolis participants 
reached this standard. This is in line with Ryfe’s (2006) study of five National Issues Forums, 
finding that the primary form of reasoning is story-telling. For common good orientation, 
explicit respect toward other participants’ arguments, and explicit respect toward third 
country migrants, there is about a 50 percent chance that participants reached these standards. 
Sophisticated justification was the most difficult item, with a 37 percent chance that 
participants reached this standard.  
                                                          
13
 The Bayesian Item Response analysis was performed in WinBUGS, a free software package for Bayesian 
estimation. 
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Figure 2.1: Response Function for each Item  
 
An intriguing result is that story-telling - even though it represents the easiest standard - has a 
strong relationship with the latent dimension. This means that story-telling is a partial 
complement to justification rationality, i.e., people who make sophisticated justifications also 
use story-telling. This provides a hint that the classic distinction between rational discourse 
and alternative forms of communication may be misled, since high-skilled deliberators also 
use personal experiences to back their positions and arguments. Of course, the chance rates 
only display whether the diverse standards of classic deliberation were reached once during an 
entire discussion. But the results are still quite striking. Theoretically, one might have 
expected that classic deliberative standards all form difficult items of an intelligence test. But 
this is clearly not the case, and the standards of classic deliberation are far from being utopian 
standards that no citizen deliberator can achieve. Surely, the number of genuine high quality 
deliberators is quite low: focusing on the raw data, the number of participants reaching all six 
standards is only 10 percent.  
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Figure 2.2: Individual Latent Deliberative Quality (Sorted by Group)  
 
In Figure 2.2 we explore whether high and low deliberative quality varies according 
individuals and discussion groups. Notice that scores on the latent variable cannot be 
interpreted in an absolute way; but the more we move to the right-hand side of the continuum, 
the higher the deliberative quality (and vice versa). Individual points with 90% credible 
intervals correspond to individual participants nested in 13 discussion groups (we use the 
Europolis group classifications to denote the various groups).
14
 In accordance with the 
Bayesian approach, we should not interpret the overlapping credible intervals as the absence 
of a statistically significant difference, but the magnitude of overlap as the probability of 
indifference of ideal points. In other words, the less overlap the higher the probability that 
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 Credible intervals are the Bayesian analogue to confidence intervals in conventional frequentistic statistics. 
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participants differ in their ability to deliberate. Participants are further sorted based on the 
average deliberative quality in each group. The panel clearly displays that every discussion 
group involves participants with high and low deliberative ability. By the same token, there 
are no outstanding differences in deliberative quality among the 13 discussion groups when 
comparing maximum performances of individuals.  
2.5.2 Exploring Biases 
In order to explore whether particular socio-economic, cultural or psychological variables 
predict individual deliberative ability, multilevel models were estimated for our latent 
construct of deliberative quality. As the random intercept model in Table 2.1 displays (Model 
1), there is only one statistically reliable effect: working-class participants score lower on 
deliberative quality than participants from higher classes (p<.05). This confirms sociologists 
arguing that working-class people possess a repertoire of speaking and arguing which may 
not so easily align with classic and Habermasian-inspired forms of deliberation. We have also 
probed for interaction effects among socio-economic and cultural variables, and found two. 
Working-class participants from both Central Eastern Europe and Southern Europe (Spanish 
and Portuguese) do not reach the same levels of deliberative quality than other participants. 
Both interactive effects are substantively large and statistically significant (p<.05). This 
means that clearly less privileged people in the European “polis” - lower class participants 
from the European periphery – were also the least skilled deliberators. Indeed, when focusing 
on the raw data, we see that working-class participants from CEE, for instance, did not 
provide a single sophisticated rationale in the entire discussion. From a bias perspective, this 
is a worrisome finding, meaning that already disadvantaged people have trouble to adapt to 
deliberative modes of interaction, which turns citizen deliberation into a fragmented exercise. 
Notice, however, that Central Eastern and Southern Europeans (Spanish and Portuguese) per 
se do not perform worse than Western Europeans. Region turns into a significant predictor 
only when it is interacted with class (Model 2). Thus, at a general level, popular claims that 
culture is a powerful predictor of deliberative quality are not corroborated.  
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Table 2.1: Antecedents of Deliberative Quality 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Fixed effects     
Individual variables     
Intercept    0.295 (0.499) 0.351 (0.486) 
Men 0.121 (0.131) 0.181 (0.129) 
Education 0.008 (0.014) 0.005 (0.014) 
Working-class   -0.381 (0.158)* 0.082 (0.216) 
Age (in 10 years) -0.068 (0.039)
+
 -0.061 (0.039) 
Central Eastern Europeans (CEE) -0.192 (0.176) -0.022 (0.196) 
Southern Europeans (SE) -0.203 (0.186) 0.029 (0.198) 
Working-class x SE   -0.744 (0.356)* 
Working-class x CEE 
 
-1.108 (0.373)*
* Salience -0.049 (0.027)
+
 -0.052 (0.026)* 
Knowledge 0.085 (0.070) 0.111 (0.069) 
Interest in politics 0.055 (0.032)
+
 0.051 (0.031)
+
 
Briefing material 0.000 (0.055) -0.009 (0.054) 
Group level variables 
    Group heterogeneity -0.026 (0.149) -0.042 (0.145) 
Facilitator performance -0.034 (0.080) -0.046 (0.078) 
Random effects     
Individual level 0.579 (0.761) 0.549 (0.741) 
Group level  0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
AIC 427.9 422.5 
Log Likelihood -198.9 -194.3 
Note: Multilevel linear models estimated with the lme4 package in R (Bates et al. 2011). Estimated 
standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
+
p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01. Individual N=159; Group N=13.  
Nonetheless, one may still wonder whether the two interaction effects are the product of 
different “speech cultures” (with working-class people from Central Eastern and Southern 
Europe having a different way of speaking and arguing than other participants), or whether 
they represent a “newcomer” effect, especially mirroring the inexperience of Central Eastern 
Europeans with pan-European affairs (see Naurin, 2010). Of course, no definitive answer can 
be given here. But the fact that the substantive effect is clearly stronger for Central Eastern 
Europeans than for Southern Europeans which have a longer history of EU membership than 
Central Eastern Europeans provides a first hint that the effect may be more due to newcomer 
status than due to different “speech cultures”. Next, we find that higher salience levels lead to 
lower deliberative quality. This effect is marginally significant in Model 1 (p<0.10) and 
significant in Model 2 (p<0.05). This is an intriguing result, supporting classic deliberation’s 
claim that it is dispassionate attitudes – and not passionate ones – which are conducive to 
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higher deliberative quality. Furthermore, and in accordance with our expectations, we find 
that higher political interest (a proxy for general motivation to engage with the topic under 
discussion) is slightly associated with higher deliberative quality. Contrary to our 
expectations, lower age is associated with higher deliberative quality. However, these two 
effects are only marginally significant (p<0.10). No statistically reliable effects are detected 
for gender, education, prior knowledge and the intensity of studying the briefing material. 
Given its (enduring) prominence in the literature (see Karpowitz et al., 2012), the absence of 
gender effects is an important result. It defies feminists’ claims and empirical findings in 
psychological experiments that women are disadvantaged in deliberative processes. In case of 
education, the absence of any effect seems surprising at first glance. However, in the 
Europolis case, we suspect that this results may be due to the particular way the Europolis 
questionnaire measures education – namely as “years of education”. This operationalization 
does not properly disentangle participants having higher education and a university degree 
from those who have not; this distinction may be the driving factor behind high and low 
deliberative quality, however.
15
 The absence of information effects (prior knowledge and 
intensity of studying the briefing material) is noteworthy too: it means that biases in 
deliberative abilities cannot be easily compensated by enhancing the knowledge of 
participants. Finally, at the level of groups, neither facilitator activity nor group heterogeneity 
affects the quality of deliberation. Eventually, this result may not be so surprising. As we saw 
before, variation across the thirteen discussion groups is very small, a fact that is also 
documented by the extremely small variation at the group level.
16
 Moreover, we should not 
forget that despite variation of group heterogeneity and (perceived) facilitator activity, the 
comparison here is one of differences-in-degree rather than of differences-in-kind. On the one 
hand, the random assignment of participants to discussion groups avoids homophily effects 
(whereby like-minded and otherwise similar people self-select in discussion groups); on the 
other hand, despite some variation in the application, facilitation styles were still in basic 
accordance with a general facilitator script. 
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In accordance with this interpretation, working-class has no statistically significant association with this 
measure of education (Pearson’s r=-0.18, p=0.27). If the education measure had properly separated between 
people with higher education / university degree and others, then we should see a much stronger association with 
working class.  
16
 One might object that variance components are underestimated when multilevel model with a small number of 
level-2 units are estimated via maximum likelihood procedures. However, an ANOVA-Test confirmed that the 
variance in latent deliberative quality between Europolis groups is negligible (p=0.825). In addition, the lme4 
package estimates linear models using restricted maximum likelihood (REML), which mitigates possible biases 
to a considerable degree (e.g., Steenbergen and Jones, 2002; Browne and Draper, 2006). Therefore, we refrained 
from using Bayesian inference to estimate the multilevel models presented in Table 2.1. 
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In sum, citizen deliberation in supportive institutional environments such as deliberative polls 
is not immune against bias, documented by the important class-region effect. But at a general 
level, citizen deliberation may work better than its most fervent critics have postulated. Not 
only is deliberation a more widespread ability than commonly assumed, important socio-
economic variables such as gender and age are not – or, only weakly associated - with 
deliberative quality.  
2.6 Extensions and Implications 
In this section, we put the findings of our bias analysis in perspective, giving context and 
further meaning to them. First, we relate our measure of deliberative ability to participation 
equality, which represents another crucial measure of deliberative quality (and bias; see, e.g., 
Thompson, 2008). Second, we explore whether biases in deliberative abilities also translate 
into the outcomes of deliberation. Third, we shall discuss the implications of our findings for 
transnational and global citizen democracy and the design of deliberative events. 
First, let us consider the relationship between our latent construct of deliberative quality and 
participation equality. Recall that we have excluded participation equality from our measure 
of deliberative quality since it is not directly concerned with the formal quality of 
argumentation. Participation equality can be assessed in several ways, ranging from frequency 
and volume of participation (e.g., Siu, 2009; Stromer-Galley, 2007) to equality of 
consideration, i.e. whether arguments from specific social and cultural groups received 
adequate consideration from other groups (Pedrini et al., 2013). We focus here on the standard 
evaluation measure, frequency of speaking and length of speaking.
17
 A correlation analysis 
shows that both frequency of speaking and the total speaking time (measured in seconds) are 
moderately correlated with our measure of deliberative quality: for frequency of speaking, 
Pearson’s r is 0.65 (p<0.001); for speaking time, the coefficient is 0.66 (p<0.001). This means 
that high-skilled deliberators are also the more dominant participants in discussion. In other 
words, some participants in Europolis not only lacked “articulateness” (Young, 2002: 38), 
they simultaneously lacked “standing”.  
Open-mindedness is a defining feature of highly competent deliberative actors (Gutmann and 
Thompson, 1996). If only deliberatively low skilled and disadvantaged participants shift their 
preferences while high skilled and advantaged participants do not change their minds at all, 
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 See Chapter 3 for a more encompassing analysis of participation equality. Notice that we have refrained from 
inserting frequency of participation or speaking time as predictors in our models since these variables are 
strongly endogenous with our measure of deliberative quality.  
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deliberative ability would represent a mere “etiquette” (Baccaro et al., 2011). A full-fledged 
analysis of the outcomes of the deliberative ability is beyond the scope of this article. In the 
following, we only provide an exploratory analysis by linking individual deliberative ability 
to opinion change. Regarding opinion change, we focus on two preference items in 
connection with the immigration topic: “regularizing irregular immigrants” and the “degree of 
European involvement in immigration affairs”. These two items formed the core of the 
Europolis immigration discussions and were, more or less intensely, discussed in all of our 
groups, which is essential when exploring the consequences of different deliberative 
abilities.
18
 We evaluate both items at two time points, namely immediately before the 
deliberation phase (T2) and at the end of the Europolis event (T3). Regarding deliberative 
ability, we follow research on intelligence and IQ scores (see, e.g., Plomin et al., 1994) and 
take a special focus on low skilled vs. high skilled deliberators. Hereby, we consider the top 
and low ends of our latent variable of deliberative quality. Concretely, we selected 
participants above the 90
th
 percentile and below the 10
th
 percentile of our latent construct of 
deliberative quality (leading to 18 participants in each of the two groups). In so doing, we 
consider those participants whose ideal points were clearly different from each other in the 
item response analysis (see Figure 2.2). A glance at the raw data shows that participants in the 
group of low skilled deliberators reach a maximum of two standards of deliberative quality, 
whereas participants in the group of high skilled deliberators reach five or six quality 
standards.  
Table 2.2 presents the raw data and the t-tests between the high and low skilled deliberators 
(and for comparison purposes, the raw data of the whole sample). Looking at the absolute 
change, we find that both high and low skilled deliberators change minds: the average change 
rates on the 11-point scales are 1.06 (“regularizing irregular immigration”) and 2.50 
(“European involvement”) for high skilled deliberators and 1.94 and 2.76 for low skilled 
deliberators, respectively. Thus, at a very general level, deliberative ability is not a mere 
“etiquette”. Both groups changed their minds and although high skilled deliberators did so to 
a (slightly) smaller degree, the difference is in neither case significant at a level of p<0.1. In 
sum, trends underline that we do not confront a “worst case scenario” where only the opinions 
of deliberatively low skilled and otherwise disadvantaged deliberators shift considerably 
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 The item “regularizing irregular immigrants” was measured on the basis of an 11-point scale where 
participants had to rank their policy choice between wholehearted agreement with return (0) and wholehearted 
agreement with legalization (10). The item “European involvement” was measured on the following question: 
On a scale from 0 to 10, where ‘0’ means “entirely at the EU level”, and ‘10’ means “entirely by the individual 
Member States”, and ‘5’ is exactly in the middle”, at what level do you think decisions should be made in each 
of the following areas? We inverted the scale so that higher values indicate more “European involvement”. 
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while the high skilled sit on their positions and do not change minds. Interestingly, however, 
the two groups differ considerably in respect of relative attitude changes. While for the item 
“regularizing irregular immigration”, high skilled deliberators display more “progressive” 
attitudes towards irregular immigrants after deliberation, low skilled deliberators have moved 
towards the “conservative” end of the scale. The complete opposite occurred for the 
“European involvement” item. While the two groups differ significantly and substantially in 
their pre-deliberative opinions, low skilled deliberators closed the gap by turning more 
European.
19
 At this point, we do not have an explanation for the detected patterns. We regard 
the examination of deliberation’s effect on post-deliberative opinions as an important issue for 
future research. Chapter 4 will make an initial attempt to explore this subject.  
Table 2.2: Pre- and Post-Deliberative Opinions and Absolute Opinion Change 
 Irregular immigration 
b
 European involvement 
c
 
 T2 T3 
Absolute 
change 
T2 T3 
Absolute 
change 
Whole sample (N=185) 
5.57 
(0.18) 
5.72 
(0.18) 
1.58 
(0.15) 
4.84 
(0.22) 
5.06 
(0.20) 
2.33 
(0.18) 
High skilled (N=18) 
6.11 
(0.56) 
6.83* 
(0.53) 
1.06 
(0.25) 
6.22 
(0.81) 
6.06 
(0.43) 
2.5 
(0.59) 
Low skilled (N=17) 
a
 
5.94 
(0.55) 
4.82
+
 
(0.61) 
1.94 
(0.54) 
3.71 
(0.67) 
5.06 
(0.66) 
2.76 
(0.63) 
 Mean difference Mean difference 
Between groups 0.17 2.01* - 0.89 2.52* 1.00 -0.26 
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Levels of significance are shown for within-group differences 
(first three lines) and differences between the high and low skilled group (bottom line). 
+
p<0.1, *p<0.05, 
**p<0.01. 
a
 Due to missing information in questionnaire responses, the low skilled sample is reduced by one 
participant for both items. 
b
 The question is captured on an 11-point scale, where 0 indicates full agreement with 
sending irregular immigrants back and 10 indicates full agreement with regularizing all irregular immigrants 
currently living in the country. 
c
 The question is captured on an 11-point scale, where 0 indicates that decisions 
on immigration should be made entirely at the national level and 10 indicates that decisions should be made 
entirely at the EU level.  
Our findings have important implications for the prospects of global citizen democracy as 
well as the design of deliberative citizen events. Transnational citizen deliberation may be 
more fragmented than many deliberative democrats are willing to admit. This particularly 
concerns the various proposals for deliberative citizen involvements in global politics (Dryzek 
et al., 2011; Goodin and Ratner, 2011). Dryzek et al. (2011: 4), for instance, draw from non-
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 However, the standard errors are large and therefore, the difference between high and low skilled deliberators 
is not significant.  
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Western experiences with citizen deliberation and assert that deliberation is not “the preserve 
of wealthy societies and educated participants”. Hence, global citizen deliberation is presented 
as a manageable event that will have the capacity of bringing highly diverse citizens together 
rather than reinforcing already existing differences. But as the Europolis event makes clear, 
overly optimistic expectations that deliberation is an event where all participants engage 
equally and deliberate together at high quality levels are romantic dreams indeed. Even 
though deliberative ability is far from being socially or culturally determined, class and region 
turned out to be important predictors of deliberative performance. Moreover, biases are 
amplified by the fact that deliberatively high skilled participants not only speak more and 
longer, but also have different opinions at the end of the event. Therefore, proposals for 
deliberative citizen involvement in global or transnational affairs must make special 
provisions to properly integrate people from diverse social and cultural backgrounds, 
especially if these combine widely varying deliberative skills (see also Rosenberg, 2005: 
222). In this regard, a more dedicated focus on alternative forms of communication – such as 
story-telling – may only be a partial solution for better integrating low skilled deliberators, 
since story-telling is a technique employed by high skilled deliberators as well. Another 
pathway might be to focus on group composition (and voting rules). Karpowitz and 
Mendelberg (2007) have demonstrated empirically that a high share of women and cultural 
minorities in discussion groups in combination with unanimity voting rules came closest to 
deliberative ideals on a range of possible outcome measures. Here, group composition (in 
combination with voting rules) altered the functioning of the whole group, empowering 
disadvantaged groups and equalizing deliberative interactions (see also Karpowitz et al., 
2012). Thus, by creating a strong presence of disadvantaged people in discussion groups and 
by giving these groups a common decision task (e.g., working out a common statement; see 
Grönlund et al., 2010), inequalities in the process may be reduced. Finally, one might also 
conceive of a “learning phase” prior to the “real deliberation” phase (Kanra, 2005), where 
disadvantaged participants are given the possibility to familiarize themselves with deliberative 
repertoires (see also Mansbridge, 1996b: 57–58). In particular, we would like them to enhance 
their standing in deliberation, i.e., speaking up more frequently, as well as developing and 
cultivating their rhetorical skills. Only when this is the case can we expect that more 
egalitarian patterns of deliberative interaction evolve with advantaged participants seriously 
listening to the viewpoints and opinions of less advantaged participants. 
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2.7 Conclusion 
This is one of the first studies exploring deliberative abilities of ordinary citizens on the basis 
of a philosophically grounded measure, an updated version of the Discourse Quality Index 
(DQI). The object of our study was Europolis, a transnational deliberative poll. The Europolis 
event yields a fairly nuanced and mixed picture of citizen deliberation. On the positive side, 
citizens’ deliberative abilities are more widespread than assumed by skeptics and demanding 
standards of classic deliberation are far from being utopian standards that no citizen can 
achieve. Moreover, high skilled deliberators as envisaged by deliberative theory exist in the 
realm of citizen deliberation. An item response analysis shows that classic deliberative quality 
forms a latent dimension with participants scoring high on all deliberative standards, ranging 
from justification rationality to common good orientation, respect, empathy, and 
inquisitiveness. Finally, high deliberative ability is not fully determined by social or cultural 
characteristics: important social variables - especially gender - are not associated with 
deliberative ability. On the negative side, we nonetheless detected an important class-region 
bias in the ability of deliberating: compared to other participants, working-class participants 
from Central Eastern and Southern Europe were considerably less likely to reach the various 
standards of high quality deliberation. Moreover, putting our findings in perspective, we 
detect a slightly worrisome trends: our measure of deliberative ability is moderately correlated 
with the frequency and length of speaking, giving a preliminary indication that less 
deliberatively skilled participants find it more difficult to express their concerns. In sum, 
while citizen deliberation may work better than its most fervent critics have claimed, it is a 
much more fragmented exercise than its staunchest advocates are ready to admit. 
Of course, our study is not without limitations. First, critics might say that our results and the 
implications we draw from them are driven by our conceptualization of deliberative quality. 
Had we set less demanding deliberative standards, then the biases would not have shown up 
and we could draw a much brighter picture of citizen deliberation. We disagree. On the one 
hand, deliberation – even in its re-configurations (see Bächtiger et al., 2010a) – is a 
demanding concept of political communication, and critics have attacked its viability not on 
watered-down variant but on the classic and Habermasian-inspired version thereof. On the 
other hand, even if one applies a more lenient version of deliberative quality, namely the 
Fishkinean conception of “reasoned and civil discussion”, similar biases than we found for 
our classic and Habermasian-inspired conception of deliberation show up (analyses upon 
request). Second, one might object that we have only analyzed 13 out of 25 discussion groups 
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in Europolis. However, since there are no signs of systematic variation in maximum 
deliberative performance across discussion groups, we wonder how much empirical leverage 
will be gained by analyzing more groups. Third, some of the measures used in the analysis are 
not optimal and stronger associations might have been found if we had other measures. This 
mainly concerns psychological factors. There is new research linking personality traits to 
electoral behavior, political participation, and political attitudes (see Gastil et al., 2008; 
Mondak et al., 2010). It is urgent to include such variables in future questionnaires of citizen 
deliberative events as well. Fourth, our analysis only considers the formal aspects of 
deliberative quality while neglecting other aspects, namely the informational quality of the 
discussions, the substantive content of arguments as well as argumentative balance. Fishkin 
(2009: 34), for instance, emphasizes that argumentative balance, i.e., “the extent to which 
arguments offered by one side or from one perspective are answered by considerations offered 
by those who hold other perspectives”, is a crucial element of deliberative quality. Future 
research will need to consider such measures of deliberative quality as well. And fourth, while 
we have made a first attempt at linking deliberative ability to opinion change, much more 
could and should be done. Indeed, the link between process quality and outcomes has been 
largely neglected in previous studies (for exceptions, see Neblo, 2007a; Baccaro et al., 2011; 
Sanders, 2012). Yet, optimistic conclusions for deliberative theory do not follow unless one 
can demonstrate that deliberation changes opinions “primarily via mechanisms specified in 
the normative theories” (Neblo, 2007a: 1). This means, on the one hand, that a high 
deliberative ability should be linked to the willingness of participants to change their 
opinions. On the other hand, we need to explore whether deliberative quality can serve as a 
resource, in that the provision of high quality arguments influence the direction of opinion 
shift – at least in a safe venue for deliberation such as Europolis. For an initial attempt to 
remedy this deficiency, see Chapter 4. 
Despite these limitations, our study is the first one to perform a comprehensive, systematic, 
and in-depth analysis of deliberative abilities of ordinary citizens. At the same time, it 
provides researchers with a tool set that can be applied to an in-depth evaluation of the 
booming numbers of citizen deliberative events world-wide. 
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Chapter 3 
3 EQUAL PARTNERS IN DIALOGUE? 
PARTICIPATION EQUALITY IN 
EUROPOLIS* 
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“Deliberation depends on achieving an 
important kind of equality, equality as a 
partner in dialogue.” Warren (2001: 81) 
3.1 Introduction 
By supporting diverse participatory approaches, Brussels has recently made efforts to bring 
the European Union closer to its citizens. Among these efforts, the pan-European deliberative 
poll (DP) on third country migration and climate change (Europolis) may be considered one 
of the most extensive attempts to increase citizens’ involvement in European affairs. By 
gathering a representative sample of the European population for deliberation, Europolis 
created a favorable environment for EU-citizens of all 27 member states to become 
substantially more informed about politics (Fishkin, 2009: chp. 6). At the core of molding 
more informed opinions lies the premise of political equality, which is according to Fishkin 
and Luskin (2005: 285) the requirement for “equal consideration of everyone’s preferences”. 
Up to now, evaluations of political equality in DP have largely focused on the questions of 
whether the sample of deliberators was representative of a broader public (e.g., Andersen & 
Hansen, 2007; Fishkin et al., 2010; Luskin et al., 2002) and whether post-deliberative 
opinions were dominated by the view of a particular social group (e.g., Fishkin et al., 2010; 
Luskin et al., 2013).  
Less is known about the degree to which participants actually gained equal standing in the 
process of deliberation itself (see Kim et al., 2010; Siu, 2009 for partial exceptions). This is a 
substantial shortcoming for at least two reasons. First, while offering everyone equal 
possibilities to participate in mini-public events is essential, it is in itself not a sufficient 
condition to establish equal participation (e.g., Bohman, 1997; Cohen, 1989; Fraser, 1992; 
Young, 2002). Critics argue that informal hurdles to participation can persist even after 
individuals gain formal access to the floor. However, organizers of mini-publics such as the 
DP mitigate this concern by emphasizing that mini-public designs incorporate many 
procedural safeguards: the introduction of trained facilitators and specific rules for discussion 
should ensure that deliberation proceeds in a fair and equal way (e.g., Fishkin and Luskin, 
2005). Yet, it is surprising how little the role of the facilitators has been theorized in the 
framework of deliberation, given the essential part that is attributed to facilitators in 
establishing an inclusive atmosphere for discussion (Smith, 2009: chp. 6; see Moore, 2012 for 
an exception). It comes as no surprise that the lack of theorization echoes in largely mixed 
results on facilitators’ behavior and their potential influence on establishing a balanced 
atmosphere for discussion (e.g., Ryfe, 2006; Schneiderhan and Khan, 2008; Stromer-Galley, 
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2007; but see Trénel, 2010). Thus, an evaluation of deliberative participation that only focuses 
on formal access to deliberation may be insufficient. Second, estimating whether post-
deliberative opinions are strongly influenced by a particular social group may not give a full 
account of whether participants were substantively equal in deliberation. Of course, 
confirming that disadvantaged groups were not forced to conform to the views of a dominant 
group by underlying power structures is a positive sign of deliberative inclusion. Yet, an 
outcome-oriented approach to participation equality might be too quick in assuming that 
serious reflection of others’ arguments automatically manifests in opinion shift (Dobson, 
2012: 844; see Barabas, 2004). In other words, whether others’ thoughts manage to change 
one’s opinion is, ideally, more a question of the force of the better argument than of the actual 
willingness to seriously consider others’ claims in the light of one’s own (Mansbridge, 1999: 
225). Moreover, DP is an educative forum and its prime aim is the formation of considered 
opinions (Fung, 2003). In order for citizens to get enlightened preferences, a deliberative 
process has to ensure that the relevant reasons are aired and appropriately weighed 
(Mansbridge et al., 2012). Only a focus on the process of deliberation allows for testing 
whether this was actually the case. 
This article adds another layer to the literature on inclusiveness of deliberative mini-publics 
by analyzing participation equality in the process of deliberation itself. Specifically, the article 
argues in favor of two additional dimensions of substantive participation equality that are 
regarded as crucial preconditions to creating more informed and considered opinions. I dub 
them equal contribution and equal consideration. From such a perspective, I address the 
questions of the extent to which individuals participated at equal levels and whether their 
arguments were considered on equal merits. I propose multilevel modeling and social network 
analysis as possible methodological tools to address these questions. A subsample of 
Europolis small group discussions on third country migration serves as a case study. 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. The next section contains the theoretical 
discussion on equal opportunities to influence the deliberative process and embeds the 
argument in deliberative theory. Section 3.3 displays the empirical model and details the 
statistical methodologies at use. Subsequently, I present the main results (section 3.4) and 
discuss the implications of the findings (section 3.5). Section 3.6 concludes and offers 
suggestions for future research.  
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3.2 Participation Equality in Deliberation 
Democratic equality has many facets (e.g., Dahl, 1989, Saward, 2003) and theorists also 
disagree about the kind of equality that deliberation should be concerned with (see Thompson, 
2008). A broad and often cited definition stems from Joshua Cohen (1989). Cohen (1989: 22-
23) states that not only do individuals need to be formally empowered to participate in 
deliberation, they also need to be substantively equal “in that the existing distribution of 
power and resources does not shape their chances to contribute to deliberation, nor does that 
contribution play an authoritative role in their deliberation”. Although random sampling 
methods as utilized in DP may succeed in gathering a representative sample of a broader 
public and therefore fulfill a necessary condition for equal participation, they are in 
themselves not sufficient.
20
 Equalizing the chances to take part in DP is what Young (2002) 
refers to as external inclusion. The concern about remaining informal hurdles to effective 
participation, however, is related to her conception of internal inclusion. According to Young 
(2002: 55), internal inclusion is violated when some people or particular groups lack effective 
opportunities to influence the political decision-making process, despite having gained access 
to the political floor. Young (2002) fears that traditional power structures will be transferred 
to deliberative settings because the calm, reasoned and dispassionate style of expression that 
classic deliberation demands only suits the already advantaged (see also Sanders, 1997).  
According to Knight and Johnson, 1997: 292), lacking equal opportunities to political 
influence is a violation of “the fundamental notion that democratic outcomes are the product 
of the interest of equal citizens”. By viewing deliberation as “uncoerced give and take of 
reasoned arguments” (p. 281), the authors are among the few to explicitly take into account 
the dialogical element of deliberative participation. In such a view, a speaker’s opportunity to 
political influence is determined not only by the action of the speaker himself but also by the 
listeners’ willingness to take the speaker’s claim into account (see also Bohman, 1997). Yet 
the authors advance a capacity-based conception of equal opportunities that, first and 
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 There are a few reservations about the benefits of statistical representativeness. Comparing the sample of 
participants to the control sample neglects another level of possible exclusion that may have occurred before the 
sample was gathered. On the one hand, such exclusion might be technical: random digital dialing bars people 
without landline from participation, and these are predominantly young people (see Hansen, 2004; chp. 2). On 
the other hand, exclusion might also be systematic in that those unwilling to take part in the initial survey are 
likely to differ in some important ways from the ones that demonstrate high motivation for participation 
(Parkinson, 2006a: chp. 4). Moreover, statistical representation is not the same as sampling an adequate cross-
section of the population (Parkinson, 2003; Brown, 2006), nor does it guarantee discursive representation 
(Dryzek and Niemeyer, 2008).  
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foremost, requires everyone to possess equal abilities to reason and articulate ideas in order to 
influence political outcomes (Knight and Johnson, 1997: 295-299).  
However, deliberative theory would meet such an approach to equal opportunities with 
reticence. A priori denying a particular social perspective or non-rational styles of 
communication from exerting political influence would be counterproductive to the goal of 
deliberative inclusion (e.g., Bohman, 2006; Cohen, 1989: 30). By enlarging the pool of 
admissible forms of deliberative communication such as rhetoric or storytelling, deliberative 
theory recently leveled the requirement for rational discourse, which gave pause to theorists 
calling for equal reasoning capacities (e.g., Bächtiger et al., 2010a; Dryzek, 2000; see also 
Mansbridge, 1999: 233). To be sure, in order to influence deliberative outcomes, political 
equality requires that deliberators possess at least basic deliberative abilities for effective 
participation. Most deliberative theorists would also agree that deliberative outcomes should 
be guided by epistemic principles rather than requiring everyone to exert equal influence on 
the outcome (e.g., Estlund, 2000, 2009; Knigth and Johnson, 1997; Mansbridge, 1999). As 
Estlund (2000: 138) holds, whether one’s arguments have been treated with adequate respect 
is not reflected in equal influence on the outcome, nor are inequalities in the outcome a clear 
indicator of disrespect. In this sense, Bohman (1997) presents a more convincing approach to 
equal opportunities that emphasizes the requirement for effective social freedom, i.e. the 
willingness of others to recognize one’s claim as a possible relevant reason. Bohman (1997: 
345) adheres that “citizens will then know when their failure to achieve their political goals 
has to do with their lack of convincing reasons rather than limits upon the extent of their 
effective social freedom or the greater freedom of others”. In his argumentation, Bohman 
makes an important distinction between being able to influence the process of deliberation 
and the ability to influence the outcome of deliberation (or, the ability to effectively influence 
the deliberative process). While the former requires active communication of one’s central 
claims and others’ willingness to weigh the merits of each claim on equal grounds, the latter 
additionally requires one’s ability to convince others by superiority of reasoning. The scope of 
this article is limited to the former.
21
 The following two subsections elaborate on the 
theoretical foundations and practical limitations of such an approach.  
3.2.1 Equal Contribution 
From an epistemic point of view, deliberation is desirable because it holds the potential for 
incorporating a wide array of different perspectives (e.g., Bohman, 2006; Estlund, 1997; 
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 But see Chapter 4 for an initial attempt to capture the latter.  
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Mansbridge et al., 2012). By gathering a random sample of a given population, DP possesses 
the potential to expose participants to a wide range of facts and moral positions which may 
render individuals more considerate, further tolerance and may even reduce prejudice (Mutz, 
2006). However, in order to unleash its full potential, deliberation requires everyone to 
express his preferences in a free and unconstrained manner (Cohen, 1989: 29). Sure, the 
deliberative ideal of equal participation does not demand that everyone participates with equal 
numbers of words (Mansbridge, 1999: 232). However, equal participation requires that no 
person or particular group completely dominates the discussion, even though deliberators may 
differ in power and prestige (Thompson, 2008: 501). Patterns of dominance in discussion 
would have consequential framing and agenda-setting effects and preclude people from 
basing their judgments on the entire pool of relevant reasons (see e.g., Mendelberg, 2002; 
Schulz-Hardt et al., 2000).  
Several scholars express reservations when it comes to the practicability of equal contribution 
(e.g., Benhabib, 1996; Sanders, 1997; Williams, 2000; Young, 2000). This is based on the fact 
that these critics attribute a calm and dispassionate style of expression to middle- and upper-
class white men, while they view the emotive and physically demonstrative modes of 
expression to be strongly associated with women and cultural minorities. As a consequence, 
Young (2002) fears that historically oppressed segments of the population do not dare to 
speak, as they do not consider themselves able to fulfill the requirement of rational discourse. 
As a possible cure, Mansbridge (1996b: 57-59) suggests that enclave deliberation among the 
disempowered should precede more heterogeneous deliberation. While deliberating among 
themselves, the less powerful could elaborate on their ideas and positions in a secure 
environment and prepare to confront the dominant groups with sufficient confidence (see also 
Karpowitz et al., 2009). Yet some researchers would contest the concerns related to gender by 
arguing that women are particularly prone to deliberation, in that they pursue a kinder and 
gentler style of politics (Childs, 2004; Norris, 1996; see also Karpowitz and Mendelberg, 
2007). Moreover, Neblo et al. (2010) provide convincing evidence that groups that normally 
display reluctance towards traditional means of political participation are actually more 
willing to participate in deliberation. Hoping to get a better hearing of their claims, these 
groups might view deliberation as a valuable alternative to “politics as usual”. Whether mini-
publics manage to activate disadvantaged groups to a substantial degree is still an open 
question and the few studies that addressed this subject so far provide mixed evidence 
(Hansen, 2010; Himmelroos, 2011; Kim et al., 2010; Siu, 2009).  
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3.2.2 Equal Consideration  
By filtering incoming information in a biased way, deliberators may infringe another form of 
equality. For deliberation to reach its full epistemic potential, post-deliberative preferences 
and decisions need to be based on facts and logic and be the outcome of “substantive and 
meaningful consideration of relevant reasons” (Mansbridge et al., 2012: 11). In order for 
relevant reasons to enter the opinion formation process, deliberators’ claims need to be 
listened to seriously (e.g., Bickford, 1996; Dobson, 2010; Mansbridge et al., 2012). However, 
deliberative researchers often ignore the importance of listening in that they often (and against 
all evidence) assume that incoming information is processed in a uniform way (Dobson, 2012; 
Lupia, 2002; Mendelberg, 2002). From a viewpoint of equal opportunities to influence the 
deliberative process, however, it is essential that everyone be recognized as equal discussant 
with legitimate claims (e.g., Bohman, 1997; Knight and Johnson, 1997). Moreover, a 
demanding understanding of equal consideration requires recognition to go beyond the mere 
and rather passive act of listening to what others have to say. As Bickford (1996: 153-159) 
succinctly puts it, silence may either be an indicator of attentive listening or a non-verbal 
refusal to engage with what others have said. In other words, deliberation requires uptake of 
and engagement with others’ claims, so that people respond to claims “as issues – that is, as 
matters that deserve response in their own terms” (Warren 2001: 81; see also Goodin, 2000: 
90-92; Pedrini et al., 2013). The very interactive moment of reciprocal recognition is also 
embodied in Gutmann and Thompson’s (1996: 79) definition of mutual respect, which 
demands a “favorable attitude toward, and constructive interaction with, the persons with 
whom one disagrees”. According to the authors, a listener’s willingness to treat a speaker with 
respect also demonstrates his commitment for self-reflection and openness to preference 
change. And it is only to the extent that the listener actively responds to what a speaker has 
said that everyone, including the speaker, is able to reflect on public deliberation (see 
Christiano, 2008: 201). 
Again, critics question the direct applicability of such a deliberative ideal to real-world 
deliberation. One argument is that dominant groups may, even unconsciously, treat claims of 
people from traditionally disadvantaged groups with inadequate respect (Sanders, 1997; 
Young, 2002). If true, this would dispel many of the benefits accredited to deliberation: 
“when this happens, democratic theory doesn’t have an answer, because one cannot counter a 
pernicious group dynamic with a good reason” (Sanders, 1997: 354). Adequate consideration 
of others’ views may also be more difficult to achieve when the group increases in 
heterogeneity. By bringing together people with different cultural backgrounds, more time 
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and energy might be required in order to appropriately consider the full variety of speaking 
and reasoning styles (Benhabib, 2002: 138-139; Burkhalter, 2002). The well-known insights 
provided by the interracial town meetings on school desegregation amplify some of these 
concerns (Mendelberg and Oleske, 2000). On the other hand, more optimistic conclusions are 
drawn when it comes to the uptake of claims from language minorities’ in the Swiss 
parliament (Pedrini et al., 2013). Beyond these valuable insights, we lack empirical 
observations on the practicability of equal consideration. In the transnational environment of 
Europolis, the viability of equal consideration may particularly be endangered by the fact that 
people enter the discussion with a variety of cultural backgrounds and experiences in the field 
of EU-politics and the topic of immigration (e.g., Freeman, 1995; Geddes, 2003). When it 
comes to deliberative polling, Fishkin (2009: 160) admits that the degree to which equal 
consideration is realized cannot be prescribed by institutional design. To date, we lack 
empirical investigations on equal consideration in DP. 
3.3 Data and Measurement 
3.3.1 Case Study (Europolis) 
Empirically, I analyze the discussions on third country migration in a subsample of 13 
Europolis discussion groups (see section 2.4.1). Due to limitations in simultaneous 
translation, national heterogeneity of Europolis small group compositions varied to a 
considerable degree: while some groups encompassed a wide variety of nationalities, in others 
it merely came down to a discussion among neighbors. The Europolis project thus presents an 
interesting case for analyzing small group deliberation with varying degrees of European 
diversity. Although the subsample is limited in scope with regard to EU member states, it is 
comparable to the rest of the sample with regard to important socio-demographic and 
psychological variables (see Appendix D).
 
Despite its limitations concerning the 
representation of different nationalities, the sample consists of groups that show notable 
variation in national heterogeneity.  
3.3.2 Statistical Analysis 
As individual participants are embedded in small groups for discussion, multilevel modeling 
seems the appropriate approach for the case of Europolis (Mendelberg, 2005: 641-642). The 
central idea behind a multilevel approach is that institutional or other context-level 
determinants do have an influence on individual level phenomena, but their influence is not 
necessarily determinant or uniform (see, e.g., Steenbergen and Jones, 2002). By estimating 
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random effects, multilevel modeling acknowledges that the estimated predictors may not 
account for all variation that exists between the groups. Given that exploring social group 
dynamics is still a lacuna in deliberative mini-public research, multilevel models may offer a 
welcome opportunity to account for this situation in a proper way.  
The previous reluctance to use multilevel modeling in small group discussions might stem 
from the fact that the number of deliberating groups is usually rather low. Yet Gelman and 
Hill (2007: 247) assert that a model with as little as five groups may already be suitable for 
multilevel analysis. Nevertheless, there is the danger that using maximum likelihood 
inference, variance components are not properly estimated and estimates and confidence 
intervals can be biased, particularly when cross-level interactions are estimated in models 
where the number of level-2 units is smaller than 15 (Stegmueller, 2013; see also Browne and 
Draper, 2006). Due to the small number of groups in our sample (N=13), only rather simple 
models will be estimated. By assigning each individual to a particular group for discussion, 
the hierarchical structure in DP is straightforward, allowing for less complex models to be 
run. In order to estimate more complex models, fully Bayesian procedures would be 
appropriate (see, e.g., Hangartner et al., 2007; Bächtiger and Hangartner, 2010).
22
 Where 
cross-level interactions are estimated, an informal approach to Bayesian inference 
complements the analyses: model simulations are run in order to retrieve an uncertainty 
distribution of the parameter estimates. The multilevel models run in this article are estimated 
using maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) with the lme4 package in R (Bates et al., 2011).  
Since deliberation is a communicative act and an “individual functions as a part of the group 
and each influences the other” (Mendelberg, 2005: 645), social network analysis may help to 
capture elements of deliberative inclusion. Yet, with a few exceptions, network structures of 
deliberative discussions remain largely unexplored (see Cinalli and O’Flynn, 2013; Graham 
and Witschge, 2003 for exceptions). In order to explore consideration structures, network 
measures of homophily (e.g., McPherson et al., 2001) and centrality (Borgatti, 2005; 
Freeman, 1979) may be of particular relevance. Centrality measures capture an actor’s 
connectedness to a set of other actors and are commonly viewed as an indicator of an actor’s 
power within the network (see, e.g., Krackhardt, 1990; Ibarra, 1993). In deliberative 
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 Contrary to Hangartner et al. (2007) who analyzed deliberative behavior in the parliamentary setting, I have to 
deal neither with cross-classification nor with multiple hierarchical levels, which would increase model 
complexity to a considerable degree. Yet, due to the low number of groups, only models with one varying 
component (random intercept or random slope) are estimated. Particularly in models with cross-level interactions, 
random intercept models represent a simplification in assuming that individual differences in the outcome 
variable are completely accounted for by the moderating variable.  
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discussions, an actor’s power may be determined by the degree to which his views have been 
taken up by his co-discussants. In order to evaluate whether participants’ claims have received 
equal consideration, the dependent variable will be operationalized as a measure of 
consideration centrality (see below). Yet an empirical approach to equal consideration not 
only requires that claims are taken up, but also that the claims of some groups have been 
considered by other groups (Pedrini et al., 2013). Finding that members of some groups only 
talk to each other may have the same pernicious consequences as enclave deliberation without 
follow-up deliberation in more heterogeneous groups. As Mansbridge (1996b: 58) puts it: 
“when white supremacists only speak to white supremacists, Serbs to Serbs, feminists to 
feminists and political philosophers to political philosophers, they encourage one another not 
to hear anyone else”. In this sense, homophily analysis may serve as an important 
complement to the analysis of consideration centrality. Homophily is defined as the tendency 
for similar individuals to form a relation (McPherson et al., 2001). Translated to the 
deliberative setting, homophily allows for testing whether members of a dominant group 
remained sufficiently open to claims raised by more peripheral actors or whether they 
preferred to engage with dominant others and thus contributed to the monopolization of the 
discussion.  
3.3.3 Dependent Variables 
In order to capture the essentials of the two dimensions of procedural equality, I rely on two 
features of the updated version of the Discourse Quality Index (DQI) (Bächtiger et al., 
2010b). The DQI is a content-analytic measure that attempts to capture the essentials of 
Habermas’ discourse ethics at the level of the speech act (Steenbergen et al., 2003). 
Originally, the DQI was developed to investigate parliamentary debates (Bächtiger, 2005; 
Steiner et al., 2004). With the recent amendments, however, the DQI has been applied 
successfully to the evaluation of citizen deliberation.  
Contribution: Since there is no universal agreement on how to capture contribution, a double-
track approach is pursued (see also Stromer-Galley, 2007). A participant’s contribution is 
captured via the amount of speaking time (in seconds) and the frequency of contribution.
23
 
Linear multilevel models are estimated for the logarithm of speaking time. The distribution of 
speaking time is strongly skewed to the left and ranges from 0 to 1593 seconds (26.5 minutes) 
of speaking time in a total of approximately 1.5 hours of discussion time. Random slopes 
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 The original DQI captures equality by looking at whether participants were hindered from speaking freely by 
interruptions from others. In Europolis, interruptions were technically impossible due to simultaneous translation. 
Therefore, contribution in Europolis has only been assessed via the updated measure of the DQI. 
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instead of random intercept models are estimated since overall speaking time was roughly 
equal in all groups. The slopes for participants of EU-members that joined the EU in 2004 or 
later were allowed to vary. The underlying assumption is that members of new EU-countries 
show a more balanced participation behavior if they discuss only among themselves. The 
distribution of frequency is also strongly skewed to the left, ranging from 0 to a total of 21 
delivered speeches. Here, Poisson models for count data were estimated. In order to account 
for overdispersion, Poisson lognormal models are estimated by adding an individual-level 
random effect to the models estimated with lme4 (Bates et al., 2011; Bolker, 2010).  
Consideration is based on the updated DQI indicator of respect towards other participants’ 
arguments. The DQI indicator captures interactivity, or the uptake of arguments, in assessing 
whether speakers explicitly referred to others’ arguments in a disrespectful, neutral or 
respectful manner or whether they ignored other participants’ statements. An explicit 
reference is present if someone directly addresses a previous speaker in response to something 
he had said. In a first step, interactive instances have been coded from the transcripts of the 
group discussions. An inter-coder reliability test by three independent coders showed 
respectable levels of agreement on the coding.
24
 By assessing the nature of the reference as 
well as the sender and the receiver of a reference, a matrix of argumentative uptake can be 
created (see Pedrini et al., 2013). This presents the basis for further analysis. In this paper, I 
focus on explicitly neutral or positive references and subsume them under the category of 
“civil references”. I ignore disrespectful references, since they violate the fundamental notion 
of constructive interaction (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996; Mansbridge et al., 2012).
25
 
Moreover, instances of disrespect were rare in Europolis. This is not surprising given that in 
DP, stakes are low and participants are encouraged to meet others with respect (Fung, 2003). 
In order to retrieve the measure for consideration, an actor’s centrality has been calculated 
from the matrix. Here, I focus on in-degree relations, i.e. the amount of references that a 
participant receives. Concretely, the network centrality measure encompasses the total 
number of co-discussants that made a civil reference to a speaker at least once. In the 
Europolis subsample, in-degree centrality ranges from 0 (a person spoke but has never been 
referenced) to 10 (a person was referenced by 10 different co-discussants at least once). Since 
the distribution is strongly skewed to the left, lognormal Poisson models are estimated (see 
above).  
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 See Appendix B.  
25
 From a deliberative standpoint, however, receiving disrespectful feedback may be preferable to being 
completely ignored. I thank Michael Neblo for highlighting this point.  
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3.3.4 Predictor Variables 
The following variables of interest were included in the model in order to test whether 
participation in Europolis was biased in relation to important demographic and socio-
economic indicators: a binary variable for gender, taking in the value (1) for women and (0) 
for men; another binary variable indicating whether a person feels that she belongs to the 
working-class (1) or to the middle or upper class (0); a variable for education, measured in 
years of age when the education ended; and a categorical variable for age, classifying a person 
into being young (18-34 years old), intermediate (35-64 years old) or older (65 and above).  
Two additional variables were introduced in order to account for the impact of national 
diversity. At the individual level, an additional categorical variable distinguishes between 
people belonging to a Western European (0), a Southern European (1) or a Central Eastern 
European state that joined the EU in 2004 or later (2). At the group level, a measure was 
created to capture the degree of national heterogeneity that was present within the groups. The 
measure is based on the Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization Index (ELF) (see Fearon and 
Laitin, 2003). The ELF captures fractionalization based on the Herfindahl concentration 
index.
26
 The original ELF can take in any value between zero and one and indicates the 
probability that two randomly selected individuals from the entire population will be from 
two different groups. Yet the ELF indicator does not take into account another crucial feature 
of European diversity, namely the broader cultural background of participants and the 
possibility that experiences with immigration differ across countries or regions (see Freeman, 
1995; Geddes, 2003). Therefore, the group scores obtained on the basis of the ELF indicator 
have been weighed by a factor of three for groups that were composed of Western, Central 
Eastern, and Southern Europeans and by a factor of two for groups composed of Western and 
Central Eastern Europeans or groups composed of Western and Southern Europeans.
27
 
Groups where all participants originated from the same region obtained a weight of 1. The 
scores ranged from 0.48 to 2.11, with higher scores indicating higher levels of national 
heterogeneity. 
Additional individual level factors are introduced as controls. All of them are expected to 
enhance an individual’s engagement in discussion. Interest in politics is captured on an 11-
point scale from (0) “not at all interested in politics” to (10) “passionately interested in 
politics”. An indicator for salience aims to capture the personal relevance of the topic by 
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 ELF = 1-Σsi
2
 where si is the share of group i out of a total of n groups.  
27
 None of the groups of our subsample exclusively incorporated participants from Central Eastern and Southern 
Europe.  
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asking how immigration is perceived on a continuum from “no problem at all” (0) to “the 
most serious problem we face” (10). In order to model expertise in the field, a knowledge 
index was created that takes in a discrete value from 0 to 3, by indicating the number of 
correct answers to knowledge questions on immigration in the questionnaire.
28
 Last but not 
least, a categorical variable for a person’s attitude toward immigration is introduced. The 
variable has been built as a scale from five central questions on immigration that proved to be 
substantially related in a test of inter-item correlation.
29
 The 25% at the lower end of the scale 
were classified as holding strong conservative opinions towards immigration, while the top 
25% of the scale were classified as holding strong progressive opinions towards immigration. 
The in-between 50% represent the baseline category. All control variables express 
participants’ answers at wave 2 of the questionnaire, i.e. right at the start of the small group 
discussions.
30
  
3.4 Results 
The first step was to estimate multilevel models for contribution. Model 1 in Table 3.1 
presents the results of the lognormal Poisson models for frequency of participation. 
According to expectations, interest in politics is a clear driver of contribution in terms of 
utterances.  
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 The questions asked for the definition of Blue Card workers, the role of the EU in the current immigration 
policy and for a figure of the number of immigrants currently living in the EU. For each of the questions, the 
participants could choose out of four possible options and an additional “don’t know” category.  
29
 α=0.76. See Appendix D for more details on the construction of the scale.  
30
 I refrain from inserting a group level predictor for facilitator intervention. First of all, DP is not designed to 
test the influence of different facilitation styles. Therefore, encountered differences in facilitator behavior are 
non-systematic and a categorization of different intervention styles proved difficult. Second, facilitator 
intervention should be driven by participation patterns. Only if participation is largely unequal, facilitators 
should interfere. If individuals participate on roughly equal levels from the start, there is no need for intervention. 
Therefore, a proper measure of facilitator behavior would require identifying cases where the necessity for 
facilitator intervention existed but where facilitators failed to comply with their tasks. Creating such a measure 
proved to be exceedingly difficult.  
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Table 3.1: Determinants of Contribution (incl. Silent Participants)  
 
Model 1 
Frequency 
Model 2 
Speaking Time 
Fixed effects 
Intercept 
     1.563*** 
(0.166) 
      5.621*** 
(0.245) 
Women 
-0.111 
(0.116) 
  -0.663** 
(0.223) 
Education 
0.013 
(0.013) 
0.021 
(0.026) 
Working-class 
-0.261
+
 
(0.150) 
-0.312 
(0.280) 
Younger participants 
-0.144 
(0.152) 
0.018 
(0.292) 
Older participants 
-0.131 
(0.148) 
0.150 
(0.290) 
Southern Europeans (SE) 
-0.054 
(0.182) 
0.111 
(0.320) 
Central Eastern Europeans (CEE) 
 -0.357 
+
 
(0.188) 
-0.783 
(0.480) 
Interest in politics 
 0.072* 
(0.030) 
      0.184*** 
(0.056) 
Knowledge 
0.038 
(0.063) 
  0.301* 
(0.127) 
Salience 
-0.016 
(0.027) 
-0.003 
(0.053) 
Attitudes (strongly progressive) 
0.073 
(0.146) 
-0.239 
(0.289) 
Attitudes (strongly conservative) 
0.120 
(0.148) 
-0.447 
(0.281) 
National heterogeneity of  small group 
-0.306 
(0.266) 
0.001 
(0.287) 
Random effects   
Individual level  
0.244 
(0.494) 
1.942 
(1.394) 
Group level  
0.385 
(0.148) 
0.770 
(0.877) 
AIC 364.4 655.8 
Log Likelihood -166.2 -311.9 
Notes: Multilevel models are estimated with the lme4 package in R (Bates et al., 2011). For contribution 
in speaking time, a linear hierarchical model with varying slopes for CEE participants is estimated. The 
dependent variable is operationalized as log of the total amount of speaking time. For frequency of 
contribution, a lognormal Poisson model is estimated (varying intercept) in order to account for 
overdispersion (Bolker, 2010; Bates et al., 2011). All ordinal and continuous predictor variables are 
centered at the mean. Estimated standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
+
p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01., 
***p<.001. Individual N=173. Group N=13. 
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Exponentiating the estimates reveals that a one-point increase on the 11-point scale accounts 
for a significant difference in contribution of 7.5%, holding all other factors constant. In turn, 
belonging to a Central Eastern European (CEE) member state is supposed to reduce 
participation by 30% of the expected count. A strong reduction is also suggested for members 
of the working-class (-23%). However, there is still a considerable degree of statistical 
uncertainty in the latter two estimates (p<0.1). On the other hand, no bias is detected for age, 
education, or gender. Yet, the picture looks somewhat different when focusing on speaking 
time, the second indicator of contribution equality (Model 2, Table 3.1). Exponentiating the 
estimate for women shows that the significant reduction in speaking time is considerable (-
48.5%), holding all other factors constant. Even higher is the estimated reduction in speaking 
time for participants from CEE states (-54.3%), although the effect slightly misses the level of 
marginal significance (p<0.1). While working-class participants are biased when it comes to 
frequency of speaking, there is no significant evidence that this bias translates to the amount 
of speaking time.  
One fear of deliberative critics is that participation biases increase with the heterogeneity of 
the discussion environment (e.g., Karpowitz et al., 2009). This is explicit for women and 
participants from new EU-member countries.
31
 Figure 3.1 displays the marginal effect plots 
based on the interaction models presented in Appendix E. Again, the bias is more pronounced 
for the models of speaking time while the effect for frequency of contribution does not reach 
sufficient levels of statistical significance. In terms of speaking time, women’s contribution 
was significantly and substantially different from zero in the nine most heterogeneous 
discussion groups, while the gender gap is smaller and less certain in the more homogeneous 
groups. More worrisome is the picture for participants from new EU-member countries. The 
shaded area demarcates the location of the groups in which participants of the new CEE 
member states were engaging with participants from older EU-member states. From a 
perspective of European integration, the results are somewhat troubling: when engaging with 
participants from older EU-countries, the newcomers are very likely to add significantly less 
to the discussion. As for women, the gap in speaking time increases with national diversity. 
Since CEE members were more likely to be located in highly heterogeneous group 
discussions, it is reasonable to check for individual level interaction effects as well: although 
CEE women are slightly more likely to remain silent than Western European (WE) women, 
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 For working-class and Southern European participants, national heterogeneity did not prove to be an 
amplifying factor of inequalities (results available on request).  
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active CEE women are contributing more compared to active WE women, both in terms of 
frequency and speaking-time.
32
 
Figure 3.1: The Effect of Women and CEE Participants on Contribution by National 
Heterogeneity of Small Groups 
 
 
Note: Marginal effect and 95% confidence intervals are based on the hierarchical models presented in Table 
E.1 in Appendix E. The shaded areas demarcate the location of the groups in which CEE participants were 
engaging with participants from older EU-member states (WE, SE, or both). See also Figure E.1 (Appendix 
E) for the results of the simulation of the conditional effects. 
That women participate considerably less compared to their male counterparts reflects 
findings from other face-to-face mini-public settings (Hansen, 2010; Himmelroos, 2011; see 
also Mansbridge, 1983) but contradicts findings from online deliberative polls (Kim et al., 
2010; Siu, 2009). Yet in the Danish deliberative poll, Hansen (2010) concludes that the 
gender gap is particularly pronounced among the most passive speakers. The findings are 
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 The latter also translates to consideration. Results available on request.  
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similar in Europolis: Table 3.2 presents the contribution models by only including the active 
speakers, i.e. the participants that contributed at least once to the discussion. These results are 
important to keep in mind when turning to the consideration models, since active contribution 
is a necessary precondition for receiving consideration.  
Being female results in a reduction in speaking time of 29%, which is considerably lower than 
the estimate of the models including the non-speakers, suggesting that a significant majority 
of the non-speakers are female. On the other hand, the effect for working-class participants 
increased both in magnitude and clarity. Among the active speakers, working-class 
participants seem to be the ones with the smallest amount of contribution. Holding all other 
factors constant, being a member of the working-class is associated with a substantial 
reduction of 48.7% in speaking time (and 28.6% in contribution frequency). With regard to 
frequency of contribution among the active speakers (Model 4), new biases appear for 
younger (-21.5%) and older participants (-20.7%) on a marginal level of significance (p<0.1). 
On the other hand, being a participant with strong conservative attitudes towards immigration 
increases the frequency of contribution by 28.8% (p<0.1). No such effect is detected for 
participants that display highly progressive viewpoints towards immigrants.   
Let us now turn to the determinants of consideration (Table 3.2, Model 3). In terms of biases 
for our marginalized groups, the consideration model seems to be somewhat a reflection of 
the frequency model for active speakers presented in the same table (Model 2), indicating that 
the ones who spoke more often were also the ones whose views were considered more often 
by others.
33
 With a value of 0.73, the bivariate correlation between consideration centrality 
and frequency of speaking is indeed considerable. According to the estimates, being a 
member of the working-class accounts for a 39% decrease in receiving consideration. For 
women and new EU-members, results look more promising: while there is no evident 
discrimination in terms of contribution frequency among the active speakers, there is also no 
evidence for their marginalization in terms of consideration.  
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 However, this is only true for the variables of interest. Turning to controls, it becomes evident that although 
interest in politics is a strong driver of participation, it is not an explanatory factor for receiving consideration. 
On the other hand, the ones that clearly receive more consideration compared to their rate of contribution are 
holders of conservative attitudes towards immigration.  
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Table 3.2: Determinants of Contribution and Consideration (Active Speakers only) 
                          Contribution                    Consideration 
Fixed effects Model 3 Time Model 4 Frequency Model 5 Centrality 
Intercept 
      5.527*** 
(0.415) 
     1.589*** 
(0.160) 
     0.962*** 
(0.152) 
Women 
-0.343* 
(0.158) 
0.001 
(0.106) 
-0.145 
(0.133) 
Education 
0.008 
(0.018) 
0.013 
(0.011) 
0.012 
(0.014) 
Working-class 
    -0.667*** 
(0.196) 
-0.337* 
(0.136) 
  -0.494** 
(0.181) 
Younger participants 
-0.237 
(0.204) 
 -0.242
+
 
(0.139) 
-0.150 
(0.174) 
Older participants 
-0.238 
(0.202) 
 -0.232
+
 
(0.134) 
 -0.298 
+
 
(0.171) 
Southern Europeans (SE) 
0.119 
(0.220) 
-0.021 
(0.166) 
-0.307 
(0.203) 
Central Eastern Europeans (CEE) 
-0.209 
(0.270) 
-0.230 
(0.174) 
-0.185 
(0.201) 
Interest in politics 
    0.108** 
(0.039) 
0.052
+
 
(0.027) 
0.006 
(0.034) 
Knowledge 
0.110 
(0.088) 
-0.015 
(0.057) 
0.006 
(0.072) 
Salience 
-0.010 
(0.037) 
-0.014 
(0.024) 
-0.016 
(0.030) 
Attitudes (strongly progressive) 
-0.074 
(0.199) 
0.160  
(0.130) 
0.153 
(0.164) 
Attitudes (strongly conservative) 
-0.048 
(0.200) 
 0.253
+
 
(0.135) 
 0.390* 
(0.163) 
National heterogeneity  
0.065 
(0.193) 
-0.279 
(0.271) 
-0.219 
(0.207) 
Random effects    
Individual level  
0.898 
(0.948) 
0.154 
(0.393) 
0.161 
(0.401) 
Group level  
0.133 
(0.365) 
0.166 
(0.407) 
0.047 
(0.217) 
AIC 501.8 301.5 282.5 
Log Likelihood -234.9 -134.8 -125.2 
Notes: Multilevel models are estimated with the lme4 package in R (Bates et al., 2011). For contribution in 
speaking time, a linear hierarchical model with varying slopes for CEE participants is estimated. The dependent 
variable is operationalized as log of the total amount of speaking time. For frequency of contribution and 
consideration, lognormal Poisson models are estimated (varying intercept) in order to account for overdispersion 
(Bolker, 2010; Bates et al., 2011). All ordinal and continuous predictor variables are centered at the mean. 
Estimated standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
+
p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01., ***p<.001. Individual N=163. 
Group N=13. 
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Again, interaction models were estimated. Figure 3.2 plots the marginal effects for gender and 
CEE members on receiving consideration. There is no concrete evidence that new EU-
members received significantly less consideration than their older European peers. Yet, the 
confidence intervals for women in the most heterogeneous groups are different from 0, 
suggesting that women receive significantly less consideration in when they engage in highly 
heterogeneous groups. 
Figure 3.2: The Effect of Women and CEE Participants on Consideration by National 
Heterogeneity of Small Groups 
  
Note: Marginal effect and 95% confidence intervals are based on the hierarchical models presented in 
Table E.1 in the Appendix E. The shaded areas demarcate the location of the groups in which CEE 
participants were engaging with participants from older EU-member states (WE, SE, or both). See also 
Figure E.2 (Appendix E) for the results on the simulation of the conditional effects. 
In sum, results indicate that the magnitude of the decrease in the representation of women, 
CEE members and working-class participants is substantial at the level of contribution. While 
not so pronounced in terms of frequency of speaking, traditionally disadvantaged groups have 
a strong tendency to keep their statements short. Yet finding that these groups nevertheless 
managed to get themselves heard would render previous results less worrisome. As can be 
gleaned from Table 3.2, participants receive consideration from others in general accordance 
with their contribution to the discussion: for all three groups, the decrease in consideration 
lies in-between the (less pronounced) decrease in frequency and the (more pronounced) 
decrease in speaking time. At first sight, this indicates that no additional mechanism of 
exclusion was present in relation to consideration of arguments. Yet we may also want to 
know whether arguments of the more peripheral groups have been fairly considered by 
members of the dominant group. Discovering that views of marginalized group members only 
found appropriate consideration among members of the peripheral groups would reveal the 
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previous optimism as too hasty. Therefore, we turn to the question of homophily. Homophily 
analysis explores whether individuals’ views were more likely to be considered by similar 
others. While the absence of homophily would suggest that the claims of peripheral groups 
reasonably entered the consideration process of members of the dominating groups, evidence 
of homophily might imply that exclusionary mechanisms were at work. I test for homophily 
by comparing network densities of the consideration networks between peripheral and 
dominant groups (see Lazer et al., 2010). Network densities are calculated as the total number 
of existing relations (here: references) over the total number of possible relations. Densities 
can take in any number between 0 (here: indicating that no one’s view was referenced) and 1 
(indicating that everyone’s view was referred to by all members of the group). Figure 3.3 
displays the percentage point differences in within- and between-group densities. Positive 
numbers indicate a tendency for homophily (more references were made to in-group 
members), while numbers below zero indicate a tendency toward heterophily (more 
references were made to out-group members). While the triangles display the differences in 
densities for the more dominant cohorts (separately, for each small group discussion), the 
circles show the same from the perspective of the marginalized groups.  
Figure 3.3: Homophily Effects for Members of the Dominant and Peripheral Groups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: For the corresponding entries to the Figure, see Tables E.3-E.5 in Appendix E. 
Figure 3.3 reveals an overall tendency towards homophily for men, non-working-class 
participants and citizens of older EU-countries: the dominating groups in terms of 
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contribution tend to consider views from their peers more often than views of their more 
peripheral discussion partners. Yet the extent to which they do that varies greatly from group 
to group. For example, while in three groups, participants from older EU-countries were 
equally likely to interact with participants from CEE countries as with their peers, another 
group shows a 50 percentage point difference in favor of referencing their dominant peers. As 
an illustration, Figure 3.4 graphs the consideration network of the respective group.  
Figure 3.4: Network of Consideration (Group 9) 
 
Note: Attributes display country affiliation. Diamonds are used for CEE participants (Polish), 
triangles for WE participants (Germans and Austrian)). The size of the nodes is given by the in-
degree centrality of an actor (amount of references received from co-discussants). The arrows 
indicate the direction of the reference. Isolates (top left corner) indicate participants that 
contributed to the discussion but neither made a civil reference to someone nor received one. 
Graphs were created using NetDraw (Borgatti et al., 2002). 
Turning to the marginalized groups (circles), the reverse picture is on display. In the large 
majority of the group discussions, women, working-class participants and members from new 
EU-countries showed higher consideration densities towards members of their out-group. For 
some reason, members of peripheral groups deemed insights of the dominating crowd more 
pivotal than perceptions of members of their own groups. Yet there are two notable 
exceptions for gender: in two comparatively homogeneous groups (group 3, WE members 
only; group 16, CEE members only), women received more references from both male and 
female participants.  
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3.5 Discussion and Implications 
At this point, we may only speculate on the reasons for the patterns of dominance detected in 
the foregoing analyses. One may argue that, in terms of epistemic quality, the contributions of 
members of peripheral groups may not have lived up to the contributions provided by the 
dominating speakers. Recognizing some actors to be the more eloquent advocates may have   
intimidated other actors from contributing and it may explain why the formers’ views were 
more likely to find consideration. Yet we demonstrate in Chapter 2 that the deliberative 
competence of women and members of new EU-countries who participated in Europolis does 
not significantly rank behind their dominating counterparts (see also Himmelroos, 2011).
34
 
The results are different for working-class members: their contributions were of lower 
deliberative quality than those of higher class participants. According to the previous analysis, 
working-class participants are also the most marginalized group in terms of consideration. 
Yet, as discussed above, deliberative theory would be unwilling to a priori exclude a 
particular group from influencing the deliberative process, particularly if the group is likely to 
add a relevant social perspective to the discussion (Bohman, 2006; Brown, 2006).
35
 By 
discussing third country migration, working-class participants could have offered a new 
perspective on blue-collar immigrants that could have been deemed worthy of consideration. 
The same accounts for the new CEE members and their potentially different experiences with 
migration. On the other hand, it is hard to understand what particular perspective men, as a 
group, could have introduced to the discussion on third country migration that would justify 
their dominant position in the discussion. 
Yet to conclude that the findings are the result of purposive exclusion by the dominating 
group may be too hasty, given the results of the homophily analysis and an extension thereof: 
in 8 out of 13 groups (11, respectively), women and working-class participants received, in 
absolute terms, more reference from the central actors than from members of the peripheral 
groups.
36
 Thus, the fact that marginalized groups received somewhat less consideration 
compared to their dominating counterparts is not necessarily due to a lack of interest from the 
side of the central groups. Rather, marginalized actors seem to contribute to the preservation 
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 However, it should be noted that in Europolis, the correlation between latent deliberative quality and 
contribution in terms of frequency and speaking-time is moderate (see Chapter 2, section 2.6). This accounts as 
well (to a slightly lesser degree) to consideration (r = 0.616).  
35
 A social perspective does not necessarily stand for shared interests or preferences. Rather, a social perspective 
consists of „shared experiences (...) which tend to give rise to shared questions and concerns“ (Brown, 2006: 
218).  
36
 The same is true for 3 out of the 5 heterogeneous groups that included more than one member of a new EU-
country. See Tables E.3-E.5 in Appendix E. 
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of their peripheral position by considering the arguments of the dominating speakers as more 
valuable. Figure 3.5 illustrates such a situation in group 1. 
Figure 3.5: Network of Consideration (Group 1) 
 
Note: Node attributes are shown for gender (men as squares, women as circles). The size of the 
nodes is given by the in-degree centrality of an actor (amount of references received from co-
discussants). The arrows indicate the direction of the reference. Isolates (top left corner) indicate 
participants that contributed to the discussion but neither made a civil reference to someone nor 
received one. Graphs were created using NetDraw (Borgatti et al., 2002). 
Are these findings concerning in light of what we know about inequalities in other 
deliberative settings? A tentative answer is both yes and no. Compared to real-world 
deliberation in town meetings (Bryan, 1999; Mansbridge, 1983), inequalities in contribution 
are of minor concern in Europolis. Although this suggests that artificially created (mini-
)public spaces are able to attenuate common patterns of social dominance, one still wants to 
know whether they manage to do so to their best ability. Compared to other settings that use 
similar procedural safeguards, the following pattern emerges: while contribution biases for 
socio-economic characteristics have now been detected repeatedly in face-to-face deliberative 
setting (Hansen, 2010; Himmelroos, 2011), they have proved to be almost completely absent 
in online DP (Siu, 2009; Kim et al., 2010; see Price, 2009). Keeping the latter in mind, I 
refrain from concluding that remaining discrepancies in contribution patterns between social 
groups in Europolis are solely the result of different speaking styles and that patterns of social 
dominance have been completely absent.   
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Finding that consideration patterns are largely a reflection of the patterns for frequency of 
contribution recalls Sanders’ (1997) meta-analysis of jury studies. Sanders (1997: 365) 
concludes that whether an argument prevails during deliberation is a matter of whether the 
argument has a “talkative promoter”. A promising (though tentative) conclusion would be that 
by enhancing contribution equality, consideration biases could be attenuated. On the other 
hand, offering “overspeaking” as a panacea to recognition may leave us with an uneasy 
feeling: a participant that only contributed once may offer a novel perspective or introduce 
critical remarks, while a participant that “overspeaks” may add little to the discussion if he 
only repeats the same arguments several times. From a practical point of view, one may also 
question how participation equality could be boosted further, given that DP already places so 
much emphasis on providing a favorable environment for free and equal participation. 
Nevertheless, facilitator intervention varied across Europolis group discussions (Gerber, 
2011; see also Bächtiger and Gerber, 2012). A systematic evaluation of facilitators’ influence 
on fair and equal participation is, however, beyond the scope of this chapter. What is more, 
facilitator interventions may be more appropriately studied in experimental settings, where 
different facilitator styles are purposely introduced as a treatment variable (see Reykowski, 
2006; Schneiderhan and Khan, 2008). Yet a deliberative theory of facilitation has hitherto 
been missing (but see Moore, 2012). Whether and how facilitators manage to establish a fair 
and equal discussion environment are important issues for future research. 
3.6 Conclusion 
In this article, I have proposed a pathway to evaluate equal participation during small group 
discussions in deliberative polling (DP). The main motivation for doing so is that informal 
impediments to participation may remain even after everyone is formally empowered to take 
part (e.g., Fraser, 1992; Sanders, 1997; Young, 2002). By accounting for the intrinsically 
relational aspect of interpersonal communication, the paper adds to the small but growing 
literature on deliberation that voices reservations about taking the willingness to engage with 
others claims for granted (e.g., Burkhalter, 2002; Dobson 2010, 2012; Stromer-Galley, 2007; 
Pedrini et al., 2013). Methodologically, the article responds to Mendelberg (2005) who argues 
for taking the deliberative context more seriously. As a consequence, multilevel modeling and 
social network analysis have been proposed as suitable tools of analysis.  
In terms of contribution, the findings reveal that particularly women, members of new EU-
countries and working-class participants spoke significantly and substantially less than their 
counterparts. Most importantly, results suggest a contextual effect on contribution: with 
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increasing diversity of national backgrounds, women and new EU-members tend to give the 
floor to men and members of older EU-states. Yet the effects are more attenuated for the 
absolute amount of speaking time, while they are nuanced for the number of speeches made 
by individuals. When it comes to patterns of consideration, the article is far from concluding 
that the dominating groups purposely excluded the views of more peripheral actors. Rather, 
results suggest that the degree to which a speaker receives consideration from others largely 
depends on the number of speeches he or she contributes to the discussion. Thus, except for 
the working-class participants whose exclusion from the discussion is consistent and 
substantial, lacking consideration was not a serious issue for traditionally marginalized 
groups. Moreover, finding that receiving consideration is strongly bound to one’s presence in 
terms of utterances gives rise to some concerns. Deliberative theory would meet an approach 
that offers  “overspeaking” as a panacea to recognition with reticence. 
The article is limited in the scope and generalizability of its findings. First of all, the sample 
used in this study was small and results await confirmation from further research. 
Furthermore, the definition of equality offered in this study is strongly bound to the setting 
under examination. Recalling that the imperative in DP is learning and understanding rather 
than decision-making (Fung, 2003; see also Olsen and Trenz, 2013), a deliberative process 
has to make sure that the relevant reasons are aired and appropriately weighed in order for 
citizens to develop more informed and considered opinions (Mansbridge et al., 2012). In a 
setting where the aim is decision-making, one might also want to place emphasis on the 
nature of the deliberative outcome, for example in terms of inclusiveness, justice, or fairness 
(e.g., Gutmann and Thompson, 2002; Rawls, 1971; Sanders, 1997). In addition, the article is 
restricted to the question of whether participants actively communicated their arguments and 
on the uptake of these arguments. In doing so, the nature and consequences of participants’ 
contributions are not to be denied. Rather, they are the topic of concurrent work (see also 
Chapter 4). The principle aim of the chapter is to call for alternative and multiple evaluative 
yardsticks of equal participation in deliberative mini-publics.  
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4.1 Introduction 
To date, the success of deliberative polls (DPs) has mainly been evaluated by assessing 
whether participants change their minds after deliberation (e.g. Luskin et al., 2002; Fishkin, 
2009; Farrar et al., 2010). Opinion change is crucial for the Madisonian approach to 
deliberation that James Fishkin and associates are strongly wedded to (Morrell, 2010). 
Madisonian deliberation focuses on engaging citizens (or legislators) in reflective 
consideration of their own views. Since people are not all knowing, being confronted with 
new information and hearing other opinions should be conducive to opinion change. From a 
normative vantage point, however, post-deliberative opinions may not be valid unless we 
ascertain that they are the results of “mechanisms specified in the normative theories” (Neblo, 
2007a: 1). This is also recognized by Fishkin (2010: 70) who acknowledges that “the question 
for the DP is whether or not the moves are based on reasoned argument with good 
information considered under good conditions”. While Fishkin and associates have already 
investigated the link between information gain and opinion change (e.g., Luskin et al., 2002), 
very few scholars have taken the trouble to investigate whether and to what extent post-
deliberative opinion is linked to the deliberative quality of the discussion process (exceptions 
are e.g., Siu, 2009; Sanders, 2012).  
Ignoring the deliberative process as a potential driver for post-deliberative opinion is a major 
deficiency, though. First, most deliberative theorists put a strong prime on the actual process 
of deliberation and the quality of arguments presented during that process. As mentioned 
above, opinion change should occur after the ‘give and take’ of ‘good’ arguments. However, 
the claim that deliberation is conducive to enlightened opinions stands in stark contrast to 
previous evidence from public opinion research and cognitive psychology. Lupia (2002), for 
example, lists various cognitive constraints that hinder listeners to properly engage with a 
speaker’s message. Consequently, Lupia reproaches deliberative theorists for pursuing an 
“unreliable folk theory of learning” (p. 149). Similarly, public opinion researchers have hinted 
at framing effects, i.e. the danger for citizens to change their opinions in direction of the more 
accessible (i.e. more recently or frequently used) frames (see Druckman, 2001). In order to 
answer the question whether deliberation actually lives up to its promise, we should attempt 
to grasp its influence on opinions and specify to what extent it can be separated from other, 
non-deliberative opinion formation processes. Second, DPs consist of a package of 
interventions, out of which only the group discussions can be considered truly deliberative. 
Other interventions, such as the provision of balanced briefing material and the discussions 
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with experts and/or politicians are basically means to provide participants with additional 
information (Mutz, 2006: 59). Some deliberative theorists have even claimed that the 
discussion component may be less meaningful for opinion change than the information phase 
and the internal-reflective process in participants’ heads prior to discussion (what Goodin 
(2000) calls “deliberation within”). Therefore, we need to better determine the exact causal 
weight of the deliberative process in the small discussion groups on post-deliberative opinions 
(e.g., Price and Neijens, 1998; Schneiderhan and Khan, 2008).  
The goal of this article is to open up the black box and explore deliberation’s influence on 
post-deliberative opinion formation. In concrete, we ask whether and to what extent 
deliberative quality in the discussion process of DPs is linked to individual post-deliberative 
opinions. Theoretically, we combine the formal quality of argumentation - which we dub 
“justification rationality” - with a focus on the content and direction of argumentation and link 
it to opinion change. We call this “deliberative persuasion”. We directly contrast our 
conception of deliberative persuasion to non-deliberative persuasion, where the repetition of 
positions rather than the formal quality of arguments matters for opinion formation. 
Empirically, we focus on Europolis, whereby we analyzed the discussions on third country 
migration in a subsample of 13 groups.
37
  
The article proceeds as follows. First, we discuss the mechanisms of opinion change as 
specified in public opinion research and deliberative theory. Next, we present our approach of 
deliberative persuasion, followed by a description of the data, measures, and the statistical 
method. The next section presents the results, followed by a discussion of the implications of 
our results. The last section concludes.  
4.2 Two Perspectives on Public Opinion Formation 
Both deliberation and public opinion researchers agree that in general, citizens lack 
information about political matters (e.g., Converse, 1964; Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; 
Ackerman and Fishkin, 2002). Apart from this agreement, the two research traditions have 
worked on polar tracks for a long time. While public opinion researchers explored the 
potential for low-information rationality (e.g., Lupia and McCubbins, 1998), deliberative 
researchers argued that deliberation helps to inform public opinion. In the following, we will 
first give a brief overview how opinion formation processes are perceived by public opinion 
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 With regard to persuasion, we understand the successful attempt to convince someone of one’s opinion on a 
matter. As such, the definition of persuasion per se is value free (see e.g., Lupia and McCubbins, 1998). In the 
context of our study, persuasion can rely on deliberative or non-deliberative mechanisms. 
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research and deliberative theory. Then, we connect with recent attempts that started to 
combine the two perspectives and explore whether and how deliberation actually lives up to 
its promises.  
4.2.1 Public Opinion Research and Opinion Change 
Classic research in public opinion formation generally viewed opinion changes as 
problematic. According to Converse (1964), most citizens are incapable of making valuable 
contributions to public debates given their ignorance about the substance of politics and their 
inconsistency of opinions on public issues. Consequently, opinion stability – and not opinion 
change - was seen as a sign of ‘considerateness’. However, public-opinion research in the 
post-Converse era challenged these assumptions on theoretical and empirical grounds (Bartle, 
2000). Zaller and Feldman (1992) argued that the instability of attitudes is the result of more 
complex information processing related to factors such as issue salience, rhetoric of the 
political elite, political awareness and individual predispositions rather than a product of non-
attitudes. In other words, complex information processing can lead to attitudinal ambivalence 
(Zaller, 1992; see also Lavine et al., 2012). In the following, the complexity of opinion 
formation (or, change) was further explained by issue framing in media and elite discourse 
(Alvarez and Brehm, 2002; Druckman, 2001). The argument is that frames, i.e. the selection 
and presentation of information, shape how citizens think about an issue. Framing studies 
showed that exposing people to an argument for a given position has the power to push an 
individual toward this position (e.g., Zaller, 1992; Nelson et al., 1997). While classic studies 
of framing effects only exposed people to one particular frame, recent studies started to 
incorporate competing frames, making such experiments more adapted to political reality 
(e.g., Sniderman and Thierault, 2004; Brewer and Gross, 2005; Chong and Druckman, 2007). 
This development is associated with a paradigmatic shift in how citizens are viewed to 
process information. As Druckman (2001: 241) holds: “If emphasis framing effects work 
through a more deliberate process, we would expect systematic limits to political 
manipulation: people will not follow any frame that they recently and/or frequently hear”. By 
demonstrating that balanced discussion has the potential to limit framing effects, opinion 
researchers began to ‘warm up’ with the idea that deliberation could have beneficial effects 
for opinion formation and change (e.g., Druckman and Nelson, 2003; Price et al., 2005; but 
see Lupia, 2002). 
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4.2.2 Deliberation and Opinion Change 
Frames are unavoidable in all types of communication, even in deliberation (Price and 
Neijens, 1998; Calvert and Warren, 2012). However, problematic frames may be mitigated in 
deliberative settings such as DP, where a wide range of different frames (or, perspectives) on 
a particular issue is deployed and where facilitator intervention is supposed to establish a 
balanced and civil discussion environment. In such settings, people have the opportunity to 
“choose their own ‘terms of the debate’” (Price and Neijens, 1998: 160), which may make 
them less prone to framing effects (Hansen, 2007; Calvert and Warren, 2012). The idea of 
transformation of opinions and preferences is a defining characteristic of deliberative theory. 
Compared to aggregative visions of democracy, where exogenous preferences are merely 
cumulated, deliberative theory assumes that preferences are endogenously formed in the 
political process (e.g., Mansbridge, 1983; Rawls, 1993; Chambers, 2003). Being exposed to 
“information and arguments that may be dramatically different from what they ordinarily 
encounter”, people should be open to reflect on their own preferences in the light of better 
arguments (Barabas, 2004: 688). Moreover, being exposed to divergent viewpoints increases 
the chances that people actually engage in an extensive and deliberate process of reasoning – 
something which is not always the case in discussions with like-minded or in the context of 
internal reflection or “deliberation within” (Goodin, 2000; Landemore and Mercier, 2012).  
Yet, deliberative theorists are wary of making an automatic link between process quality and 
the propensity of changing minds. It is entirely possible that after serious reflection, 
participants find out that their original opinions and beliefs are fully valid, and consequently 
do not change their minds (Barabas, 2004; Dickson et al., 2008). However, when opinion 
change takes place, deliberative theory would require it to occur “via mechanisms specified in 
normative theory” (Neblo, 2007a: 1). Thus, individuals should change their minds only if they 
come to the conclusion that arguments presented by other participants are superior compared 
to their own (or, other) arguments. To date, this has rarely been subjected to systematic 
empirical scrutiny. The few existing studies differ widely in their conceptual and 
measurement approaches as well as in their findings. Two experimental studies found fairly 
optimistic results suggesting that deliberation rather than mere discussion is conducive to 
(strong) opinion changes at the group level (Barabas, 2004; Schneiderhan and Khan, 2008). 
Focusing on DP, Siu (2009) found some evidence that the substantive content of arguments 
presented in discussion affects the direction of opinion shifts at the individual level. In 
addition, Siu found that the effect of the substantive content becomes stronger when claims 
were backed by reasons. Two other studies did not find any significant relationship between 
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deliberative quality and post-deliberative opinions (Baccaro et al., 2011; Sanders, 2012). 
While the study by Baccaro et al. (2011) employs an external evaluation of deliberative 
quality (based on the Discourse Quality Index), Sanders (2012) employed a perception-based 
measure of deliberative quality. In the following, we will expand on these attempts by 
proposing an approach of deliberative and non-deliberative persuasion.  
4.3 Mechanisms of Opinion Change 
4.3.1 Mechanisms of Deliberative Persuasion 
All deliberative theorists have emphasized the crucial importance of robust reasoning – or, 
justification rationality (e.g., Cohen, 1989; Habermas, 1991; Rawls, 1993). As Chambers 
(1996: 99) succinctly puts it, “only rational, that is, argumentative, convincing is allowed to 
take place”. Justification rationality not only makes a speech accessible to rational critique, it 
also increases the chances of persuading others on the basis of logical coherence. In line with 
an “argumentative theory of reasoning” (Landemore and Mercier, 2012), we argue that 
opinion change is normatively desirable when it is based on proper reasoning, i.e., when 
positions are backed by robust reasons. Our conception of deliberative persuasion starts from 
the premise that diverse pro- and contra-positions are presented during discussion. 
Deliberative persuasion then means that specific positions are coupled with well-justified 
premises. By well-justified premises, we expect, as a minimum, that a complete linkage is 
made between a premise and a conclusion. Neblo (2007a) calls this “decent rationales”. We 
also consider more elaborated linkages between a premise and a conclusion, whereby 
participants explain in more detail why they support or reject a specific position or proposal. 
Neblo (2007a) calls this “sophisticated rationales”.38 All else equal, the expected (and desired) 
result of deliberative persuasion is that participants shift their opinions in direction of those 
positions that are embedded in decent or sophisticated rationales. This satisfies the 
deliberative criterion of a reason-driven pathway to opinion formation.  
We may, however, encounter situations where there is a balance between decent or 
sophisticated pro- and contra-rationales. Actually, Fishkin (2009) considers “argumentative 
balance” as a key feature of a desirable deliberative process. Only when participants have 
considered arguments for different sides of an issue can we speak of proper deliberation. 
Indeed, the absence of decent or sophisticated rationales for one side may have nothing to do 
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 Yet, in addition to the formal structure of argumentation, Neblo’s (2007a) assessment of decent and 
sophisticated rationales incorporates basic substantive judgments about the quality of the rationales.  
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with the superiority of arguments for that specific position but simply with the inability of 
participants to forward rationales for the ‘other side’. Put differently, not every side of a 
controversial issue may have vociferous and rhetorically gifted advocates, a problem which is 
amplified in citizen deliberation where participants tend to possess highly varying levels of 
deliberative ability (see Chapter 2). Therefore, the presence of argumentative balance is 
generally a welcome fact, even though its consequences are not yet fully explored. On the one 
hand, argumentative balance may lead to a range of opinion shifts, a fact that is not fully 
recognized by most deliberative scholars. Clearly, after listening to different positions, 
participants may weigh respective reasons and find one side more persuasive than the other. 
But “argumentative balance” may also be conducive to a depolarizing trend, i.e., participants 
with more extreme positions move towards middle positions. On the other hand, 
“argumentative balance” may also lead to opinion stability: if participants in deliberation 
realize that there are ‘good’ arguments for both sides, they may just stick to their original 
positions. Finally, it may be that pure balance is not conducive to any opinion change, as 
Zaller’s (1992) model would predict. 
A final comment is in order. We are fully aware that high justification rationality may not 
equal argumentative superiority. For example, a clever speaker might use unnecessarily 
elaborate arguments precisely to cover weaknesses in the main argument, overwhelming his 
audience with evidence and complex argumentation. Yet, as Landemore and Mercier (2012: 
920) argue, a theory of argumentative reasoning is not detached from truth seeking. Since one 
function of reasoning is the evaluation of arguments, deliberators have a strong incentive to 
present sound arguments. If a speaker nevertheless sets up a well-phrased construct of lies, 
truth seeking is most effectively advanced through falsification of the claim by means of 
rational argumentation. Moreover, the non-strategic setting of DP (where participants make 
no consequential decisions at the end) may considerably reduce the incentive to depart from 
truth in order to unconditionally impose one’s (narrow) interests on the group. In this sense, 
DPs are viewed as “safe havens”, that are “insulated from certain negative or distorting 
effects”, as we typically find them in the broader public and political sphere (Chambers, 2004: 
400). In addition, one might criticize that our definition of deliberative persuasion reduces 
deliberative quality to purely formal properties of the force of the better argument (see Neblo 
2007b). We agree that the conception of deliberative persuasion that we advance in this paper 
is a narrow one. However, to provide a comprehensive definition of deliberative persuasion 
would be beyond the scope of this paper. Future research may want to broaden the conception 
of deliberative persuasion and find a way to incorporate substantive criteria of deliberative 
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quality. Yet we defend our approach in relation to the case under examination: in Europolis, 
justification rationality is not only part of a latent construct of deliberative quality at the level 
of the speakers (see Chapter 2), the construct can also be sensed at the level of the (most 
rational) speeches. In general, the speeches with the highest justification rationality are 
characterized by public spiritedness and the complete absence of disrespectful utterances 
towards the relevant social group.  
4.3.2 Mechanisms of Non-Deliberative Persuasion 
Ideal deliberation should be immune against non-deliberative mechanism of persuasion (such 
as threats, coercion or other kinds of repression and inequality), i.e. mechanisms that are 
unrelated to the merits of an argument (Chambers, 1996: 100; see also Neblo, 2007a; Mutz, 
2008). However, social and cognitive psychology as well as rational choice theory has listed 
various cognitive constraints that may hamper deliberatively induced opinion change (see 
Lupia, 2002 for a review and Neblo, 2007a for an empirical test). Here, we focus only on one 
non-deliberative mechanism, namely the influence of a dominant position. In order for 
deliberation to have epistemic value, we need to make sure that the evaluation of arguments 
also occurs independently of the size of the group offering them (Estlund, 1997: 191; see also 
Myers, 2012). Majorities might not always be correct. If latent social pressures make people 
change their minds in direction of the majority’s viewpoint, “social muscle, not persuasive 
[deliberative] argumentation, carries the day” (Mendelberg, 2002: 159). Yet, one may argue 
that mechanisms of social comparison are less frequent in DP, where participants are not 
forced to reveal their post-deliberative preferences to the rest of the group. Yet, skewed 
positioning in a specific direction may still exert a non-deliberative persuasion effect. 
Similarly, research in psychology has shown that moderate levels of repetition of arguments 
and statements may push uninformed individuals in this direction, by creating a so-called 
“illusion of truth” or validity effect (see, e.g., Arkes and Blumer, 1984; Moons et al., 2009; 
see also Chong and Druckman, 2013). Therefore, we complement our analysis by assessing 
whether the dominant position affected the post-deliberative opinions of Europolis 
participants. 
4.4 Data and Measurement 
Empirically, we analyzed the discussions on third country migration in a subsample of 13 
Europolis discussion groups by employing OLS regression with clustered standard errors. We 
refrained from analyzing all 25 small discussion groups, since analyzing deliberative 
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processes empirically is a highly demanding and time-consuming affair. Although our 
subsample is limited in national diversity compared to the full sample of participants, it is 
comparable to the rest of the sample with regard to pre- and post-deliberative opinions on our 
questions of interest (see Appendix D).  
4.4.1 Dependent Variables 
In this study, we concentrate on individual level opinion change rather than on group level 
outcomes, such as the net aggregate opinion shift of a group. The point is that opinion 
changes at the individual level may occur in the absence of a net shift at the aggregate. 
Moreover, we do not create an indicator of immigration preferences. Although the 
participants were required to answer a batch of questions on preferences and attitudes toward 
third country immigration, many of those questions were rather specific and were not 
intensely discussed in the groups. Therefore, we focus on two preference items in connection 
with the immigration topic: “regularizing irregular immigrants” and “European involvement 
in immigration affairs”. These two items formed the core of the Europolis immigration 
discussions and were rather intensively discussed within the groups, which is essential when 
exploring the consequences of different deliberative abilities (see Stromer-Galley, 2007: 6). 
While the item “European involvement” represents a fairly pragmatic issue, the item 
“regularizing irregular immigrants” has a strong humanitarian dimension (Kymlicka, 2000). 
Irregular immigration was measured on an 11-point scale whereby participants had to rank 
their policy choice between wholehearted agreement with return (disagreement with 
regularization) (0) and wholehearted agreement with regularization (disagreement with 
return) (10). European involvement in immigration affairs was measured on an 11-point scale 
whereby participants had to rank the level at which third country immigration should be 
regulated by the European Union or by individual member states. While (0) means “entirely 
at the individual member states”, (10) denotes that the decision should be left completely to 
the European Union. We evaluate both items at the end of the Europolis event (T3), 
controlling for opinions at T2 (immediately before the discussion started). This strategy to 
assess opinion change has been used elsewhere (Neblo, 2007a; Sanders, 2012). We refrain 
from measuring opinion change as a difference between pre- and post-deliberative opinion 
due to “ceiling effects” (Luskin, 2002; see also Luskin et al., 2002). For example, individuals 
already having a progressive position at T2, i.e. fully in favor with the regularization of 
irregular migrants, cannot become more progressive at T3. If the best argument in terms of 
justification rationality was in favor of regularization of migration, such individuals can only 
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keep their initial position (see Barabas, 2004). In a model of deliberatively-induced opinion 
change, such individuals would receive a value of 0 (indicating no change), putting them at 
the same level with individuals that did not change their minds at all, but could have done so 
because their initial opinions were less favorable toward regularization.  
4.4.2 Predictor Variables: Deliberative and Non-Deliberative Persuasion 
To obtain a measure for deliberative persuasion, two external coders identified all relevant 
statements that Europolis participants offered on policy options for irregular immigration and 
European involvement in immigration affairs. In addition, the coders also assessed the 
direction of arguments by looking at whether the speakers expressed acceptance or refusal of 
the specific policy option. The coding categories are largely based on options that were 
presented in the briefing material.
39
  
We also assessed the justification rationality of these statements on the basis of the Discourse 
Quality Index (DQI) developed by Steenbergen et al. (2003). The DQI captures justification 
rationality under the rubric of level of justification and is a measure to assess whether and to 
what extent statements, or speech acts, have been backed with reasons. Basically, the DQI 
distinguishes four levels of justification: (0) no justification provided for a statement; (1) 
inferior justification where the linkage between reasons and conclusion is incomplete (i.e., by 
merely providing illustrations without linking them to the conclusion);
40
 (2) qualified 
justification where a single but complete linkage between reasons and conclusion is made; (3) 
sophisticated justification where a problem is examined in-depth and/or from various 
viewpoints.  
In line with Neblo (2007a: 20), we see the provision of argumentative rationales as a group 
source and transform our speech level data into a group level variable of “deliberative 
persuasion”. For each discussion group, we first focused on progressive statements, i.e. 
statements in favor of regularization of irregular immigrants or statements against sending 
irregular immigrants back, and contrasted them with conservative statements, i.e. statements 
favoring sending irregular migrants back or statements opposing regularization. We then 
                                                          
39
 This coding was part of a larger coding project where we coded all statements that participants uttered in the 
immigration discussions. In total, we coded acceptance or refusal of more than 20 policy options and assessed 
whether actors considered a certain aspect of immigration as problematic or beneficial.  
40
 We are far from considering stories, or illustrations, as inferior modes of communication. In Chapter 2, we 
present an updated version of the DQI that accounts for storytelling’s importance by capturing its presence in a 
separate category. Moreover we even found story-telling to be a partial complement to high justification 
rationality. However, in cases where illustrations are used without linking them to the conclusion, the statements 
lack justification rationality. 
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applied the same procedure for statements on the item of European involvement in 
immigration affairs. Here, we identified Europeanist statements, i.e. statements in favor of a 
European immigration policy or statements against country specific solutions, and contrasted 
them to nationalist statements, i.e. statements against a European solution or statements 
favoring country specific solutions. Having identified progressive (Europeanist) vs. 
conservative (nationalist) arguments, we then assessed the level of justification for the various 
“argumentative camps”. For each “argumentative camp”, we identified the statement with the 
highest level of justification and compared it to the statement with the highest level of 
justification of the opposite camp. In each group and for both items, the following three 
situations might arise: (1) Progressive/Europeanist position with higher justification 
rationality: At least one of the progressive/Europeanist statements had a higher level of 
justification than any conservative/nationalist statement presented during group discussion. 
(2) Argumentative balance: the level of justification of progressive/Europeanist statements 
was equal to the level of conservative/nationalist statements. (3) Conservative/nationalist 
position with higher justification rationality: At least one of the conservative/nationalist 
statements had a higher level of justification indicator than any progressive/Europeanist 
statement presented during group discussion.  
We provide a concrete coding example in Appendix G.
41
 In the end, we are left with three 
dummy variables at the group level indicating whether situation 1, 2, or 3 applies.
42
 We opted 
for running three separate models with three binary variables, since we wanted to model the 
effect of one particular situation independent of the two other situations.  
In order to obtain a measure for non-deliberative persuasion, we created another group level 
variable, termed “dominant position”. This variable ignores justification rationality and only 
focused on the frequency of specific policy positions over others (see also Siu, 2009 for a 
similar approach). Our variable divides the total number of arguments in favor of 
regularization of irregular immigrants (or, in favor of European involvement) by the total 
number of statements presented on the respective issue (i.e. statements in favor and 
statements against regularization of irregular immigrants – or, European involvement).  
                                                          
41
 In all groups, justification rationality for the statement ranked the best, mounted at least to a score of 2 
(qualified justification). However, on both questions, at least one camp in the large majority of groups offered 
sophisticated justifications (3) for their statements.  
42
 Of course, aggregating the speech acts in this way implies losing information. Yet, this kind of aggregation is 
exactly what a proper test of deliberative theory requires, namely investigating whether the ‘best’ argument won 
– independent of how frequently it has been brought up. 
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Finally, we report the reliability of our coding. We conducted two inter-coder reliability tests, 
one for justification rationality, and another one for the content and direction of statements. 
With regard to justification rationality, three independent research assistants coded a random 
sample of statements (N=80). The training of the coders consisted only of the instructions 
contained in the coding scheme (see above) and a brief verbal introduction by the project 
leader. For level of justification, coder agreement was 65% and Cohen’s Kappa reliability 
statistic (ĸ) mounted to 0.52. Thereby, we missed the benchmark for substantial agreement 
(ĸ=0.60) according to Landis and Koch (1977). Spearman’s r and the standardized 
Cronbach’s alpha were respectable (r=0.78; α=0.92), showing that the existing coding 
discrepancies resulted from minor disagreements. After the disagreements had been settled, a 
second reliability test round has been performed before coding the full database. Now, the re-
test (N=20) indicates substantial coder agreement with a rater coder agreement of 80% and 
Kappa of 0.73, and with scale reliability statistics of 0.97 for Cronbach’s alpha and 0.94 for 
Spearman’s r. With regard to the content and direction of statements, three coders conducted 
a reliability test by coding 30 randomly chosen statements. A value of 0.67 for Cohen’s 
Kappa indicates satisfactory inter-coder reliability for the content of statements. The direction 
of statements was never disputed. 
4.4.3 Control Variables 
We include a number of controls in our models that opinion researchers deem important in the 
context of opinion formation. We first control for a number of socio-economic and cultural 
variables: gender (coded 1 for men and 0 for women), participant’s age (in years), education 
(measured as age at which main education ended), working-class (dummy variable) and a 
categorical variable that allows us to distinguish between participants coming from Central 
Eastern, Southern or Western European countries. Next, we include a variable that captures an 
individuals’ ideology by asking participants to indicate their ideological orientation on a scale 
from left (0) to right (10). Further, we introduce a variable for salience that indicates the 
perceived seriousness of the immigration problem on an 11-point scale from (0) (“not at all”) 
to 10 (“most serious problem we face”). We also include a knowledge index that calculates 
the amount of correct answers to the three knowledge questions on immigration (T2) and an 
item that captures a person’s general interest in politics on an 11-point scale from (0) (“not at 
all”) to 10 (“passionately”). 
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4.4.4 Statistical Analysis 
We employ OLS regression to explore whether deliberative persuasion is linked to opinion 
shifts. All models use clustered standard errors at the level of the groups in order to take into 
account that errors are potentially correlated within groups. For the question on European 
involvement in immigration affairs, we limit our sample to ten groups. This is necessary since 
three groups only offered arguments in favor of Europeanization. Including these three groups 
in the analysis would preclude us from separating deliberative from non-deliberative 
persuasion effects. Since the number of groups is small, we only use a restricted number of 
control variables. We excluded control parameters that showed a very high degree of 
uncertainty in an initial Bayesian hierarchical linear model incorporating all predictors. For 
regularizing irregular immigration this concerned age, working-class, interest in politics, and 
the indicator for country regions; for European involvement in immigration affairs, this 
concerned working-class, education, and the indicator for country regions (see Appendix F).  
4.5 Results 
We start with post-deliberative opinions on irregular immigration. Overall, we find no net 
aggregate shift for this item. At T2, participants of our subsample had an average score of 5.6 
on the 11-point scale, indicating a marginal favourability towards regularization (10) 
compared to sending irregular immigrants back (0). After deliberation at T3, the average 
score was 5.7 (see Appendix D). Despite the absence of a net aggregate shift, 60.5% of 
participants shifted their opinions by at least one scale point (and 36.8% by two or more scale 
points). That the groups display different pattern of opinion shift becomes visible by glancing 
at the scatterplot in Figure 4.1. While on the aggregate, some groups became more open to 
regularization (area below solid line), others became more open to sending irregular 
immigrants back (area above solid line). 
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Figure 4.1: Aggregated Pre- and Post-Deliberative Opinions on the Item 
“Regularization of Irregular Immigrants” (by Group) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The next question we would like to address is whether these group-specific differences can be 
explained by factors that occurred in the small group discussions. Using OLS regression, we 
now explore whether our mechanisms of deliberative and non-deliberative persuasion 
contributed to explain post-deliberative opinions (T3). Table 4.1 reports the results. We first 
explore the effects of deliberative persuasion (Model 1a and 1c). We find that participants in 
groups where the progressive position entailed a higher level of justification (7 out of 13 
groups) were significantly more open to regularization after deliberation (Model 1a). On the 
other hand, individuals in groups where the conservative position had a higher level of 
justification (2 out of 13 groups) were significantly less open to regularization after 
deliberation (Model 1c). This is excellent news for our conception of deliberative persuasion, 
emphasizing that opinion change takes on deliberative virtue when positions are backed by 
robust reasons. However, the effect size of deliberative persuasion is rather small. Being 
exposed to higher quality progressive arguments leads to a 0.813 increase in favor of 
regularization on the 11-point scale (Model 1a). If the higher quality argument was 
conservative, the model predicts a 0.693 decrease on the scale (Model 1c). This effect is 
comparatively small if one takes into account that a three-point difference on the salience 
index already accounts for (almost) the same effect size. In other words: even though 
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mechanisms of deliberative persuasion were at work, they were not able to compensate for 
effects of predispositions such as salience, ideology or knowledge (see also Hansen, 2007).  
Table 4.1: Predicting Post-Deliberative Opinions for the Item 
“Regularization of Irregular Immigrants” 
 Opinion T3 
 Model 1a Model 1b Model 1c 
Opinion T2 
0.341*** 
(0.081) 
0.353*** 
(0.082) 
0.363*** 
(0.079) 
Men 
-0.562
+
 
(0.285) 
-0.555
+
 
(0.295) 
-0.514
+
 
(0.286) 
Education 
-0.031 
(0.028) 
-0.038 
(0.028) 
-0.039 
(0.028) 
Ideology 
-0.175*** 
(0.038) 
-0.176*** 
(0.039) 
-0.183*** 
(0.040) 
Knowledge T2 
0.395* 
(0.136) 
0.394* 
(0.138) 
0.367* 
(0.130) 
Salience T2 
-0.256** 
(0.061) 
-0.249*** 
(0.061) 
-0.250** 
(0.063) 
High justification rationality 
(progressive) 
0.813* 
(0.324) 
  
Balanced justification rationality  
 
-0.299 
(0.394) 
 
High justification rationality 
(conservative) 
  
-0.693* 
(0.311) 
Dominant position 
-0.599 
(0.576) 
0.090 
(0.694) 
0.087 
(0.739) 
Constant 
5.430*** 
(0.772) 
5.650*** 
(0.792) 
5.762*** 
(0.862) 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Adj. R
2
 0.414 0.397 0.405 
Note: Robust standard errors (clustered at the level of the groups) are shown in 
parentheses. N=170, Groups=13. 
+
p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. T2 indicates 
participants’ opinions right at the start of the three-day event and T3 right at the end of 
the three-day event.  
We now turn to Model 1b. When participants were exposed to equal argumentative quality (4 
out of 13 groups) there is no significant effect for the direction of opinions. In addition, 
descriptive results show that participants exposed to equal argumentative quality were not 
particularly more likely to stick to their original position than participants exposed to unequal 
argumentative quality. Moreover, polarization was even less frequent in the balanced 
DELIBERATIVE PERSUASION   81 
groups.
43
 In sum, balanced argumentative quality neither led to opinion paralysis nor to 
confirmation bias, which both is good news for deliberation.  
By the same token, participants did not shift their opinions towards the dominant position. 
The perceived correctness of a position did not depend on how often a position has been 
brought up. In sum, inherent qualities of a statement, not the mere frequency of a position, 
influenced post-deliberative opinions.
44
  
Let us now turn to the item of European involvement in immigration affairs. The net 
aggregate shift for this item was small and not statistically significant. Participants in our 
subsample of 10 groups moved from an average of 4.7 to a slightly more Europeanist position 
of 5.1. Again, individual level opinion shifts were considerable: A total of 68% of participants 
shifted their opinions by at least one scale point and 54.2% changed even 2 or more scale 
points on the 11-point scale. Again, a scatterplot of aggregate pre- and post-deliberative 
opinions shows that groups differ in their pattern of opinion shift, suggesting that group-
specific factors have contributed to shaping opinions in Europolis.  
Figure 4.2: Aggregated Pre- and Post-Deliberative Opinions on the Item 
“European Involvement in Immigration Affairs” (by Group) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
43
 Results available on request.  
44
 The dominant position in a group was far from always being the position that had the higher justification 
rationality: the point biserial correlations for our deliberative and non-deliberative group level variables are 
moderate to low with 0.55 (Model 1a), -0.43 (Model 1b), and -0.21 (Model 1c).  
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Turning to the OLS regression in Table 4.2, results show that the magnitude of individual-
level opinion shifts is so large to that the pre-deliberative opinion on Europeanization does not 
yield a significant effect on post-deliberative opinion. Table 4.2 shows that there are no 
statistically reliable effects for deliberative persuasion: reasons in favor or against European 
involvement did not affect post-deliberative opinions (Models 2a and 2c).
45
 By contrast, the 
main factor driving post-deliberative opinions was dominant positioning: the higher the share 
of pro-European statements, the more participants were in favor of European involvement at 
T3.
46
  
The models suggest that exposing participants to completely one-sided argumentation either 
in favor or against Europeanization shifts participants’ opinions 4 scale points in either 
direction. Surely, in DPs, where the stated goal is to expose participants to argumentative 
balance, completely unbalanced argumentation is a rare occurrence. For the item European 
involvement in immigration affairs, however, our subsample shows considerable variation in 
argumentative balance.
47
 Thus, dominant positioning is a possibility in DPs with considerable 
effects on opinion formation. What is more, not only are opinions at T3 driven by the 
dominant position and cognitive and motivational factors, they are also determined by the 
socio-economic variables of gender and age. If we understand successful deliberation in terms 
of increased awareness of others’ perspectives (e.g., Mansbridge, 1996b; see Neblo, 2007a), 
these results give rise to some concern.  
At this state of research, we can only speculate about possible reasons why we find a 
deliberative persuasion effect for one item and a non-deliberative persuasion effect for the 
other. Obviously, the two items clearly differ in terms of scope, substance and implications, 
which makes them not comparable to each other. Further research might want to examine 
whether some issues are more susceptible to deliberative persuasion than others. Given that 
the best arguments in terms of justification rationality are characterized by the absence of 
narrow group interests and disrespectful utterances toward migrants, we exclude the 
possibility that the lack of impact on the Europeanization item may be explained by shallow 
or inadequate reasoning. To what extent substantive criteria of deliberative quality are 
                                                          
45
 In our reduced sample of 10 groups, 3 groups displayed a quality bias towards Europeanization: 2 groups were 
biased towards country specific solutions and 5 groups showed balanced argumentative quality.  
46
 Again, the most dominant position was by far not always the position with the highest justification rationality. 
The point biserial correlations for the group level variables are low with 0.21 (Model 2a), -0.03 (Model 2b), and 
-0.20 (Model 2c). 
47
 While the least Europeanist group of our subsample offered 37.5% of relevant statements in favor of European 
involvement, the most Europeanist group offered 86.7% in favor of European involvement. Remind that three 
groups were excluded from our model because all statements were favoring European involvement. 
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supposed to shape the opinion formation process and enter the conception of deliberative 
perception, however, needs to be addressed in future work.  
Table 4.2: Predicting Post-Deliberative Opinions for the Item 
“European Involvement in Immigration Affairs” 
 Opinion T3 
 Model 2a Model 2b Model 2c 
Opinion T2 
0.139 
(0.114) 
0.151 
(0.115) 
0.146 
(0.105) 
Men 
1.021* 
(0.414) 
1.021* 
(0.410) 
1.017* 
(0.403) 
Age (in 10 years) 
-0.260* 
(0.086) 
-0.245* 
(0.076) 
-0.250* 
(0.085) 
Ideology 
-0.213
+
 
(0.100) 
-0.204
+
 
(0.101) 
-0.202
+
 
(0.097) 
Knowledge T2 
0.625** 
(0.142) 
0.612** 
(0.138) 
0.613** 
(0.137) 
Salience T2 
0.220* 
(0.077) 
0.224* 
(0.075) 
0.213* 
(0.069) 
High justification rationality 
(Europeanist) 
0.367 
(0.339) 
  
Balanced justification rationality  
0.008 
(0.485) 
 
High justification rationality 
(nationalist) 
  
-0.435 
(0.609) 
Dominant position 
4.249** 
(1.194) 
4.458** 
(1.258) 
4.276** 
(1.076) 
Constant 
3.588* 
(1.191) 
3.384* 
(1.289) 
3.692** 
(1.083) 
Prob > F 0.001 0.001 0.001 
R2 0.301 0.298 0.302 
Note: Robust standard errors (clustered at the level of the groups) are shown in 
parentheses. N=138, Groups=10. 
+
p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. T2 indicates 
participants’ opinions right at the start of the three-day event and T3 right at the end of 
the three-day event. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
This paper made a first attempt in assessing the influence of deliberative and non-deliberative 
persuasion mechanisms on individual post-deliberative opinions in the context of Europolis. 
The findings are mixed and the effects complex. When it comes to the issue of regularizing 
irregular immigrants, we find evidence that participants moved towards the position with the 
highest justification rationality rather than towards the dominant position, i.e., the position 
that was most frequently mentioned during discussion. Yet, this finding does not reflect a 
general trend: regarding the issue of European involvement in immigration affairs, it is the 
dominant position and not the formal quality of arguments that drives opinions. 
Our article is a modest contribution to the perennial question under which circumstances a 
statement in deliberative discussions “wins or loses the battles of attention, memory, and 
choice” (Lupia, 2002: 149). On the one hand, we show that rational argumentation can trump 
the dominant position, which is excellent news for deliberative theory. On the other hand, we 
find that mechanisms of non-deliberative persuasion may also be at work. This, in turn, 
underlines that post-deliberative opinions are not always the result of a careful weighing of 
competing rational arguments. At this stage of research, however, we cannot say why we find 
a deliberative persuasion effect for one preference item and a dominant position effect for the 
other preference item. Future research will need to clarify under what conditions deliberative 
and non-deliberative persuasion mechanisms are operative. 
Future research will need to broaden the conception of deliberative persuasion. In this article, 
we did not develop a general or encompassing approach of deliberative persuasion. Our only 
goal was to investigate to what extent the formal structure of an argument can affect opinions. 
Yet, several authors have claimed that a good argument cannot exclusively be defined by its 
formal properties (e.g., Gutmann and Thompson, 2002; Chambers, 2004; see Neblo, 2007b). 
Mucciaroni and Quirk (2010), for example, have focused on the accuracy and realism of 
claims. Moreover, one may also wonder whether some arguments should have more leverage 
than others, regardless of their formal quality. When epistemic questions are at stake, there 
may be a correct (or, better) answer (at least sometimes), making the formal quality of 
arguments obsolete. When it comes to humanitarian issues, Neblo (2007b) reminds us that 
there is root in deliberative theory arguing that deliberation should lead to an expanded sense 
of community while simultaneously transforming prejudices and stereotypes. Neblo (2007b: 
548) dubs this “progressive vanguardism”48: “On this understanding, deliberative democracy 
                                                          
48
 Neblo is not an adherent of this position; he only lists it as a possibility how to evaluate deliberative outcomes. 
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is intrinsically and primarily an emancipatory project with strong substantive content, more or 
less tracking leftist political concerns”. From the perspective of “progressive vanguardism”, 
humanitarian positions should certainly be contrasted with other positions, but the expectation 
is that humanitarian positions involve a higher level of generalizability and consequently have 
a higher persuasive leverage. In other words, deliberative persuasion in humanitarian 
directions should be conducive to opinion shifts in this direction, even in the presence of 
sophisticated counter-positions. From this perspective, our findings for the legalization of 
irregular immigrants become mixed: on the one hand, and in line with “progressive 
vanguardism”, the well-argued immigrant-friendly and pro-humanitarian position affects 
opinion change in immigrant-friendly directions. On the other hand, that position is not the 
only one with persuasive leverage: robust reasoning in direction of less immigrant-friendly 
and conservative directions (such as the ‘pull’-argument that regularization of irregular 
immigrants attracts more immigrants) also drives opinion change. “Progressive vanguardists” 
will be reluctant to interpret this finding as deliberative persuasion. Surely, “progressive 
vanguardism” is a contestable position, but it may nonetheless provide us with a critical (and 
provocative) yardstick that future research may not so easily discard. 
In conclusion, our research represents a starting point for more systematically linking 
processes and outcomes of deliberation, a task hitherto largely neglected by empirical 
research. Our article shows that in a supportive environment for deliberation, argumentative 
rationality is one mechanism of deliberative persuasion that links the deliberative process to 
outcomes in a normatively desirable way. 
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5 DQI CODING AND THE DEFINITION OF 
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Table A.1: Operationalization and Aggregation of Discourse Quality 
Note: In a first step, each speech act was coded according to the coding scheme provided in the second column 
of the table (see Table A.2 for coding examples). Afterwards, we aggregated the speech level data to the 
individual level by extracting individuals’ maximum performance on each indicator. In a last step, we set the 
threshold values as detailed in the third column of the table.  
 DQI categories Threshold Value 
J
u
st
if
ic
a
ti
o
n
 r
a
ti
o
n
a
li
ty
 
(0) No Justification: The speaker does not present any argument or only says 
that X should or should not be done, but no reason is given.  
(1) Inferior Justification: Here a reason Y is given why X should or should not 
be done, but no linkage is made between X and Y—the inference is 
incomplete or the argument is merely supported with illustrations. 
(2) Qualified Justification: A linkage is made why one should expect that X 
contributes to or detracts from Y. A single complete inference already 
qualifies for code 2. 
(3) Sophisticated Justification: At least two complete justifications are given, 
either two complete justifications for the same demand or complete 
justifications for two different demands. 
(0) max < 3 
(1) max = 3 
C
o
m
m
o
n
 g
o
o
d
 
o
ri
en
ta
ti
o
n
 
(0) Explicit statement concerning constituency or group interests (own country) 
(1) No reference: The speaker does not refer to benefits and costs at all.  
(1.5) Explicit statement in terms of both, Europe and own country 
(2) Explicit statement in terms of a conception of the common good in 
utilitarian or collective terms (EU, Europe). 
(3) Explicit statement in terms of the difference principle (solidarity, quality of 
life, global justice, etc.)  
(0) max < 1.5 
(1) max ≥ 1.5 
 
R
es
p
ec
t 
a
n
d
 
in
te
ra
ct
iv
it
y
 (0) Negative (disrespectful) reference to other participants’ arguments. 
(1) No reference to other participants’ arguments. 
(2) Neutral reference to other participants’ arguments. 
(3) Positive (explicitly respectful) reference to other participants’ arguments. 
(up to three references were coded per statement) 
(0) max < 3 
(1) max = 3 
R
es
p
ec
t 
to
w
a
rd
s 
g
ro
u
p
s 
(0) No Respect: This code is reserved for speeches in which there are only or 
predominantly negative statements about the groups. 
(1) Implicit Respect: No explicitly negative statements can be identified, but 
neither are there explicit positive statements. 
(2) Respect (balanced): Both, positive and negative respect is equally 
expressed.  
(3) Explicit Respect: This code is assigned if there is at least one explicitly 
positive statement about the groups and either are negative statements 
completely absent or positive statements are clearly dominating the 
negative statements. 
(0) max < 2 
(1) max ≥ 2 
 
Q
u
es
ti
o
n
in
g
 
(0) No (or only rhetorical) question posed. 
(1) Question asked (informational or critical). 
(0) max = 0 
(1) max = 1 
S
to
ry
-
te
ll
in
g
 (0) No story-telling. 
(1) Story-telling. 
(0) max = 0 
(1) max = 1 
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Table A.2: DQI Coding Examples 
Justification rationality (level of justification) 
This indicator captures whether and to what extent speakers provide reasons to back their claims. 
(0) No Justification: The speaker does 
not present any argument or only says 
that X should or should not be done, 
but no reason is given. 
a) „Ich hätte eine Frage an die Deutschen. Sind doch die Einwanderer der dritten Generation bereits in 
Deutschland. Und werden diese dann immer noch als Einwanderer betrachtet, obwohl sie die deutsche 
Staatsangehörigkeit haben und in Deutschland geboren sind?“ (spanische Frau stellt eine Frage, Gruppe 17) 
[Deutsche Übersetzung des Originalbeitrages durch Europolis Übersetzer] 
a) „I would like to pose a question to the Germans: Now you have the third generation of immigrants in Germany. 
Are they still regarded as immigrants despite the fact that they possess the German citizenship and are born in 
Germany?” (Spanish women poses a question, group 17) [own English translation from German transcript; 
German translation of the original speech was provided by Europolis translators] 
b) « Moi je suis pour ça enfin [contrôles rigoureux]. Pour moi c’est bon. » (homme français sans justifier sa 
position, groupe 4) 
b) “This is what I favor [strict border controls]. To me, this sounds like a good solution.” (French man does not 
justify his position, group 4) [own English translation from French transcript] 
c) “I think that in Poland, there are not so many immigrants. I guess most of them are coming to my country from 
Ukraine and Belarus.  However, people are also transiting Poland to get to other EU countries that have a better 
standard of living.” (Polish men describing the immigration situation in his home country, group 16) [English 
translation from Polish transcript] 
(1) Inferior Justification: Here a 
reason Y is given why X should or 
should not be done, but no linkage is 
made between X and Y 
« (…) 15 millions d’immigrés sont venus en Allemagne de manière légale - sans qualification 44 pourcent, sans 
qualification professionnelle, entre 22 et 40 ans : 44 pourcents, et sans qualification professionnelle en provenance 
de Turquie : 72 pourcent. Alors, lorsqu’on compare par exemple l’immigration en Australie. Si je veux immigrer 
en Australie, je dois avoir beaucoup d’argent, je dois prouver que j’ai un employeur en Australie.. Donc il faudrait 
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peut-être voir ce qui se passe en dehors de l’Europe, comment on gère l’immigration dehors de l’Europe. » 
(homme allemand, groupe 21) [traduction française de la contribution originale faite par les traducteurs 
d’Europolis] 
“(…) 15 millions of immigrants came to Germany in a legal way. Without qualification 44 percent, without 
professional qualification, between 22 and 40 years old: 44 percent. And from Turkey, 72 percent arrived without 
professional qualification. Let’s compare this to immigration in Australia: if I want to migrate to Australia, I need 
to have a lot of money, I need to prove that I do have an employer in Australia.. Therefore, we should maybe turn 
to countries from outside Europe and see how they handle immigration.” (German men, group 21) [own English 
translation from French transcript, French translation of the original speech was provided by Europolis 
translators] 
(2) Qualified Justification: A linkage 
is made why one should expect that X 
contributes to or detracts from Y. 
« Le fait qu’ils quittent leur pays c’est déjà triste peut-être. Mais si dans leur propre pays, ils pourraient déjà 
bénéficier de meilleurs conditions de vie, cela irait bien mieux que devoir, comme des réfugiés devoir partir, 
quitter toute la famille, aller au très grand voyage et partir dans un pays tout à fait étranger. Donc je trouve que les 
pays de l’Union Européenne devraient, entre eux, centrer d’aide pour essayer de maintenir les gens dans leur 
propre pays en améliorant justement les conditions de vie dans leur propre pays. Alors donc, cela pourrait éviter le 
fait de devoir obligatoirement encore émigrer. (…) » (femme allemande, groupe 21) [traduction française de la 
contribution originale faite par les traducteurs d’Europolis] 
“The fact that they leave their home country is already sad, perhaps. If they could already profit from better living 
conditions in their own country, this would definitely be better than having to leave the family, undertake a very 
long journey to a country that is very different from one’s own, as the refugees currently do. This is why I think 
that the countries of the European Union should, among each other, center the aid in order to try to keep the people 
in their own country by improving the living conditions in the respectable countries. This could prevent them from 
being forced to emigrate. (…)” (German women, group 21) [own English translation from French transcript, 
French translation of the original speech was provided by Europolis translators] 
(3) Sophisticated Justification: At 
least two complete justifications are 
given, either two complete 
« Donc d’abord sur le sujet de la confession. C’est ce que je voulais dire tout à l’heure. En disant, est-ce qu’on doit 
s’adapter parfaitement au pays dont qu’on arrive ou est-ce qu’au contraire, on peut avoir un équilibrage? En 
France, c’est très différent qu’avec l’Espagne, c’est très différent qu’avec la plupart des autres pays européens. 
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justifications for the same demand or 
complete justifications for two 
different demands. 
Nous avons une exigence de la laïcité, c'est-à-dire que nous n’avons pas… il y a une pratique religieuse, 
chrétienne, historique, qui est toujours active mais en place de la laïcité au dessus dans le sens où le culte religieux 
est de l’endroit privé. Donc, on ne peut pas, par exemple tenir ce discours, de dire que les immigrés qui viennent 
en France doivent respecter une tradition chrétienne, par exemple. C’est quelque chose qu’on –  on peut le dire, 
mais bon, sauf que dans l’effet, ça ne se présente pas dans les écoles, sauf dans les écoles privés. Mais on n’y est 
pas confronté. Donc pour moi, la réponse au problème, à l’éventuel problème posé par des immigrés de confession 
musulmane, elle passe par là en faite, la laïcité c’est ce qui permet de respecter les différences de chacun. Bon, ça 
c’est peut-être aussi de mes conditions mais quand vous parlez de s’adapter, moi personnellement, je m’adapte 
assez peux aux traditions français, donc et pourtant, je suis français, je ne vais pas partir de moi. Voilà. Donc cette 
histoire de se dire qu’on doit se confronter à une certaine culture – (…) Moi personnellement, je ne pense pas que 
ça serait la bonne réponse, parce qu’il y a trop des différences et je ne pense pas qu’un pays égale une culture en 
fait. Voilà, personnellement.» (homme français, groupe 10)  
“First, on the subject of religious denomination. That is what I just wanted to say before. On the question whether 
one needs to completely adapt to the host country or whether, on the contrary, there could be a balance. In France, 
the situation is very different from Spain, and different from the majority of European countries. We have the 
principle of laicism, this means we do not have.. there is religious practice, Christian, historically, which is still 
active but it is situated below the principle of laicism in the sense that religion is a private affair. This means that 
we cannot conduct a discourse that demands, for example, that the immigrants coming to France have to respect 
the Christian tradition. This is something that – one can say that but this does not apply to schools, except to 
private schools. But we are not confronted with that. For me, the answer to the problem, the eventual problem that 
Muslim immigrants pose, goes through laicism and this is what allows respecting individual differences. Alright 
then – this perhaps only applies to me but personally, when you speak of the need for adaptation, I don’t adapt 
myself to the French culture in a sufficient way and I am French nevertheless, and I won’t deviate from myself. 
The story that one needs to conform to a certain culture – (…) Personally, I don’t think that this is the right answer 
because there are too many differences and I don’t think that a country equals a culture. That’s the way I see it. 
(…)” (French man, group 10) [own English translation from French transcript] 
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Common good orientation (content of justification) 
In the eyes of many deliberative democrats, good reasons should entail a common good orientation (e.g., Rawls 1971). The original DQI measures whether 
arguments are cast in terms of narrow group or constituency interests, whether there is neutral reference or mixed reference (i.e., reference to both narrow 
group interest and common good), or whether there is a reference to the common good. 
(0) Explicit statement 
concerning constituency or 
group interests is made (here: 
own country) 
 
„(...) Meiner Meinung nach würde ich es sehr begrüssen, wenn wir vermeiden könnten, dass sich das [Einwanderung und 
damit verbundene Probleme] auch nach Osteuropa ausweitet. (...)“ (litauischer Mann, Gruppe 20) [Deutsche 
Übersetzung des Originalbeitrages durch Europolis Übersetzer] 
“(...) Personally, I would very much appreciate if we could prevent that this [immigration and connected concerns] also 
extends to Eastern Europe. (…)” (Lithuanian men, group 20) [own English translation from German transcript; the 
German translation of the original speech was provided by Europolis translators] 
(1.5) Explicit statement in terms 
of both, Europe and own 
country is made 
“To tell you the truth: in Holland, immigration is perceived as something that lingers in the minds of people and that is 
present in any context of discussion. The EU should take care of it, so that other countries, which do not have that kind 
of problems yet, such as Poland for instance, would contribute in order that we can solve this problem together. So that at 
least we could share the knowledge and experience in this matter. I think we should cooperate like that.” (Dutch man, 
group 23) [own English translation from Polish transcript; the Polish translation of the original speech was provided by 
Europolis translators] 
(2) Explicit statement in terms 
of a conception of the common 
good in utilitarian or collective 
terms is made (here: EU; 
Europe) 
« (…) Nous avons besoin d’immigrés pour le problème de démographie. Nous devons de plus en plus vieux, en Europe 
nous avons besoin de beaucoup des personnes. (…) Et bon je reste d’avis dès lors qu’en tant que l’Europe, et c'est 
pourquoi il faut qu’il est vraiment une politique européenne et non pas par pays comme ça se fait maintenant, parce que 
sinon on l’en sortira jamais. (…) » (homme hollandais, groupe 3) [traduction française de la contribution originale faite 
par les traducteurs d’Europolis] 
“(…). We need immigrants in order to solve the demographic problem. We grow older and older in Europe and we need 
a lot of people. (…) Well, I hold on the position that from a prospective view of Europe, this is why we need a European 
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policy instead of state based solutions like we have them now. If we don’t opt for a European solution, we will never 
overcome this problem. (…)” (Dutch men, group 3) [own English translation from French transcript; the French 
translation of the original speech was provided by Europolis translators] 
(3) Explicit statement in terms 
of the difference principle is 
made (solidarity, quality of life, 
global justice, etc.) 
„Ja ich bin also der Meinung, dass die Aufgabe der EU das eigentlich nicht unbedingt ist, die Länder und die Grenzen 
dicht zu machen, weil wir müssen das alles ja doch auch ein bisschen globaler sehen, wir sind doch nun einmal eine Welt 
und die Welt besteht doch nun einmal aus vielen anderen Ländern und wir müssen doch dann auch dafür sorgen, dass es 
der restlichen Bevölkerung und den anderen Menschen in irgend einer Form gut geht, die wir über all die Jahre 
ausgebeutet haben. Wir haben doch eine Verpflichtung; also Menschlichkeit ist doch ein ganz oberes Prinzip und ich bin 
einfach der Meinung, wir können uns nicht abschotten und können einfach unser Süppchen alleine kochen. (...)“ 
(deutsche Frau, Gruppe 9) 
“In my opinion, it should not be the task of the EU to close the borders, because we need to consider this from a more 
global point of view. It’s a fact that we are just one world and the world consists of many other countries and we have to 
see that the rest of the population and the other people that we exploited for so many years are doing well in any way. 
We do have a responsibility. Humanity is the highest principle and I think that we cannot seal ourselves off and ‘cook 
our soup’ unilaterally. (…)” (German women, group 9) [own English translation from German transcript] 
Respect and interactivity 
The updated version of the DQI allows capturing interactivity, a hitherto neglected aspect in the empirical measurement of deliberation. The introduction of 
a neutral response category ensures that every uptake of others’ arguments is encompassed. This includes uptakes in the form of questioning, recapitulations 
of what others have said, and references to stories. Note that expressing disagreement is not bound to the code of negative respect. As examples (2a) and 
(3c) demonstrate, disagreement can also be expressed in a neutral or even positive way. However, when people explicitly mentioned that they are in full 
disagreement with other participants’ arguments (without acknowledging the other’s position in any respect), this was coded as a disrespectful statement 
(0a). 
(0) Negative (disrespectful) 
reference to other participants’ 
a) « Et que les deux premiers avis, premiers opinions soient favorable à ce que cette politique soit défini par les états et 
non par l’Union Européenne. Alors je suis tout à fait en désaccord. Je pense que la politique de migration doit être 
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arguments définie dans la base par les organes Européens. (…) » (homme portugais répond aux personnes précédentes, groupe 1) 
[traduction française de la contribution originale faite par les traducteurs d’Europolis] 
a) “And the first two opinions that were expressed were in favor of regulating this policy at the country level instead of 
the level of the European Union. I am completely opposed to that. I think that in its main features, the European 
institutions should define the immigration policy. (…)” (Portuguese man responds to previous speakers, group 1) [own 
English translation from French transcript; the French translation of the original speech was provided by Europolis 
translators] 
b) « Je ne vois pas au quoi l’immigration illégale pose un problème de logement pour les français ou des choses comme 
ça. Je crois qu’il ne faut pas faire attention, pas tous mélanger. (…) Je crois que ce n’est pas possible de faire une 
confusion de cette sorte là. » (homme français répond à la personne précédente, groupe 21) 
b) “I don’t see in which way illegal immigration presents a problem of housing for the French people. I think we should 
not pay attention, should not mix everything up. (…) I think it is not possible to confuse things like that.” (French man 
responds to a previous speaker, group 21) [own English translation from French transcript] 
(2) Neutral reference to other 
participants’ arguments 
a) „Also an der Stelle möchte ich meinen beiden Vorrednern in gewisser Weise widersprechen. (...)“ (deutscher Mann, 
Gruppe 24)  
a) “At this point, I would like to contradict the previous speakers to some extent. (…)” (German man, group 24) [own 
English translation from German transcript]  
b) “According to what the previous speaker said, immigrants are coming because there are jobs that Polish people do not 
want to take, so in my country, the immigrants are coming to take these jobs over. (…)” (Polish women, group 16) [own 
English translation from Polish transcript] 
(3) Positive (explicitly 
respectful) reference to other 
participants’ arguments 
a) « Je suis tout à fait d’accord avec [l’homme français]. S’il y a des lois, il faut les respecter. (…) » (homme allemand, 
groupe 4) [traduction française de la contribution originale par les traducteurs d’Europolis] 
a) “I fully agree with [French man]. If there are laws, they need to be respected. (…)” (German man, group 4) [own 
English translation from French transcript; the French translation of the original speech was provided by Europolis 
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translators] 
b) « Je pense que la proposition de [l’homme allemand] concernant le traitement différenciel des personnes est très 
importante. (…) » (homme allemand, groupe 4) [traduction française de la contribution originale faite par les 
traducteurs d’Europolis] 
b) “I think that the proposal of [German man] concerning a differentiated treatment of people is very important. (…)” 
(German man, group 4) [own English translation from French transcript; the French translation of the original speech 
was provided by Europolis translators] 
c) „Zu deinem Kommentar noch; das stimmt, aber das erste ist auch ausschlaggebend; es ist ja auch ein gewisser 
Prozentsatz da, die wollen sich nicht integrieren. (...)“ (deutscher Mann, Gruppe 9) 
c) “On your comment: you are right but the first point is crucial as well; there is also a certain amount of people that 
doesn’t make an effort to integrate. (…)” (German man, group 9) [own English translation from German transcript] 
Respect towards groups (migrants) 
Respect toward groups implies that participants, either implicitly or explicitly, acknowledge the needs and rights of different social groups. In the context of 
Europolis discussions on third country migration, migrants from outside the EU are the social group of interest.  
(0) No Respect: This code is 
reserved for speeches in which 
there are only or predominantly 
negative statements about the 
groups. 
a) « L’immigration du 20ème et 21ème siècle, c’est l’immigration des gens des cultures complètement opposées à la 
nôtre. Et c’est ça le problème. Ces gens-là, ils ne s’attachent pas du tout à notre culture. (…) On a eu des problèmes, ces 
gens-là sont différents. » (homme français, groupe 4) 
a) “The immigration of the 20th and 21st century is an immigration of people from cultures that are completely opposed to 
our. And this is the problem. These people do not adapt at all to our culture. (…) We have had problems – these people 
are different.” (French man, group 4) [own English translation from French transcript] 
b) „(...) Also Leute die nach Europa kommen, wollen zumeist definitiv hier bleiben, nicht irgendwie nur ein Zeitvertrag 
ableisten und dann wieder weggehen. Sie wollen ins europäische System eintreten. Sie wollen nicht wirklich sich 
einfügen in die Kultur, aber die wirtschaftlichen Vorteile nutzen und nicht wirklich als Europäer auftreten dann. Das ist 
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sehr schwer, sie dann wieder wegzuschicken, man findet sie kaum. Ja ich weiss, dass es schwierig ist da. Aber ich weiss 
auch, dass es viele Einwanderer gibt, von denen kommen sogar die meisten als Touristen. Mit einem Monatsvisum und 
dann bleiben sie hier als illegale Einwanderer. (...)“ (spanischer Mann, Gruppe 19) [Deutsche Übersetzung des 
Originalbeitrages durch Europolis Übersetzer] 
b) „People that come to Europe intend, most of the times, to stay here on a long-term base. They don’t want a temporal 
contract that requires them to leave after the contract expires. They want to enter the European system. They don’t make 
serious efforts to adapt to our culture, but they want to profit from the economic benefits without becoming European. It 
is difficult to make them leave again because you hardly find them. Yes I know that they have it difficult over there. But 
I also know that many of the immigrants arrive as tourists with a monthly visa. After the expiration of the visa they just 
stay and become illegal immigrants. (…)” (Spanish man, group 19) [own English translation from German transcript; 
the German translation of the original speech was provided by Europolis translators] 
(2) Respect (balanced): Both, 
positive and negative respect is 
equally expressed.  
 
„(...) Man kann das nicht alles über den Kamm scheren und alle nach einem Schema beurteilen, denn es gibt 
Einwanderer, die in andere Länder eindringen um vielleicht sich der Arbeit zu entziehen oder sich unrechtmässig zu 
bereichern durch Diebstahl und so weiter; es sind also Parasiten. Aber es gibt daneben auch Einwanderer, die sich 
anstrengen um sich den Gegebenheiten und insbesondere auch der Kultur des Landes anzupassen.“ (polnische Frau, 
Gruppe 9) [Deutsche Übersetzung des Originalbeitrages durch Europolis Übersetzer] 
“(…) There is no way in trying to apply one standard to all. There are immigrants who infiltrate a country, maybe in 
order to avoid having to work or in order to enrich themselves illegally via theft and so on – these are parasites. On the 
other hand, there are immigrants that make an effort in order to adapt themselves to the circumstances of a country and in 
particular to its culture.” (Polish woman, group 9) [own English translation from German transcript; the German 
translation of the original speech was provided by Europolis translators] 
(3) Explicit Respect: This code 
is assigned if there is at least 
one explicitly positive statement 
about the groups and either are 
negative statements completely 
absent or positive statements are 
a) « (…) Je pense même que parmi les autochtones, il y a plus des gens qui ne veulent pas travailler que parmi les 
immigrants. (…) » (homme hollandais, groupe 3) [traduction française de la contribution originale faite par les 
traducteurs d’Europolis] 
a) “(…) I think that among the indigenous population, there are more people who don’t want to work than there are 
among immigrants. (…)” (Dutch man, group 3) [own English translation from French transcript; the French translation 
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clearly dominating the negative 
statements. 
of the original speech was provided by Europolis translators] 
 b) „(...) Ich denke, niemand verlässt sein Heimatland aus Spass, sondern die Leute machen das aus Not, weil sie nichts 
mehr haben um zu überleben. Kaum noch etwas zu essen. Sie machen das nicht unbedingt freiwillig. Also das Leben 
muss schon sehr schlecht sein, es muss einem sehr schlecht gehen, damit man sich dazu entschliesst, seine Heimat zu 
verlassen und dass es eben auch keinerlei Aussicht auf Besserung gibt, dass sich die Dinge eben nicht kurzfristig im 
Land verbessern lassen. (...)“ (spanischer Mann, Gruppe 20) [Deutsche Übersetzung des Originalbeitrages durch 
Europolis Übersetzer] 
b) “(…) I think no one leaves his home country just for fun. Rather, people leave because of misery, because they don’t 
have anything left in order to survive. Hardly anything to eat. They don’t necessarily do that on a voluntary basis. Life 
must treat one very bad in order to make the decision to leave one’s home country. There must be no prospect of 
improvement, there must be a certainty that these things will not change for the better in the near future.” (Spanish man, 
group 20) [own English translation from German transcript; the German translation of the original speech was provided 
by Europolis translators] 
Questioning 
The updated version of the DQI regards inquisitiveness as an essential aspect of an interactive deliberative process. In the context of Europolis, we do not 
distinguish between informational and critical questions (see Ikuenobe 2001). 
(1) Question asked 
(informational or critical) 
a) „Eine Frage an [deutschen Mann]: In welche Dimension wächst das Problem mit der Abwanderung von 
Arbeitskräften?“ (deutsche Frau, Gruppe 9) 
a) “I have a question to [German man]: To what extent increases the problem of emigration for working purposes?” 
(German women, group 9) [own English translation from German transcript] 
b1) „Ich möchte mal die Dame nebenan fragen, was sie macht, wenn sie ungebetenen Besuch kriegt; wenn sie 
heimkommt und in ihrer Wohnung ist jemand drin. Was sie dann macht.“ (deutscher Mann, Gruppe 9) 
b2) „Da würde ich fragen, wie sie die Wohnung, also wirklich intimen Lebensraum, mit dem breiten Raum eines Landes 
oder einer weiteren Umgebung vergleichen können?“ (deutscher Mann, Gruppe 9) 
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b1) “I’d like to ask the lady next to me what she would do when she would receive unsolicited visit. When she returns 
and there is somebody, right inside her apartment. What would she do?” (German man, group 9) [own English 
translation from German transcript] 
b2) “In this case I’d like to ask you how you can compare an apartment, meaning intimate living space, with a country 
where there is far more space.” (German man, group 9) [own English translation from German transcript] 
Story-telling 
According to Polletta und Lee (2006), “story-telling” is the most important component of alternative forms of communication. Therefore, the updated 
version of the DQI captures the presence of stories. In Europolis, story-telling ranges from the description of a situation in one’s home country to the report 
of a personal narrative. 
(1) Story-telling a) „(...) In C, da gibt es zum Beispiel ein Ort, da sind in den gleichen Schulen muslimische Kinder und da mussten wir in 
den Schulen zum Beispiel das ganze Menü in der Kantine ändern, weil sie zum Beispiel kein Schweinefleisch essen. 
(...)“ (spanische Frau, Gruppe 20) [Deutsche Übersetzung des Originalbeitrages durch Europolis Übersetzer] 
a) “(...) In C for example, there is a place where Muslim children go to the same schools as Spanish children. There, we 
were forced to change the whole menu of the cafeteria because they don’t eat pork, for example. (…)” (Spanish woman, 
group 20) [own English translation from German transcript; the German translation of the original speech was provided 
by Europolis translators] 
b) « Je voudrais rapidement réagir, donc j’ai une bonne expérience, c'est-à-dire donc une famille, en provenance de 
Mongolie, ils sont revenu et donc il y a maintenant une des filles qui a fait un doctorat en langue allemande et donc un 
autre fils a fait un examen en allemand, donc je ne connais aucune personne où on pourrait dire voilà, il a juste appris par 
cœur et puis il a oublié tout, pour avoir ce certificat [de nationalité]. Donc j’ai juste eu la chance d’avoir que des bonnes 
expériences. » (homme allemand, groupe 4) [traduction française de la contribution originale faite par les traducteurs 
d’Europolis] 
b) “I’d like to quickly reply by providing a positive experience. There is a family, originating from Mongolia, who 
returned and one of the daughters now has a PhD in German language and one of their sons did an exam in German. This 
is to say that I don’t know any person from whom I could say that ‘here we go – he just learned it by heart and after 
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receiving the [citizenship] certificate, he forgot everything again’. In sum, I only had the chance to make positive 
experiences.” (German man in reply to someone claiming that immigrants attain their citizenship certificate by learning 
everything required by heart, group 4) [own English translation from French transcript; the French translation of the 
original speech was provided by Europolis translators] 
Note: The audio discussions of the coded groups were available either in French, German, or Polish. For the French and German groups, the coding was based on the 
transcripts from the audio discussions. Thus, for non-German or non-French speakers (or German speakers in French groups as well as French speakers in German groups), 
our coding is based on the translation of the original speech act as provided by Europolis translators. For the two Polish groups, our coding relies on an English translation of 
the respective group discussions. In the present Table, our coding is always based on the first example provided in the Table. The English translations of the German and 
French speeches only serve purposes of coding demonstration. 
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A test of inter-coder reliability was conducted prior to coding the full database. Three coders 
independently evaluated 80 speeches. Four statistics were calculated: the ratio of coding 
agreement (RCA; Holsti, 1969) which simply indicates the percentage of observations that 
were coded in the same way by coders for a given indicator;  Cohen’s (1960) ĸ (“kappa”) and, 
where appropriate, Spearman’s rank correlation (Siegel, 1956) and the standardized α (a 
reliability statistic; see Holsti, 1969). These statistics take into account the difference between 
actual coding agreement and the level of coding agreement that could be expected to occur by 
chance (see also Steenbergen et al., 2003).  
We consider both the overall performance of the DQI and its performance for each of the 
coding categories. The three coders agreed on average in 85.4% of a total of 480 rendered 
judgments.
49
 The corresponding value for Cohen’s Kappa ĸ mounts to 0.70. Where 
appropriate, Spearman’s r and the standardized α were calculated (r=0.81; α=0.89). All 
findings indicate substantial agreement.  
Agreement on Specific Categories: Table B1 reports the reliability statistics for specific 
coding categories. First, consider the justification rationality (level of justification), 
RCA=0.65, which looks respectable at first glance. Taking into consideration that the coders 
may have agreed by chance alone, we also computed Cohen’s ĸ, which equals 0.52. This is 
indicative of moderate agreement and clearly misses the benchmark for substantial agreement 
(Landis and Koch, 1977). Since justification rationality is an ordinal indicator, it is also useful 
to consider Spearman’s rank correlation, which accounts for the difference in the rank 
orderings of speeches between coders. Spearman’s r equals 0.78, which produce a 
standardized item α of 0.92. These results indicate that the low coder agreement reported for 
RCA and Kappa rather resulted from minor discrepancies about which code on the scale 
should be applied. 
  
                                                          
49
 For each coding category (justification rationality, pursuit of self-interest, EU’s interests and world interests, 
respect toward participants’ arguments, and story-telling), 80 judgments were rendered.  
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Table B.1: Inter-Coder Agreement per Category 
 RCA Kappa s.e. Spearman Alpha 
Justification rationality  
(Level of justification) 
0.654 0.516** 0.068 0.778** 0.917 
Country interest 
(Content of justification 0) 
0.950 0.721** 0.110   
European Union interests 
(Content of justification 2) 
0.925 0.642** 0.111   
World community interests 
(Content of justification 3) 
0.975 0.592** 0.096   
Respect toward participants’ 
arguments 
0.792 0.698** 0.073 0.813** 0.913 
Respect toward groups 
(migrants) 
a
 
0.850 0.723** 0.113 0.756** 0.833 
Story-telling 0.946 0.852** 0.086   
Note: N=80. **p<0.01. 
a
 This category has been coded at a later point in time. Therefore, a separate reliability 
test was conducted where two independent coders coded a total number of 40 speeches.  
For the content of justification, we ran three different tests since we need to distinguish 
among references to country interest (0), the European Union (2), and the world community 
(3). For the first content of justification, the coders agreed in 95% of the time. Taking chance 
agreement into account, ĸ=0.72; this is statistically significant and indicates substantial 
agreement. For the second content of justification coding, the coders agreed in 92.5% of the 
cases. However, ĸ is at 0.64 and only slightly above the benchmark of 0.61 for substantial 
agreement (Landis and Koch, 1977). For the third content of justification coding, the coders 
agreed in 97.5% of the cases. However, the fact that that ĸ = 0.59 indicates that coders only 
agreed that references to the world community occur rarely, but then disagreed on what 
finally deserves a positive code. While the scores for the average score hover around the 
benchmark for substantial agreement, they are more daunting if we consider the wide range of 
inter-coder agreement among the pairs of coders.  
Therefore, we performed another round of coding. After the disagreement for level and 
content had been settled and disputed cases were recoded, a second reliability test was 
performed for level and content of justification (Table B.2). The re-test indicates substantial 
coder agreement after re-coding both for level and content of justification.  
The reliability of the respect indicator, in turn, was satisfactory. Regarding respect toward 
other participants’ arguments, coders agreed on 79.2% of the codes. Furthermore, ĸ=0.70, 
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which is again significant and indicative of substantial agreement. Since the indicator for 
respect toward participant’s arguments is ordinal, Spearman’s rank correlation was also 
computed: r = 0.81, which results in an impressive α of 0.91. Similarly positive results are 
obtained for the indicator of respect towards groups (migrants). Since this category has been 
coded at a later point in time, a separate reliability test was conducted (see note in Table B.1).  
The final coding category is story-telling. Here, RCA = 0.95, which is indicative of excellent 
agreement. ĸ equals .85, which is significant and reflects high levels of agreement.50  
In sum, these results show that reliable measurement through the DQI in citizen deliberation 
is possible. Even the worst reliability scores are still respectable, suggesting that different 
coders looking at the same transcripts will be able to agree on the DQI and its components. 
This is an important result, as it greatly increases the confidence one can place in the analyses 
performed with the DQI indicators. 
Table B.2: Inter-Coder Agreement Re-Test (Justification) 
 RCA Kappa s.e. spearman alpha 
Justification rationality  
(Level of justification) 
0.800 0.725** 0.128 0.942** 0.974 
Country interest 
(Content of justification 0) 
0.967 0.917** 0.222   
European Union interests 
(Content of justification 2) 
1.000     
World community interests 
(Content of justification 3) 
1.000     
Note: N=20. **p<0.01. 
                                                          
50
 Since we did not distinguish between informational and critical questions, no reliability test was conducted for 
the category of questioning. 
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Table C.1: Summary Statistics of the Overall Discourse Quality 
 Level of speeches 
b
 Level of participants 
c
 
Justification rationality   
No justification 18.5% 2.8% 
Inferior justification 39.2% 18.9% 
Qualified justification 32.2% 41.7% 
Sophisticated justification 10.0% 36.6% 
Common good orientation   
No explicit notion of interests 75.5% 30.6% 
Country interests 8.8% 20.6% 
Mixed (country/EU) 4.6% 12.2% 
European Union interests 7.3% 22.2% 
World community interests 3.8% 14.4% 
Respect towards other participants arguments 
a
   
Negative reference to arguments 5.2% 0.0% 
No explicit reference to arguments 59.1% 16.7% 
Neutral reference to arguments 38.2% 28.3% 
Positive reference to arguments 18.6% 55.0% 
Respect towards groups   
Negative respect 8.6% 2.8% 
Implicit respect 73.0% 42.2% 
Balanced respect 3.9% 12.2% 
Positive respect 14.5% 42.8% 
Story-telling 32.9% 70.6% 
Questioning 12.7% 40.0% 
Note: 
a
 Up to three references were coded per speech act. Therefore, percentages do not sum up to 100%. 
b
 
Entries refer to the number of statements that received the respective code, compared to the total number of 
statements provided (N=943). 
c
 Entries indicate the percentage of active speakers (N=180) that reached this 
standard. For example, 36.6% provided sophisticated justification at least once, 41.7% never reached the 
level of sophisticated justification but provided qualified justification at least once, and 2.8% never 
provided a justification for any of their speeches. 
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Table D.1: Group Composition of Selected Sample 
Group 
ID 
Nationalities heterogeneity
a
 f/g/p
b
 N 
1 3 French, 6 Portuguese, 6 Romanians 1.92 f 15 
2 8 French, 6 Hungarians 0.98 f 14 
3 2 Belgians (Dutch speaking), 7 Dutch, 6 French 0.62 f 15 
4 1 Austrian, 6 French, 7 Germans 0.56 f 14 
9 1 Austrian, 6 Germans, 8 Polish 1.10 g 15 
10 1 Belgian (French speaking), 6 French, 7 Spanish 1.12 f 14 
16 9 Polish, 6 Slovenes 0.48 p 15 
17 1 Austrian, 6 Germans, 8 Spanish 1.10 g 15 
19 5 Danes, 4 Germans, 7 Spanish 1.30 g 16 
20 1 Austrian, 5 Germans, 5 Lithuanians, 5 Spanish 2.11 g 16 
21 1 Austrian, 7 French, 6 Germans, 1 Luxembourger 0.61 f 15 
23 2 Belgians (Dutch speaking), 5 Dutch, 7 Polish 1.20 p 14 
24 1 Austrian, 1 Cypriot, 8 Germans, 3 Greeks 1.11 g 13 
Note: 
a
 Index of national heterogeneity of small groups. See Table D.2 for details on the creation of the 
index. 
b
 Indicates the language of the recordings of the audio discussions from which the discussions have 
been coded (see also Table A.2 and corresponding note). f=French; g=German; p=Polish.  
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Table D.2: Comparison of Selected Sample to the Rest 
 
Selected Sample 
(N=191) 
Rest 
(N=157) 
 
 
Mean 
(Std.) 
N 
Mean 
(Std.) 
N t-test 
Women  
1=female; 0=male 
0.46 
(0.50) 
191 
0.49 
(0.50) 
157 0.55 
Age  
Year of birth 
1959.4 
(16.67) 
191 
1961.9 
(16.63) 
156 1.41 
Education 
Age in year when main education ended 
20.88 
(4.59) 
171 
19.91 
(4.08) 
133 -1.91
+
 
Working-class  
1=yes; 0=no 
0.22 
(0.41) 
187 
0.26 
(0.44) 
155 0.96 
Ideology 
In political matters people talk of "the left" and "the right". What is your position? Please 
indicate your views using any number on a scale where '0' means "left" and '10' means "right."  
4.91 
(2.72) 
184 
5.32 
(2.52) 
146 1.42 
Salience T2 
On a scale from 0 to 10, where '0' is "no problem at all", '10' is "the most serious problem we 
face", and '5' is "exactly in the middle", how serious a problem or not would you say 
immigration is? 
5.72 
(2.40) 
187 
6.61 
(2.47) 
153 3.39*** 
Knowledge T2 
Amount of correct answers to the three knowledge questions on immigration available in the 
questionnaire. The questions asked for the definition of Blue Card workers, the role of the EU in 
the current immigration policy and for a figure of the number of immigrants currently living in 
1.07 
(0.89) 
191 
1.02 
(0.92) 
157 -0.56 
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the EU. For each of the questions, the participants could choose out of four possible options and 
an additional “don’t know” category. 
Read briefing material T2 
How much of the briefing material you were sent would you say you have read? 
(1) have not read or have just glanced at it 
(2) Have read less than half of it 
(3) Have read about half of it 
(4) Have read more than half of it 
(5) Have read all or nearly all of it 
3.92 
(1.21) 
186 
3.71 
(1.31) 
154 -1.53 
Interest in politics T2 
On a scale from 0 to 10, where '0' is "not at all", '10' is "passionately", and '5' is "exactly in the 
middle", how interested or not would you say you generally are in politics? 
6.48 
(2.22) 
188 
6.19 
(2.53) 
155 -1.11 
Attitude scale on immigration T2  
This variable has been built as a scale from five central questions on immigration that proved to 
be substantially related in a test of inter-item correlation (α=0.76). The questions ask for 
participants’ opinions on regularization/sending back irregular immigrants, reinforcing border 
controls, imposing penalties on employers who hire irregular immigrants, whether immigration 
increases criminality, and whether amnesty given to irregular immigrants will increase irregular 
immigration. The (standardized) scale has been generated automatically via the inter-item 
correlation command in Stata. The scale ranges from -1.27 to 2.17 with lower values indicating 
more conservative views on immigration. 
0.06 
(0.05) 
191 
-0.07 
(0.06) 
156 1.66
+
 
Dominant facilitator T3 
My small group moderator sometimes tried to influence the group with her/ his ideas. The scale 
ranges from 0 (“completely disagree”) to 10 (“completely agree”).  
1.06 
(2.38) 
187 
1.05 
(2.15) 
152 -0.05 
National heterogeneity of small group 
This measure is based on the Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Index (ELF) (Fearon and Laitin, 
2003). ELF= 1-Σsi
2
 where si is the share of group i out of a total of n groups (here: nationalities). 
1.10 
(0.48) 
191 
1.25 
(0.37) 
157 3.36*** 
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The ELF scores have been weighed by a factor of 3 for groups that incorporated members from 
all three regions (WE, SE, and CEE), by a factor of 2 for groups that incorporated members 
from two out of the three regions, and by a factor of 1 when only one region was represented in 
the group. The group scores range from 0.48 to 2.11, with higher values indicating more 
heterogeneous groups. The most homogeneous and the most heterogeneous groups are part of 
our sample. 
Opinion on item “regularizing irregular immigrants” T2 
Some people think that [COUNTRY] should send all illegal immigrants back to the countries 
they came from. Suppose these people are at one end of a 0-to-10 scale, at point 0. Other people 
think that [COUNTRY] should legalize all the illegal immigrants currently here. Suppose these 
people are at the other end of the scale, at point 10. People who are exactly in the middle are at 
point 5, and of course other people have opinions at other points between 0 and 10. Where 
would you place your views on this scale, or haven’t you thought much about that? 
5.57 
(2.43) 
185 
5.22 
(2.86) 
152 -1.21 
Opinion on item “regularizing irregular immigrants” T3 
5.72 
(2.48) 
185 
5.47 
(2.76) 
152 -0.88 
Opinion on item “European involvement in immigration affairs” T2 
On a scale from 0 to 10, where '0' means "entirely by the individual Member States ", '10' means 
"entirely at the EU level", and '5' is "exactly in the middle", at what level do you think decisions 
should be made in the area of immigration? 
a
 
4.84 
(3.02) 
184 
5.12 
(3.07) 
153 0.85 
Opinion on item “European involvement in immigration affairs” T3 
5.06 
(2.76) 
184 
4.68 
(2.90) 
153 -1.23 
Note: All variables are retrieved from the Europolis questionnaire dataset. T2 indicate questionnaire responses right at the start of the three-day event in Brussels, T3 
indicate questionnaire responses right at the end of the three-day event. 
a
 For the sake of interpretability, the poles of the original question have been exchanged in this 
paper. This is the reversed version of the question. T-test: 
+
p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. For a comparison between test- and control-group, visit 
http://ccd.stanford.edu. 
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Table E.1: Determinants of Contribution (incl. Cross-Level Interaction)  
 Speaking Time Frequency 
 Model E1 Model E2 Model E3 Model E4 
Intercept 
     5.596*** 
(0.244) 
     5.642*** 
(0.251) 
     1.550*** 
(0.165) 
     1.550*** 
(0.160) 
Women 
  -0.678** 
(0.223) 
  -0.657** 
(0.225) 
-0.120 
(0.116) 
-0.114 
(0.117) 
Education 
0.019 
(0.026) 
0.026 
(0.026) 
0.012 
(0.013) 
0.015 
(0.013) 
Working-class 
-0.327 
(0.279) 
-0.289 
(0.284) 
-0.267
+
 
(0.149) 
-0.247 
(0.151) 
Younger participants 
0.044 
(0.291) 
-0.002 
(0.292) 
-0.134 
(0.151) 
-0.154 
(0.153) 
Older participants 
0.184 
(0.290) 
0.155 
(0.291) 
-0.118 
(0.148) 
-0.142 
(0.150) 
Southern Europeans (SE) 
0.109 
(0.319) 
0.041 
(0.362) 
-0.062 
(0.181) 
-0.090 
(0.226) 
Central Eastern Europeans (CEE) 
-0.724 
(0.450) 
-0.714
+
 
(0.379) 
-0.342
+
 
(0.187) 
-0.276 
(0.190) 
Interest in politics 
     0.190*** 
(0.056) 
    0.177** 
(0.056) 
0.075* 
(0.030) 
 0.070* 
(0.030) 
Knowledge 
0.294* 
(0.126) 
0.315* 
(0.126) 
0.039 
(0.063) 
0.040 
(0.064) 
Salience 
-0.003 
(0.053) 
0.002 
(0.054) 
-0.016 
(0.027) 
-0.015 
(0.027) 
Attitudes (strongly progressive) 
-0.202 
(0.288) 
-0.260 
(0.291) 
0.090 
(0.146) 
0.056 
(0.147) 
Attitudes (strongly conservative) 
-0.434 
(0.280) 
-0.441 
(0.285) 
0.136 
(0.148) 
0.122 
(0.152) 
National heterogeneity of SG 
0.329 
(0.356) 
0.181 
(0.350) 
-0.163 
(0.284) 
-0.138 
(0.289) 
Heterogeneity x women 
-0.759 
(0.466)  
-0.334 
(0.261)  
Heterogeneity x CEE 
 
 -1.372* 
(0.69)  
-0.555 
(0.432) 
Heterogeneity x SE 
 
-0.049 
(0.728)  
-0.062 
(0.467) 
Random Effect: Individual level  
1.931 
(1.390) 
1.960 
(1.400) 
0.241 
(0.491) 
0.251 
(0.501) 
Random Effect: Group level  
0.610 
(0.781) 
0.284 
(0.532) 
0.144 
(0.380) 
0.117 
(0.342) 
AIC 654.9 654.2 364.8 366.8 
Log Likelihood -310.4 -309.1 -165.4 -165.4 
Notes: Multilevel models are estimated with the lme4 package in R (Bates et al., 2011). For contribution in 
speaking time, a linear hierarchical model with varying slopes for CEE participants is estimated. The 
dependent variable is operationalized as log of the total amount of speaking time. For frequency of 
contribution, a lognormal Poisson model is estimated (varying intercept) in order to account for 
overdispersion (Bolker, 2010; Bates et al., 2011). All ordinal and continuous predictor variables are 
centered at the mean. Estimated standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
+
p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, 
***p<.001. Individual N=173. Group N=13. 
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Table E.2: Determinants of Consideration (incl. Cross-Level Interaction)  
 Model E5 Model E6 
Intercept 
      0.940*** 
(0.153) 
      0.937*** 
(0.151) 
Women 
-0.172 
(0.133) 
-0.135 
(0.134) 
Education 
0.011 
(0.014) 
0.016 
(0.015) 
Working-class 
   -0.505** 
(0.179) 
   -0.488** 
(0.181) 
Younger participants 
-0.148 
(0.172) 
-0.144 
(0.175) 
Older participants 
-0.266 
(0.168) 
 -0.304
+
 
(0.172) 
Southern Europeans (SE) 
-0.312 
(0.201) 
 -0.469
+
 
(0.247) 
Central Eastern Europeans (CEE) 
-0.186 
(0.201) 
-0.180 
(0.202) 
Interest in politics 
0.014 
(0.034) 
0.001 
(0.035) 
Knowledge 
0.011 
(0.071) 
0.010 
(0.072) 
Salience 
-0.018 
(0.030) 
-0.014 
(0.031) 
Attitudes (strongly progressive) 
0.195 
(0.162) 
0.148 
(0.164) 
Attitudes (strongly conservative) 
    0.432** 
(0.161) 
    0.434** 
(0.168) 
National heterogeneity of SG 
0.026 
(0.240) 
-0.137 
(0.243) 
Heterogeneity x women 
 -0.685* 
(0.320)  
Heterogeneity x CEE  
-0.518 
(0.432) 
Heterogeneity x SE  
0.422 
(0.517) 
Random effects   
Individual level  
0.141 
(0.376) 
0.164 
(0.405) 
Group level  
0.056 
(0.237) 
0.033 
(0.182) 
AIC 279.8 283.8 
Log Likelihood -122.9 -123.9 
Notes: Multilevel models are estimated with the lme4 package in R (Bates et al., 2011). Lognormal Poisson 
models are estimated (varying intercept) in order to account for overdispersion (Bolker, 2010; Bates et al., 
2011). All ordinal and continuous predictor variables are centered at the mean. Estimated standard errors 
are shown in parentheses. 
+
p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<.001. Individual N=163. Group N=13. 
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Figure E.1: Simulated Effect of Women on Contribution at Different Levels of 
National Heterogeneity 
 
 
Note: Simulations are based on the statistical models presented in Table E.1. The models were simulated in 
R (1000 draws). The first row shows the frequency distribution of the simulations for total amount of 
speaking time (Model E1), and the second row shows the distribution of the simulations for frequency of 
contribution (Model E3). The x-axis indicates the percentage difference in contribution that is attributed to 
the effect of being female, at the corresponding level of national heterogeneity and by holding all other 
factors constant.  
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Figure E.2: Simulated Effect of CEE Participants on Contribution at Different 
Levels of National Heterogeneity 
 
 
Note: Simulations are based on the statistical models presented in Table E.1. The models were simulated in 
R (1000 draws). The first row shows the frequency distribution of the simulations for total amount of 
speaking time (Model E2), and the second row shows the distribution of the simulations for frequency of 
contribution (Model E4). The x-axis indicates the percentage difference in contribution that is attributed to 
the effect of belonging to a CEE member state (compared to belonging to a WE member state), at the 
corresponding levels of national heterogeneity and by holding all other factors constant. Note that the 
minimum, mean and maximum value of national heterogeneity have been recalculated. Calculations solely 
base on the groups in which CEE participants were engaging with participants from WE and/or SE member 
states.  
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Figure E.3: Simulated Effect of Women on Consideration at Different Levels of 
National Heterogeneity 
 
Note: Simulations are based on Model E5 presented in Table E.2. The model was simulated in R (1000 
draws). The x-axis indicates the percentage difference in consideration that is attributed to the effect of 
being female, at the corresponding level of national heterogeneity and by holding all other factors constant.  
 
Figure E.4: Simulated Effect of CEE Participants on Consideration at Different 
Levels of National Heterogeneity 
 
Note: Simulations are based on Model E6 presented in Table E.2. The model was simulated in R (1000 
draws). The x-axis indicates the percentage difference in consideration that is attributed to the effect of 
belonging to a CEE member state (compared to belonging to a WE member state), at the corresponding 
levels of national heterogeneity of the group discussions and by holding all other factors constant. Note that 
the minimum, mean and maximum value of national heterogeneity have been recalculated: new 
calculations solely base on the groups in which CEE participants were engaging with participants from WE 
and/or SE member states.  
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Table E.3: Network Densities of Consideration (Gender) 
Group 
ID 
Within-group  
references 
Between-group  
references 
Percentage point 
difference between 
within-and between-
group  
 Men to Men 
Women to 
Women 
Men to 
Women 
Women to 
Men 
Men Women 
1 0.264 0.000 0.139 0.083 12.5 -8.3 
2 0.286 0.107 0.125 0.143 16.1 -3.6 
3 0.125 0.200 0.200 0.067 -7.5 13.3 
4 0.304 0.100 0.208 0.229 9.6 -12.9 
9 0.429 0.200 0.238 0.429 19.1 -22.9 
10 0.214 0.119 0.204 0.143 1.0 -2.4 
16 0.181 0.583 0.306 0.250 -12.5 33.3 
17 0.179 0.119 0.143 0.143 3.6 -2.4 
19 0.167 0.119 0.159 0.127 0.8 -0.8 
20 0.119 0.067 0.024 0.071 9.5 -0.4 
21 0.300 0.139 0.244 0.200 5.6 -6.1 
23 0.222 0.250 0.111 0.267 11.1 -1.7 
24 0.300 0.200 0.194 0.222 10.6 -2.2 
Note: Entries are to be read as percentages. In group 21, for example, 30% of all possible references 
between men were made. In the same group, men referenced women in 24.4% of possible cases. This 
results in a slight tendency for homophily (5.6 percentage point difference). The last two columns are the 
entries of Figure 3.3.  
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Table E.4: Network Densities of Consideration (Working-class) 
Group 
ID 
Within-group  
references 
Between-group 
references 
Percentage point 
difference between 
within-and between-
group  
 NW to NW W to W NW to W W to NW NW W 
1 0.155 0.000 0.182 0.273 -2.7 -27.3 
2 0.220 0.000 0.028 0.083 19.2 -8.3 
3 0.152 0.000 0.083 0.125 6.9 -12.5 
4  ---  ---  ---  --- --- --- 
9 0.417 0.250 0.250 0.278 16.7 -2.8 
10 0.173 0.000 0.242 0.121 -6.9 -12.1 
16 0.378 0.000 0.100 0.100 27.8 -10 
17 0.189 0.000 0.056 0.111 13.3 -11.1 
19 0.200 0.150 0.109 0.073 9.1 7.7 
20 0.054 0.050 0.075 0.100 -2.1 -5.0 
21 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
23 0.179 0.267 0.188 0.229 -0.9 3.8 
24 0.300 0.000 0.050 0.100 25.0 -10 
Note: See note in Table E.3 for an example. NW=Non working-class participants; W=working-class 
participants. Due to the lack of working-class participants in group 4 (only one W) and group 21 (no W), no 
consideration densities were calculated for the respective small group discussions. The last two columns are 
the entries of Figure 3.3. 
 
Table E.5: Network Densities of Consideration (New CEE Members) 
Group 
ID 
Within-group  
references 
Between-group 
references 
Percentage point 
difference between 
within-and between-
group  
 old to old new to new old to new new to old old new 
1 0.167 0.250 0.136 0.194 3.1 5.6 
2 0.179 0.071 0.179 0.179 0.0 -10.8 
9 0.690 0.167 0.190 0.238 50.0 -7.1 
20 0.089 0.167 0.033 0.033 5.6 13.4 
23 0.429 0.095 0.143 0.184 28.6 -8.9 
Note: See note in Table E.3 for an example. new=participants from a new CEE member state; 
old=participants from an older member state (SE and/or WE). The last two columns are the entries of 
Figure 3.3. 
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Bayesian inference was used to estimate the full model in order to identify irrelevant control 
variables (see section 4.4.4). In addition, Bayesian analysis provides a more intuitive 
understanding of the results in that it models the uncertainty of the estimated parameters given 
a particular sample. Since we deal with a non-randomly selected subsample of the Europolis 
group discussions, Bayesian inference may be appropriate (see, e.g., Hangartner et al., 2007). 
The Bayesian analysis was run in R using JAGS (Plummer, 2011). For both models, a two-
level hierarchical model structure with varying intercepts was chosen. Following common 
practice, we start with non-informative prior distributions (see Gelman and Hill, 2007: 354). 
All independent variables are assumed to have a normal distribution. The precision follows a 
gamma distribution.
51
 
For the item of regularization of irregular immigrants, two chains were run with 60’000 
iterations, whereof the first 20’000 iterations were considered as burn-in. For the item of 
Europeanization of immigration, 80’000 iterations were run (20’000 burn-in). Both visual and 
statistical diagnostics were conducted. The trace plots show that the chains were mixing well 
and the density plots of the parameters approximate a normal distribution. We also ran several 
statistical diagnostics to test for non-convergence: The Gelman and Rubin (1992) and the 
Brooks and Gelman (1998) diagnostics both show values of 1, indicating that non-
convergence was not an issue, neither within nor between chains. In addition, the Geweke 
(1991) diagnostics did not display excessive z-scores 2 or larger, indicating that the mean 
estimates converged from the first 10% to the last 50% of the Markov chains. In addition, the 
Heidelberger and Welch (1981) test indicates that the Markov chains are stationary for all 
parameters.  
The posterior distributions in Table F.1 show that the predictors of age, belonging to a SE or 
CEE member state, interest in politics, and working-class are afflicted with a very high degree 
of uncertainty and may therefore be excluded from further analysis. Table F.2 shows the 
posterior distribution for the predictors of the Europeanization item. Again, interest in 
politics, working-class and country region show high degrees of uncertainty. The same 
accounts for education.  
  
                                                          
51
 Specification in JAGS: β ~ dnorm(0, .0001) and τy ~ dgamma(.001, .001) for the individual level;  γ~ 
dnorm(0, .0001) and τα ~ dgamma(.01, .01) for the group level; μα ~ dnorm(0, .0001) for the random intercept 
mean. 
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Figure F.1: Posterior Distributions – Individual Level Predictors of Opinions on 
„Regularization of Irregular Immigrants“ (T3) 
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Figure F.2: Posterior Distributions – Individual Level Predictors of Opinions on 
„European Involvement in Immigration Affairs“ (T3) 
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Coding Example (European Involvement in Immigration Affairs) 
A: And if we speak of selection: in fact, it always lies in the interest of the state. Each state has its 
specific culture and specific values that need to be defended. And I think that every state should 
possess the autonomy to define criteria for controlling a problematic situation. (…) (own translation 
from French)  
In this speech, speaker A argues against European involvement in immigration affairs. In his view, 
immigration requires accommodation of a host country’s culture and values. Given that each EU-
member state has its own culture, the right to decide on immigration issues should be left to each 
individual state. Due to the clear link between reason and conclusions, this speech received a (2) for 
qualified justification. A bit later, speaker B countered with the following statement: 
B: I heard that the first two speeches that were provided were in favor of leaving the decision on 
immigration to each individual EU-member state. (…) But in fact it is the European Union that 
needs to define the rules. Otherwise, we [the states] will do it because we know that Europe does not 
speak with one voice. There are four or five strong voices and various feeble ones. We have several 
voices and if we do not manage to overcome this state, we won’t get anywhere. Just to offer you my 
opinion. I am not in favor of a federal state of Europe, no. But there are certain policies that need to 
be defined by the European Union, in a global sense. And immigration is one of these policies 
because we have internal and external borders. And we need to defend ourselves at the external 
borders. From the moment a person enters the European Union, she can go anywhere in the EU, to 
different states, or at least to the states that are part of the Schengen area. All EU-member states 
need to define common positions in respect of immigration policy. Since our internal borders are 
open, I do not see our future in acting independently from each other. If a person manages to enter 
the EU, she is already in the EU. (own translation from French) 
Considering immigration as a global phenomenon, speaker B views the Europeanization of 
immigration policy as a logical consequence of open internal borders. Contrary to speaker A, B 
provides a more in-depth and differentiated account of the topic by outlining the differences between 
internal and external European borders. Therefore, the statement received the code (3) for 
sophisticated justification. In this group, not a single statement against European involvement had a 
comparable degree of argumentative sophistication. Consequently, the group receives a (1) for the 
group level variable indicating that the arguments in favor of European involvement were of higher 
justification rationality. 
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